Lackey v. Stinnie

Issues 

Must a party win a case to get attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, or is it enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case?

Oral argument: 
October 8, 2024

This case asks the Supreme Court if a party must win a case to get attorney’s fees or if it is enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case. Lackey argues that the Supreme Court should reject the Circuit consensus and decide that a preliminary injunction winner is not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S. Code § 1988 to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous cases. Additionally, Lackey maintains that when the case has been resolved due to a voluntary change in the law rather than a judicial order, there is no “prevailing party” as defined by § 1988. Stinnie counters that the winner of a preliminary injunction does indeed “win” a case in the way Congress intended when it used the term “prevailing party.” Further, Stinnie contends that the voluntary change in the law was not necessary for them to achieve meaningful relief, so they have already “prevailed” over the other party. The Supreme Court’s decision, in this case, will impact federal, state, local, and municipal governments’ ability to protect the public interest, private attorneys’ ability to vindicate civil rights, and the workload facing lower courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties 

(1) Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (2) whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties’ legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under Section 1988.

Facts 

Under the now-repealed Virginia law § 46.2-395, a Virginia resident faced automatic suspension of their driver’s license if they failed to pay specific court fines or fees. See Stinnie v. Holcomb at 3 (2018). In March of 2019, the Governor of Virginia proposed an amendment, suspending the enforcement of the law. Press Release, Va. Off. of the Governor, Governor Northam Announces Budget Amend. To Eliminate Driver's License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Ct. Fines & Costs (Mar. 26, 2019). The Virginia General Assembly repealed the law in 2020. See § 46.2-395, repealed.

In 2016, Damian Stinnie, Demetrice Moore, Robert Taylor, and Neil Russo owed court debts and had their driver’s licenses suspended due to their inability to pay off those debts. Stinnie at 3. Stinnie, Moore, Taylor, and Russo filed suit individually and on behalf of a class of additional unnamed plaintiffs in similar situations (collectively called “Stinnie”) against the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) Commissioner Richard Holcomb (“Commissioner Holcomb”). Id. at 4. Specifically, Stinnie claimed that the Virginia law violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case without prejudice for the lack of appellate jurisdiction; on remand the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted Stinnie a preliminary injunction in December 2018, preventing Commissioner Holcomb from enforcing the Virginia law against them. See generally Stinnie.

After the preliminary injunction was granted and the law was repealed in 2020, Stinnie claimed that dismissal of the original action was correct, but also claimed they should receive attorney’s fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Stinnie at 979. In 1976, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as it found that many victims of civil rights violations did not have effective access to the judicial process. See Stinnie v. Holcomb at 206. Under this law, courts may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees in certain federal civil rights cases. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The attorney’s fees incentivize lawyers to represent these plaintiffs by providing compensation for their time spent pursuing the case. Id.

The Fourth Circuit initially affirmed the District Court’s ruling but later reversed in a rehearing en banc. See Stinnie. The Fourth Circuit explained that their previous decision in Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero was an outlier among the Circuits, which concluded that a plaintiff whose case is rendered moot after winning a motion for a preliminary injunction may qualify as a “prevailing party.” Id. at 209. Further, the Fourth Circuit held that if two conditions were satisfied, a plaintiff may become a “prevailing party” by obtaining a preliminary injunction that gave them irreversible relief on the merits. Id. at 216. First, the preliminary injunction must materially alter the legal relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and second, the injunction’s relief cannot be undone because the issue became moot before a final decision and the case could be dismissed. See id.

Gerald F. Lackey was appointed the Commissioner of the Virginia DMV beginning on March 22, 2023. See Memo from the Office of the Governor of Virginia, October 1, 2023. Lackey was automatically substituted as the defending party after Holcomb left office. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Substitution of Parties. Lackey petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States to hear this case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 22, 2024.

Analysis 

“PREVAILING PARTY” UNDER SECTION 1988

Lackey argues that a preliminary injunction does not decide a case on its merits because to receive a preliminary injunction, the movant only needs to show that they would likely succeed. Brief for Petitioner, Lackey in his Official Capacity as the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“Lackey”) at 24. Specifically, Lackey contends that a showing of “likely success” is different from actual success, or the conclusive ruling required to be a “prevailing party.” See id. at 15–16. Lackey emphasizes the word “ultimately,” pointing out that when Congress passed § 1988, “prevailing party” referred to the ultimate winner when the case was resolved. See id. at 17. Lackey further points to Supreme Court precedent that defines the conditions under which “prevailing party” status is granted to the party obtaining a decisive ruling on the merits or a final judgment in its favor. See id. at 22. Lackey argues that preliminary injunctions do not provide either, as they are non-binding predictions that act as placeholders until the court can decide the case’s merits. See id. at 23; see also id. at 34. Thus, Lackey asserts that because the preliminary injunction was only an order to prevent enforcement of Section 46.2-395, there was no definitive ruling on the merits of the actual law – and therefore, no prevailing party in the meaning of § 1988. See id. at 32.

Stinnie responds that a preliminary injunction is granted when the movant clearly shows that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case. Brief for Respondents, Stinnie et al. at 33. Thus, Stinnie contends that winners of preliminary injunctions qualify as the “prevailing party.” See id. at 15–17. Stinnie also maintains that Congress intentionally omitted a finality requirement in § 1988, pointing to the House Report and noting that Congress did not mean the use of the word “prevailing” to require a final court order. Id. at 18–19. Stinnie notes that under Supreme Court precedents, consent decrees, and default judgments can grant “prevailing party” status – even if there was no judgment “on the merits” in those cases. Id. at 30. Stinnie further argues that preliminary injunctions are issued after careful analysis and a clear showing that the movant is likely to succeed on the merits. See id. at 33–34. Thus, Stinnie asserts that the preliminary injunction was sufficiently based on the merits of the case, especially since the Supreme Court has previously indicated there may be final determinations when an injunction is based on a purely legal argument – thus qualifying them as a prevailing party. See id. at 36.

MATERIAL CHANGE IN LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES

Lackey contends that under the Supreme Court’s precedents in Buckhannon Board Care Home v. West Va. D.H.H.R and Sole v. Wyner, a “prevailing party” exists when there is a judicial decision with imprimatur, or weight, behind the material change in the parties’ legal relationship. Brief for Petitioner at 33. Lackey argues that under Buckhannon, the plaintiff’s lawsuit must be more than a “catalyst” in changing the defendant’s conduct to consider the plaintiff as the “prevailing party.” Id. at 33–34. Further, Lackey notes that what mooted the case and provided any enduring relief as required under Sole was the Virginia government’s voluntary repeal of the law. See id. at 35. Lackey also argues that the preliminary injunction only prevented the government from enforcing the law while the lawsuit was pending, and thus gave only partial relief, as the injunction did not also, for example, declare that the law itself was unconstitutional. See id. at 40–41. Lackey contends that because the Virginia government mooted the case by repealing the law, the cause of the plaintiff’s relief cannot be attributed to the preliminary injunction court order to the Commissioner. See id. at 43. Thus, Lackey maintains that it was a legislative decision to moot the case and resolve the underlying controversy, which does not have any judicial weight behind it, so the plaintiffs do not qualify as a “prevailing party” benefitting from a judicial decision. See id. at 45.

Stinnie responds that granting preliminary injunctions is a judicial decision that materially changes legal relationships between parties, as they restore a plaintiff’s civil rights. Brief for Respondents at 22–23. Stinnie also points to Buckhannon, arguing that because preliminary injunctions are enforceable by the court, they are a judicial decision with weight. See id. at 26–27. In addition, Stinnie notes that preliminary injunctions are enforceable and appealable by right, as they may last for months or even years, and thus carry the necessary judicial weight to provide “enduring” relief. See id. at 27–28. Moreover, Stinnie notes that although the case became moot after the law was repealed by the Virginia General Assembly, Stinnie had already received all the relief they required from the preliminary injunction. See id. at 17. Stinnie contends that because it was the injunction that gave true relief, not the repeal of the Virginia law, there was “enduring” relief with judicial weight behind it sufficient to make Stinnie a “prevailing party.” Id. at 39. Thus, Stinnie maintains that as the injunction ordered the Commissioner to lift the suspension of the plaintiff’s driver’s licenses, for as long as they needed it while the lawsuit was pending, and the Commissioner never appealed the court order, there was a material change in the parties’ legal relationship as ordered by a judicial decision with weight. See id. at 52–53.

INCENTIVES AND ADMINISTRABILITY

Lackey argues that if preliminary injunctions entitle plaintiffs to an award of attorney’s fees, then governments will be disincentivized from voluntarily changing a challenged policy in the public’s best interest due to fears of having to pay attorney’s fees. Brief for Petitioner at 49. Lackey highlights that legislatures may want to change a challenged policy for many reasons unrelated to the case, such as when the policy has unintended downsides or when expected public benefits from the policy do not materialize. Id. Thus, Lackey argues that a strict rule that preliminary injunctions do not make one a “prevailing party” is clear and will not lead to more litigation. See id. at 49.

Stinnie responds that governments should not be protected from paying attorney’s fees when plaintiffs have received real relief from their civil rights-related concerns. Brief for Respondents at 42–43. Moreover, Stinnie contends that allowing governments to strategically moot a case by overturning the law would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating the rights of everyone else who was harmed by the government and having their day in court. See id. at 43. Thus, Stinnie argues that this incentivizes governments to use a “savvy strategy” of fighting a case only until it appears as though it may lose, after which the government can dodge paying fees. Id. at 44–45. Further, Stinnie contends that the test the Circuits are already using is administrable and without any further major problems, there is no need for a different rule. See id. at 50.

Discussion 

PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Five organizations that represent local governments and the City of Arlington (“local governments”), in support of Lackey, agree that if preliminary injunctions are attorney’s fee-eligible, local governments will be discouraged from taking prompt remedial actions, like repealing or altering a challenged policy, even if those actions would benefit the public. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Local Government Legal Center et al. (“local governments”), in Support of Petitioner at 11. Local governments contend that they should neither feel forced to repeal policy due to the threat of costly attorney’s fees nor should they fear repealing or altering policy in the public’s interest out of concern for exposing themselves to further liability. Id. at 12. Further, local governments highlight cases where attorney’s fees were granted based on preliminary injunctions, creating substantial financial burdens on local governments, and ultimately costing taxpayers because taxpayer dollars covered these fees. See id. at 15.

The Attorneys General of twenty-two states (“the States”), in support of Lackey, argue that awarding attorney’s fees based on preliminary injunctions has already created significant financial burdens on state governments, as states have been forced to pay millions of dollars in fees for cases they never actually lost. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Georgia et al. (“the States), in Support of Petitioner at 14. Further, the States emphasize that if the Court holds that preliminary injunctions are fee-eligible, state governments will continue to face unjust financial burdens in cases based on other statutes that use the “prevailing party” language such as the Fair Housing Act and the Voting Rights Act. See id. at 18.

Alliance Defending Freedom and Americans for Prosperity Foundation (“ADF et al.”), in support of Stinnie, counter by arguing that awarding attorney’s fees for preliminary injunctions is necessary to protect civil rights because the relief sought in civil rights cases cannot be valued in only monetary terms. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Alliance Defending Freedom et al. (“ADF et al.”), in Support of Respondents at 6. ADF et al. explain that civil rights plaintiffs secure critical social benefits that are not reflected by the small monetary damages awards they receive, such as deterring future government misconduct. Id. Private attorneys, ADF et al., argue, are unlikely to take on time-intensive, low-award cases without the possibility of attorney’s fees, so awarding fees from preliminary injunctions is critical for protecting civil rights and holding the government accountable for unconstitutional policies. See id. at 7, 15.

Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression and First Amendment Lawyers Association (“FIRE et al.”), in support of Stinnie, explain how many civil rights cases conclude after a preliminary injunction because injunctive relief is the quickest remedy to recover from constitutional violations. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression et al. (“FIRE et al.”), in Support of Respondents at 5–6, 11. Therefore, FIRE et al. agree that barring attorney’s fees for preliminary injunctions would raise the cost of protecting civil rights and disincentivize attorneys from taking on civil rights cases. See id. at 14–15.

INCENTIVIZING UNNECESSARY LITIGATION

Local governments, in support of Lackey, contend that making preliminary injunctions fee-eligible incentivizes unnecessary litigation. Brief of local governments at 13. LGLC et al. explain that once a plaintiff secures a preliminary injunction, plaintiff’s attorneys would be incentivized to prolong the case and rack up fees, as the threat of high fees would give them leverage in settlement negotiations. Id. Further, LGLC et al. assert that local governments would be incentivized to litigate cases to a final judgment to avoid the automatic award of attorney’s fees, placing unnecessary stress and an increased workload on district court judges. Id. at 14.

Conversely, ADF et al., in support of Stinnie, argue that fee-eligible preliminary injunctions encourage state officials to resolve cases earlier because resolving the case before the injunction is issued reduces their liability for fees. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Alliance Defending Freedom et al. (“ADF et al.”), at 12. Further, ADF et al. argue that even if a plaintiff did rack up fees, Congress only entitles plaintiffs to “reasonable” attorney’s fees, so defendants would not be stuck with unreasonably high fees. See id. at 11. Additionally, nine public interest organizations (“ACLU”), on behalf of Stinnie, claim that holding preliminary injunctions insufficient to justify attorney’s fees would burden federal courts. See Brief of Amici Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union et al. (“ACLU”), in Support of Respondents at 26. ACLU argue that if plaintiffs are not fee-eligible after a preliminary injunction, they would be incentivized to continue litigating by pursuing monetary damage claims in the hopes of recovering attorney’s fees, despite already receiving their desired relief, which would waste judicial resources. See id. at 26.

Conclusion 

Authors


Written by Esther In and Alexandra “Lexie” Kapilian

Edited by Sarah Stevenson-Peck

Acknowledgments 

Additional Resources