Louisiana v. Callais

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Louisiana v. Callais

    Issues

    Did the Louisiana State Legislature act unconstitutionally when it created SB8 to remedy a Section 2 violation?

    Oral argument:
    October 15, 2025
    Court below:
    United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

     

    This case asks whether the Louisiana State Legislature’s creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Appellant Press Robinson argues that not only does SB8 comply with both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but that it is a valid and necessary remedy to a particularly dangerous form of racial discrimination. Callais counters that SB8 is a presumptively invalid form of racially based governmental action and is neither narrowly tailored nor furthers a compelling governmental interest. This case raises significant issues about racial discrimination in redistricting, the responsibilities of elected officials to their constituents, and the relationship between the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

    Facts

    The Supreme Court first heard this case on March 24, 2025, but later ordered supplemental briefing and reargument. On June 27, 2025, the Court directed the parties to focus on whether Louisiana’s second majority-minority district violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. The Court scheduled the reargument for October 15, 2025.The State of Louisiana is formally an appellant, but it argues against the constitutionality of its own race-conscious remedial districts.  The facts of the case remain unchanged and are set out in LII’s Preview of the March argument here: Louisiana v. Callais March 2025 Preview. 

    Analysis

    RACE CONSCIOUS REMEDIES TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE FOURTHEENTH AMENDMENT 

    Robinson contends that the Louisiana SB8 map comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.   Robinson argues that Congress’ constitutional authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the power to remedy racially discriminatory practices. Robinson suggests this power is at its apex when remedying racial discrimination in voting, because of how “unremitting” unconstitutional attacks on Black voters’ rights have been. Robinson emphasizes that since the passage of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), both federal statutes and Supreme Court precedent recognize the appropriateness of invoking the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power to remedy discrimination in voting—even when the remedy implemented is itself race-conscious. Robinson says this means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power gives Congress authority to pass Section 2 of the VRA, and thereby bar voting maps that dilute the votes of Black voters.

    Callais and the State of Louisiana contend that the Fourteenth Amendment bars any consideration of race in redistricting, including Louisiana’s remedial redistricting plan.  Louisiana compares the remedies here to those in Students for Fair Admissions (“SFFA”) v. Harvard (which invalidated affirmative action in higher education), to argue that any governmental decision-making that takes race into account violates the equal protection principles in the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Louisiana, any racial classifications should be presumptively invalid, as treating individuals as a product of their race necessarily harms both the individual and society. Callais proposes that it is particularly pernicious for the government to take race into account when it regulates voting due to effects such as the creation of competing racial factions. Louisiana shares this concern, objecting that including that race-conscious redistricting harms voters by endorsing the constitutionally impermissible stereotype that individuals vote based upon their race.

    APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO SB8 

    Robinson argues that even if the Court finds race is the predominating factor for the districting, which would subject it to strict scrutiny, SB8 is still constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest. Robinson contends that ensuring compliance with Section 2 of the VRA is a compelling interest, as it is a statute promulgated to ensure compliance with constitutional equal protection requirements. Robinson also asserts that finding a Section 2 violation requires a finding of actual, past, and present race discrimination. Robinson highlights that the factors from Thornburg v. Gingles limit remedial redistricting under Section 2 only to circumstances where actual race discrimination existed, since it requires a showing of intentionally inconsistent treatment—that the State did not employ the same district-drawing standards in minority neighborhoods as elsewhere in the state. Robinson concludes that Section 2 is only violated where race is currently being considered in the political process, leading to identifiable, specific discrimination, and that remedying identifiable, specific discrimination is a compelling interest.

    Robinson argues that SB8 is narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interest because SB8 is geographically compact and reasonably configured. Robinson emphasizes that Section 2 authorizes remedies only to the extent required to address ongoing discrimination, ensuring any valid remedy is narrowly tailored. Robinson elaborates that the racialpredominance standard for finding a violation further ensures narrow tailoring, by preventing unnecessary racial consideration. Robinson also distinguishes Section 2 remedies from affirmative action programs struck down in SFFA, arguing that since Section 2 remedies are tied to present discrimination, they do have an endpoint. Alternatively, even if SB8 is not narrowly tailored, Robinson contends that the proper remedy is a new map, not the invalidation of Section 2 remedies entirely, since Robinson proposed more compact and reasonably configured maps that the legislature rejected.

    Callais argues that SB8 is unconstitutional because the use of race in redistricting was not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. Callais contends that Section 2 compliance cannot qualify as a compelling interest, since proving a Section 2 violation does not require evidence of intentional, specific discrimination. Callais points out that the Gingles factors only ask whether a minority population is sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a district, not whether there is present racial discrimination in districting. Landry similarly argues no current compelling interest exists, as the lower court relied heavily on decades-old history rather than contemporary evidence, showing Louisiana lacks a present-day basis for race-based redistricting. 

    Landry argues that SB8 is not narrowly tailored, emphasizing that the Supreme Court has never approved misshapen, stretched districts connecting distant Black populations like those SB8 draws. Landry compares SB8 to the unconstitutional North Carolina map in Shaw v. Hunt (“Shaw II”), arguing that SB8 is similar, if not worse, because both the Shaw II district and SB8 follow a highway to collect Black neighborhoods, but SB8 winds hundreds of miles longer across the state than that of Shaw II. Landry further asserts that a remedial map must be tailored to the area of the Section 2 violation, but SB8 is not. Landry points out that SB8 departs from earlier violative maps and alters areas outside those violations. Callais also contends that Section 2 has no logical end, and points to affirmative action cases which have found that even a compelling interest cannot justify a race-based remedy that extends indefinitely. Landry argues that ordering a new remedial map is not the correct remedy because Louisiana’s geography and demographics make any second majority-minority district unconstitutional.

    SB8’S CONSISTENCY WITH THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT

    Robinson argues that the Fifteenth Amendment provides an additional basis for the validity of Section 2 of the VRA. Robinson emphasizes that the amendment specifically allows Congress to enforce the right against racial discrimination in voting. Robinson reviews a line of precedent holding that the Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement power is sufficient grounds to authorize the use of remedial legislation against policies or practices with racially discriminatory effects; according to these precedents, intentional discrimination is not required to invoke remedial redistricting under Section 2.    

    Callais argues that the Fifteenth Amendment gives no additional authorization for remedial redistricting. Primarily, Callais contends that the Fifteenth Amendment bars any governmental consideration of race. Alternatively, Callais urges that even if the Fifteenth Amendment sometimes allows government to take race into account when remedying discrimination, race-conscious remedies are only allowed when “congruent and proportional” to the wrong to be righted. According to Callais, the burdens imposed by remedial redistricting outweigh any discrimination the redistricting remedies, and so Louisiana’s redistricting plan fails the congruence and proportionality requirement.    

    Discussion

    The stakes of the reargument remain unchanged from the original argument in March. At play is the balance between protecting political voice for minority communities and the risk that race-conscious districting deepens social division by reinforcing racial categories in politics. A full discussion on the policy implications of the case can be found here: Louisiana v. Callais Discussion.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:    Danny Lempert and Sarah Chang

    Edited by:      Sierra Berry

    Additional Resources