Gutierrez v. Saenz

Issues

For Article III standing purposes, does Ruben Gutierrez have a redressable injury if it is not clear that a declaratory judgment in his favor would allow him to access the DNA evidence he seeks?

Oral argument:
February 24, 2025
Court below:
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

This case asks the Court to determine if Ruben Gutierrez has Article III standing to seek a declaratory judgment in federal court stating that Texas’ denial of access to DNA evidence violates his constitutional rights. Gutierrez contends that he has standing to seek this declaratory judgment because it would significantly increase the likelihood that the prosecutor would subsequently grant him access to the DNA evidence he seeks. Saenz contends that Gutierrez lacks standing because a declaratory judgment would not affect the state’s refusal to grant Gutierrez access to the DNA evidence. This case touches upon the role of the states and the federal government in protecting fundamental rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Article III standing requires a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment.

Facts

Ruben Gutierrez was convicted of capital murder in 1999 for the murder of Escolastica Harrison and was sentenced to death in Texas state court. Harrison lived in a mobile-home park in Brownsville, Texas with her nephew, who was a friend of Gutierrez. Harrison had approximately $600,000 in cash in her mobile home, which Gutierrez and two accomplices allegedly planned to steal. Gutierrez made three contradictory statements to the police: he first claimed that he was not involved in the murder and used an alibi defense that ultimately failed. Gutierrez then told police that he was waiting in a park while two accomplices stole from Harrison. Finally, Gutierrez told police that he lied about the park and that he actually entered Harrison’s mobile home with an accomplice, who murdered Harrison with a screwdriver while Gutierrez took the money.

Gutierrez was tried for capital murder , and a jury was instructed that it could convict Gutierrez if he “acted alone or . . . with an accomplice to cause Harrison’s death intentionally.” The jury convicted Gutierrez, and he was sentenced to death. This conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 2002.

Gutierrez has since sought to mitigate his death sentence through proceedings in state and federal courts. He filed a habeas petition in state court in 2008, followed by a habeas petition in federal court in 2009. Gutierrez sought DNA testing of various pieces of evidence, including a blood sample and nail scrapings from the victim, in addition to loose hair from the victim’s finger. Gutierrez believes this evidence would demonstrate that he did not enter Harrison’s home on the night of the murder, thus showing that the jurors would not have convicted him of capital murder.

Gutierrez’s efforts to compel the production of the evidence were unsuccessful in state court. In September 2019, Gutierrez brought the current suit in federal court, challenging (1) Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures and (2) Texas’s refusal to allow a spiritual advisor inside the execution room. The Supreme Court stayed Gutierrez’s execution to consider the merits of his spiritual advisor claim. That claim became moot when Texas approved Gutierrez’s request to have a spiritual advisor with him in the execution chamber, but Gutierrez continues to seek DNA evidence.

Gutierrez is seeking a declaratory judgment that Texas’s procedures for DNA testing are constitutionally flawed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted Gutierrez the declaratory judgment he sought, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. The Fifth Circuit found that Gutierrez lacked Article III standing to bring his claim in federal court because there was no substantial likelihood that a favorable ruling would result in the production of the requested DNA evidence. In particular, the Fifth Circuit pointed to the finding by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that Gutierrez would not be entitled to DNA evidence even if the statutory bar was found to be unconstitutional . Given this, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a prosecutor would likely follow the guidance of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and deny production of the DNA evidence, even if a federal court issued a declaratory judgment stating otherwise. The Fifth Circuit thus found a lack of standing because a favorable ruling for Gutierrez likely would not redress his injury through the production of DNA evidence.

Gutierrez petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and an application to stay his execution on June 25, 2024. The execution stay was granted on July 16, 2024, and the writ of certiorari was granted on October 4, 2024.

Analysis

THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY OF REDRESSABILITY NEEDED FOR DEATH ROW PRISONERS TO ESTABLISH ARTICLE III STANDING

Gutierrez argues that he has Article III standing to bring this case in federal court because a declaratory judgment would significantly increase the likelihood that he would obtain the relief he seeks, namely access to DNA testing. Gutierrez compares this case to Reed v. Goertz , which the Supreme Court decided in 2023. Gutierrez argues that the Reed court found standing when the state prosecutor denied access to requested DNA evidence. Notably, standing was based on a finding that a declaratory judgment that the relevant post-conviction DNA testing procedures violated due process would significantly increase the likelihood that a state prosecutor would grant access to the requested evidence. Gutierrez argues that when a party seeks declaratory relief, all that is necessary to establish redressability is a significant increase in the likelihood of compliance; absolute certainty that relief is available or would be granted is not necessary. Gutierrez also argues that his injury comes in the form of a violation of his right to be heard. Gutierrez argues that this injury does not depend on the “underlying merits” of his death-eligibility claim but would be cured by the ability to access evidence that would allow him to make a future claim against his sentence.

Gutierrez also contends that he has suffered a “procedural injury” that will be remedied if required procedures regarding DNA testing are followed. In particular, Gutierrez points to past cases demonstrating that a plaintiff alleging a procedural injury can establish standing without the normal requirements of redressability and immediacy that Article III standing typically demands. Gutierrez points to two allegedly contradictory Texas statutes as evidence of his procedural injury. In particular, Gutierrez argues that, though one Texas statute provides prisoners with a “procedural right” to protect their interest in seeking relief from a death sentence, another statute “barricades” his right to seek necessary evidence to obtain that relief. Gutierrez argues that an opportunity to obtain access to and review the DNA evidence requested would remedy his procedural injury, even if it ultimately fails to render him ineligible for the death penalty.

Saenz argues that Gutierrez lacks Article III standing to bring his case in federal court because he cannot meet the redressability requirement for standing. Saenz notes that redressability requires that a favorable court ruling actually afford relief. Saenz asserts that a federal court’s persuasive opinion is not enough to establish redressability if the relief that a plaintiff seeks does not necessarily follow from it. In this case, Saenz argues that redressability is absent because it is highly unlikely that the relief Gutierrez seeks—a declaratory judgment holding the relevant DNA testing statute unconstitutional—would not redress his injury because it would not compel Saenz to provide access to the DNA evidence Gutierrez is trying to obtain. Saenz argues that multiple adequate and independent state grounds support his decision to deny Gutierrez access to the DNA evidence, and a declaratory judgment would not change his decision to continue withholding the evidence because he would have other legally sound grounds to base his objection on. Saenz points to the CCA’s 2011 decision denying DNA testing on the basis of Gutierrez failing to prove that “identity was or is an issue” in the case and the denial of Gutierrez’s 2017 DNA testing motion, which the court found was pled to “unreasonably” delay the execution of his sentence, as separate and independent state law grounds for denying DNA testing that would not be affected by a declaratory judgment.

Saenz also argues that he would likely follow the guidance of the CCA, as opposed to that of a federal court, in denying Gutierrez access to DNA evidence. Saenz also argues that the theoretical possibility that he could agree to DNA testing or ignore the guidance of the CCA is not enough to establish redressability. Saenz also opposes Gutierrez’s contention that a new theory of injury, namely that the denial of access to DNA evidence is a “procedural injury,” does not establish redressability because the only relevant question is if a declaratory judgment will significantly increase the likelihood that the relief sought would be granted.

WHETHER THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS PAST RULINGS PRECLUDE PETITIONER’S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE DNA EVIDENCE HE SEEKS

Gutierrez argues that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ (“CCA”) prior decisions do not create the barriers to the requested DNA testing that Texas argues they create. Gutierrez argues that Saenz has not opposed prior requests for DNA evidence, such as one offered in 2015, because the request alleged the existence of evidence that would make Gutierrez ineligible for the death penalty. Gutierrez points to a prior 2019 ruling from the CCA granting his motion for DNA testing as evidence that the CCA has not authoritatively ruled that the DNA evidence Gutierrez is seeking is unavailable to him. Gutierrez also points to newly raised evidence that the CCA did not previously consider as evidence that the CCA may rule him death ineligible in a future proceeding. Specifically, Gutierrez argues that newly revealed evidence that a detective lied about Harrison’s time of death and lied about a primary witness passing a lie detector test could demonstrate death ineligibility. Gutierrez argues that this previously unconsidered evidence could cast doubt on the finding that Gutierrez was present during the murder or organized the plot. In particular, Gutierrez argues that the DNA evidence could cast doubt on whether Gutierrez was present for the murder or if he was a “major” participant in the plot. Gutierrez argues that the CCA did not consider this evidence, despite its availability at the time, when determining that he could not establish death ineligibility. Gutierrez argues that treating the CCA’s determinization of his death eligibility as preclusive is inappropriate given this new evidence because an appellate determination of death eligibility is not fixed and can incorporate evidence from outside the record.

On the other hand, Saenz argues that the CCA’s prior decisions on Gutierrez’s death eligibility and access to DNA testing preclude Saenz from granting Gutierrez access to the DNA evidence he seeks. Saenz highlights the importance of this determination by asserting that a state prosecutor is likely to follow the guidance of his state’s highest court, even in the face of a contradictory declaratory judgment from a federal court. Saenz argues that the CCA’s prior decision to deny Gutierrez access to DNA evidence was correct because the CCA correctly only considered evidence in the record that was available at the time of trial. Saenz points to the CCA’s similar practice in Reed v. State as compelling evidence that the CCA’s practice of not considering subsequent evidence meets constitutional standards.

Additionally, Saenz argues that the evidence that Gutierrez seeks to have considered constitutes little more than variations on arguments that have failed for years. In particular, Saenz argues that the evidence attacking the credibility of a detective who testified at Gutierrez’s trial is flawed because it contradicts Gutierrez’s own confession to planning the robbery and putting himself at the scene of the murder. Saenz also argues that it contradicts incriminating statements provided by two of Gutierrez’s co-conspirators. Saenz also argues that Gutierrez’s other purported evidence contradicts his theory that the state’s primary witness was the real killer. Finally, Saenz argues that Gutierrez has had numerous opportunities to present this evidence in the past, including when he filed two subsequent state habeas actions. Saenz argues that the evidence presented in those cases was found by the courts to be insufficient to overcome Texas’s bar on subsequent habeas writ applications.

Discussion

STATE AND FEDERAL ROLE IN PROTECTING RIGHTS

The Constitutional Accountability Center (“CAC”), in support of Gutierrez, first argues that it is the historical role of the federal courts to protect individual constitutional rights. CAC notes that Congress specifically enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to address instances where state and other officials were not able to protect constitutional rights, either due to corruption or bias. CAC explains that if the Court were to find that the state’s refusal to grant a rehearing on the DNA was the basis for a refusal to grant standing, the Court would be essentially treating a case based on § 1983 not as a federal issue, but rather a state issue, which is inconsistent with the purpose of §1983. In other words, CAC argues that not allowing standing in this case would allow state power to control federal jurisdiction, a misplacement of authority that Congress explicitly granted to the federal, not state, government.

In response, the State of Arkansas and 13 other States (the “States”), in support of Saenz, first argue that generally speaking, the states have the authority over state judicial matters, which the federal courts should not overcome unless that state’s procedures are entirely insufficient to protect individual rights. Here, the States argue that federal intervention into an otherwise state matter would not change the outcome of the case and, therefore, waste state resources with unnecessary litigation. The States explain that, as Saenz has already made clear, Saenz would be unlikely to change the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ final decision on allowing the DNA testing to occur even if the Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner, rendering the argument moot and thus a waste of resources.

BALANCING FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND RES JUDICATA

In support of Gutierrez, the CAC first argues that it is irrelevant whether Gutierrez will be able to win the appeal of the DNA testing on the merits because procedural due process protections are essential elements of fundamental fairness regardless of the potential of exoneration. To that end, the CAC asserts that the lower court wrongly gave up constitutionally required due process when they rested the potential of the DNA law challenge on whether Guitierrez would win the case on the merits. Further, CAC argues that simply allowing the federal courts to look into the minds of the state actors, in this case, the state attorneys, to determine standing in § 1983 lawsuits would critically weaken the constitutional rights of plaintiffs, as state actors are often the defendants in these types of cases.

In response, the States first argue that finality in judgments is paramount, and as such, any post-judgment intervention by the federal courts should not occur unless it is necessary to protect substantive, not procedural, due process rights. The States argue that there should be a great deal of respect for the independence of the states and state courts. Further, the states argue that there are no issues of fairness in this case, compared to the Reed case that the Petitioner cites because, unlike in Reed , the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has already deemed that DNA testing will not occur regardless of the outcome of this case, rendering any intervention by the federal government here an unnecessary usurpation of state sovereignty. In other words, the States argue that the federal courts should not interfere with the state courts when there is no actual doubt as to the finality of the judgment.

Conclusion

Andrew Hallowell and Kehan Rattani

Rodrigo F. Tojo Garcia

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