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preliminary injunction

Doe # 1 v. Reed

Issues

Whether Washington’s Public Records Act (“PRA”), which makes signatures on referendum petitions part of public records, violates the First Amendment.

 

The dispute in this case centers on Washington's Public Records Act ("PRA"), which requires state and local governments to make public the identities of referendum petition signers. Petition signers challenged the constitutionality of this disclosure, but the Ninth Circuit held that disclosure of petition signers’ identities serves an important government interest and promotes government accountability. Specifically, petitioners, John Doe #1, et al. ("Doe #1"), argue that petition signing is core political speech and, therefore, is subject to First Amendment protections. Respondents, Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, et al. ("Reed"), contend that petition signing, especially the signing of referendum petitions, is not political speech. Rather, Reed asserts that signing a referendum is a legislative act and a "quintessentially public" exercise. Thus, in Doe #1 v. Reed the Supreme Court must decide 1) whether petition signers’ First Amendment rights to privacy in political speech, association, and belief requires strict scrutiny when a state compels public release of identifying information and 2) whether compelled disclosure of petition signers’ identities is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The district court granted a preliminary injunction protecting against public disclosure, as opposed to private disclosure to the government only, of those signing a petition to put a referendum on the ballot ("petition signers"). The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court based its decision on an incorrect conclusion of law when it determined that public disclosure of petition signers is subject to, and failed, strict scrutiny. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the First Amendment right to privacy in political speech, association, and belief requires strict scrutiny when a state compels public release of identifying information about petition signers.

2. Whether compelled public disclosure of identifying information about petition signers is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, and whether Petitioners met all the elements required for a preliminary injunction.

On May 18, 2009, the Governor of Washington signed SB 5688See Doe #1 v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 674-75 (9th Cir.

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Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

Issues

What level of judicial review is required for a court to evaluate a law that intends to protect minors from pornographic content but, as a result, burdens adults’ access to such content?

H.B. 1181 is a Texas law seeking to regulate commercial entities that publish sexual material. When more than one-third of the entities’ published material is sexually explicit, H.B. 1181 requires those entities to implement age verification systems. Free Speech Coalition argues that H.B. 1181’s age verification provision burdens adult access to constitutionally protected speech and thus the Supreme Court should apply strict scrutiny when reviewing it. Free Speech Coalition further argues that it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of H.B. 1181’s age verification provision. Paxton, on the other hand, argues that rational basis review should apply to the age verification provision because it is not content-based or speaker-based discrimination. Paxton further counters that Coalition has not proved it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of the age verification provision. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will influence how future statutes impacting protected speech may be reviewed by courts, how state governments can regulate pornography distributors to protect minors, and how the data privacy and cybersecurity of adults who use pornography websites will be weighed by the courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review, instead of strict scrutiny, to a law burdening adults’ access to protected speech.

H.B. 1181 is a Texas law intended to apply to commercial entities that publish sexual material. Free Speech Coal. v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his insights into this case.

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Lackey v. Stinnie

Issues

Must a party win a case to get attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, or is it enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case?

This case asks the Supreme Court if a party must win a case to get attorney’s fees or if it is enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case. Lackey argues that the Supreme Court should reject the Circuit consensus and decide that a preliminary injunction winner is not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S. Code § 1988 to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous cases. Additionally, Lackey maintains that when the case has been resolved due to a voluntary change in the law rather than a judicial order, there is no “prevailing party” as defined by § 1988. Stinnie counters that the winner of a preliminary injunction does indeed “win” a case in the way Congress intended when it used the term “prevailing party.” Further, Stinnie contends that the voluntary change in the law was not necessary for them to achieve meaningful relief, so they have already “prevailed” over the other party. The Supreme Court’s decision, in this case, will impact federal, state, local, and municipal governments’ ability to protect the public interest, private attorneys’ ability to vindicate civil rights, and the workload facing lower courts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (2) whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties’ legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under Section 1988.

Under the now-repealed Virginia law § 46.2-395, a Virginia resident faced automatic suspension of their driver’s license if they failed to pay specific court fines or fees. See Stinnie v. Holcomb at 3 (2018). In March of 2019, the Governor of Virginia proposed an amendment, suspending the enforcement of the law.

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Luis v. United States

Issues

May the US Government obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 to prohibit a defendant from spending assets unrelated to the crime charged without violating a defendant’s right to hire an attorney of choice?

 

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether the United States Government can constitutionally obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (“§ 1345”) to prohibit a defendant facing federal fraud charges from spending assets not derived directly from the charged crime. See Brief for Petitioner, Sila Luis at i. Luis argues that such a preliminary injunction violates a defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and that the language of § 1345 does not allow the Government to restrain spending of untainted assets. See id. at 17–18, 34–35. Luis also asserts that even if a preliminary injunction of untainted assets is constitutional, the district court violated Fifth Amendment Due Process by failing to determine whether the Government was entitled, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the untainted assets. See id. at 44. On the other hand, the United States argues that the Supreme Court has previously held the Government’s restraint of all assets in a defendant’s possession to be constitutional, so long as the Government can show probable cause that the assets are forfeitable even if the defendant needs those assets to pay for counsel. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 25–26. The Court’s decision could significantly impact criminal defendants’ ability to hire private counsel in cases of federal fraud and will also shape U.S. asset forfeiture law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, in Support of Petitioner at 7; see also Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., in Support of Petitioner at 5–6.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did a pretrial injunction prohibiting a defendant from spending untainted assets to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Petitioner Sila Luis provided health care to homebound patients through her two businesses, LTC Professional Consultants, Inc.

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Luis v. United States

Issues

May the US Government obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 to prohibit a defendant from spending assets unrelated to the crime charged without violating a defendant’s right to hire an attorney of choice?

 

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether the United States Government can constitutionally obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (“§ 1345”) to prohibit a defendant facing federal fraud charges from spending assets not derived directly from the charged crime. See Brief for Petitioner, Sila Luis at i. Luis argues that such a preliminary injunction violates a defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and that the language of § 1345 does not allow the Government to restrain spending of untainted assets. See id. at 17–18, 34–35. Luis also asserts that even if a preliminary injunction of untainted assets is constitutional, the district court violated Fifth Amendment Due Process by failing to determine whether the Government was entitled, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the untainted assets. See id. at 44. On the other hand, the United States argues that the Supreme Court has previously held the Government’s restraint of all assets in a defendant’s possession to be constitutional, so long as the Government can show probable cause that the assets are forfeitable even if the defendant needs those assets to pay for counsel. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 25–26. The Court’s decision could significantly impact criminal defendants’ ability to hire private counsel in cases of federal fraud and will also shape U.S. asset forfeiture law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, in Support of Petitioner at 7; see also Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., in Support of Petitioner at 5–6.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did a pretrial injunction prohibiting a defendant from spending untainted assets to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Petitioner Sila Luis provided health care to homebound patients through her two businesses, LTC Professional Consultants, Inc.

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Pleasant Grove City v. Summum

Issues

1. Whether a permanent monument donated by a private organization to Pleasant Grove retains its character as private speech, or whether it becomes government speech because the city owns, controls, and decides to display it?

2. Did the Tenth Circuit err in finding that the monument’s physical presence in a park is dispositive in ruling that the relevant forum is a public forum, or should the court have ruled that access to the forum based on the city’s selection process renders it a nonpublic forum?

3. Would requiring the city to immediately erect and display Summum’s monument ultimately require the city to decide either to display monuments at the request of any private party or not to display any monuments at all?

 

Summum, a religious organization, seeks to place a monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of Summum among other historical and cultural artifacts and monuments displayed in Pioneer Park. It brought a civil suit in the Federal District Court of Utah, alleging that the city of Pleasant Grove had abridged its First Amendment freedom of speech rights in denying the request to display the Seven Aphorisms monument, while approving other similar expressive monuments. The District Court denied Summum’s preliminary injunction motion, but the Tenth Circuit reversed the ruling and granted the injunction, finding that any privately-donated monument retained its character as private speech. The court held that since a park is a traditional public forum, the city cannot engage in content-based restrictions of private speech without a compelling state interest and a narrowly-tailored policy to that end. The city contends that there is no First Amendment violation because the display constitutes government speech—the city owns, controls, and ultimately decides to display the monument. It fears that the Tenth Circuit ruling would chill free speech for both private parties and the government, for the ruling would require the city to display any monument at the request of a private party or, alternatively, ban all displays in public parks. But Summum argues that categorizing such displays as government speech, where the decision to display a monument is subject to the city’s selection process, would allow the city to engage in viewpoint discrimination.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Did the Tenth Circuit err by holding, in conflict with the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, that a monument donated to a municipality and thereafter owned, controlled, and displayed by the municipality is not government speech but rather remains the private speech of the monument’s donor?

2. Did the Tenth Circuit err by ruling, in conflict with the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, that a municipal park is a public forum under the First Amendment for the erection and permanent display of monuments proposed by private parties?

3. Did the Tenth Circuit err by ruling that the city must immediately erect and display Summum’s “Seven Aphorisms” monument in the city’s park?

Pioneer Park, located in Pleasant Grove, Utah, contains a number of historical artifacts, buildings, and permanent displays, such as the city’s first city hall, its first fire department, a Ten Commandments monument, and a September 11 monument. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir.

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Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney

Issues

Should courts grant preliminary injunctions against companies for labor disputes based on the traditional four-factor test or on a different standard of whether the injunction is “just and proper” when there is reasonable cause to believe the unfair labor practices occurred?

This case presents to the Supreme Court the issue of whether district courts should defer to the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) preliminary investigations and legal judgments when deciding on preliminary injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) during unfair labor practice investigations. The Petitioner, Starbucks Corp., argues that the Sixth Circuit improperly weighted the scales in favor of the NLRB by deferring too much to the Board's initial assessment of the case and its labor-law expertise, thus undermining judicial independence and overstepping established boundaries of agency deference. The Respondent, the NLRB, maintains that such deference is warranted given its role, expertise in labor relations, and the comprehensive investigatory and adjudicative processes it undertakes before seeking injunctive relief under Section 10(j). The Court's determination will crucially affect the balance of power between administrative agencies and the judiciary and will have significant implications for labor practices and the enforcement of labor rights in the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether courts must evaluate the National Labor Relations Board’s requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act using the traditional, stringent, four-factor test for preliminary injunctions or some other more lenient standard.

In January 2022, a shift supervisor, Nikki Taylor, at the Memphis Starbucks location decided she was interested in unionizing the Memphis store. McKinney v.

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