PREVAILING PARTY

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance

Issues

Whether ERISA § 502(g)(1) requires a party to be a prevailing party before a court can award attorney fees, and if so, whether Hardt satisfies that standard.

 

Petitioner, Bridget Hardt (“Hardt”), a former employee of Dan River Inc., brought suit against Respondent, Reliance Insurance Co. (“Reliance”), the insurance provider for Dan River Inc., in an attempt to recover attorney’s fees for a previous suit Hardt had brought in the Eastern District of Virginia to recover benefits pursuant to Dan River Inc.’s Group Long-Term Disability Insurance Program Plan (“the Plan”). The Eastern District remanded the case to Reliance, which, under ERISA, not only administers the Plan, but also decides whether an applicant is entitled to benefits. On remand, Reliance provided Hardt with the requested benefits. Hardt now sues seeking attorney’s fees under ERISA § 502(g)(1). Reliance counters that Hardt did succeed on the merits in the lower court and, therefore, cannot satisfy ERISA’s definition of “prevailing party.” Hardt, on the other hand, argues that the text of the statute does not include a prevailing party standard as a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether ERISA § 502(g)(1) requires a party to succeed on the merits before attorney’s fees may be awarded and, if so, whether Hardt satisfies that requirement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that ERISA § 502(g)(1) provides a district court discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees only to a prevailing party? 

2. Whether a party is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to § 502(g)(1) when she persuades a district court that a violation of ERISA has occurred, successfully secures a judicially-ordered remand requiring a redetermination of entitlement to benefits and subsequently receives the benefits sought on remand?

Bridget Hardt, worked as an executive assistant to the president of a textile manufacturer, Dan River Inc.; in 2000, she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”) and had surgery on both wrists to relieve the pain. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 Fed. Appx.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about ERISA

·      Department of Labor: Health Plans & ERISA

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Lackey v. Stinnie

Issues

Must a party win a case to get attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, or is it enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case?

This case asks the Supreme Court if a party must win a case to get attorney’s fees or if it is enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case. Lackey argues that the Supreme Court should reject the Circuit consensus and decide that a preliminary injunction winner is not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S. Code § 1988 to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous cases. Additionally, Lackey maintains that when the case has been resolved due to a voluntary change in the law rather than a judicial order, there is no “prevailing party” as defined by § 1988. Stinnie counters that the winner of a preliminary injunction does indeed “win” a case in the way Congress intended when it used the term “prevailing party.” Further, Stinnie contends that the voluntary change in the law was not necessary for them to achieve meaningful relief, so they have already “prevailed” over the other party. The Supreme Court’s decision, in this case, will impact federal, state, local, and municipal governments’ ability to protect the public interest, private attorneys’ ability to vindicate civil rights, and the workload facing lower courts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (2) whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties’ legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under Section 1988.

Under the now-repealed Virginia law § 46.2-395, a Virginia resident faced automatic suspension of their driver’s license if they failed to pay specific court fines or fees. See Stinnie v. Holcomb at 3 (2018). In March of 2019, the Governor of Virginia proposed an amendment, suspending the enforcement of the law.

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