voting rights act

Abbot v. Perez

Issues

By adopting court-created remedial interim redistricting plans, did the Texas legislature engage in intentional racial discrimination, vote dilution, and racial gerrymandering in violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, and does the Court have jurisdiction to hear the case?

 

After a federal court struck down the Texas State Legislature’s redistricting plans as racially discriminatory and issued substantially similar interim plans for the 2012 election, the Legislature adopted those interim plans as law. However, Texas Voters (both individual voters and organizations) claim that these plans are still infected by discriminatory intent and effect. Texas argues that its Legislature did not engage in racial discrimination, vote dilution, or racial gerrymandering. Further, Texas insists that when its new Legislature repealed the old plans and adopted court-created new plans, any purported discriminatory intent was eliminated. Voters counter that the Supreme Court should adhere to the lower court’s finding of discrimination, which was not cleansed by a legislative workaround that essentially reenacted the original, problematic plans. This case requires the Supreme Court to determine when a state legislature exhibits a discriminatory intent in reconfiguring its electoral districts and how deeply that intent permeates into subsequent legislation. Further, this case may redefine the parameters for courts to evaluate redistricting, balancing the needs to protect voters’ rights and preserve state sovereignty. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1) Whether the district court issued an appealable interlocutory injunction when it invalidated Texas’ duly enacted redistricting plan and ordered the parties to appear at a remedial hearing to redraw state congressional districts unless the governor called a special legislative session to redraw the congressional map within three days; (2) whether the Texas legislature acted with an unlawful purpose when it enacted a redistricting plan originally imposed by the district court to remedy any potential constitutional and statutory defects in a prior legislative plan that was repealed without ever having taken effect; (3) whether the Texas legislature engaged in intentional vote dilution when it adopted Congressional District 27 in 2013 after the district court found, in 2012, that CD27 did not support a plausible claim of racially discriminatory purpose and did not dilute Hispanic voting strength because it was not possible to create an additional Hispanic opportunity district in the region; and (4) whether the Texas legislature engaged in racial gerrymandering in Congressional District 35 when it simply adopted the district unchanged as part of the court-ordered remedial plan.

In 2011, Texas’ 82nd Legislature (“Legislature”) proposed Plans C185 and H283 (“2011 Plans”) to change its voting districts before the 2012 elections. Perez v. Abbott, 274 F. Supp. 3d 624, 632 (W.D. Tex. 2017).

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Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama; Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama (Consolidated)

Issues

  1. Does Alabama’s legislative redistricting plan violate the Equal Protection Clause because its drafters attempted to maintain black voting population percentages in order to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?
  2. Does the Alabama Democratic Conference have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Alabama’s redistricting plan?

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely clarify the extent that state redistricting plans may take race into consideration when trying to comply with the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic Conference allege that Alabama’s 2012 redistricting plan impermissibly focused on race in drawing new district lines. Alabama responds that the 2012 redistricting plan’s primary motivations were compliance with the Constitution’s requirement of “one person, one vote” and prevention of retrogression under the Voting Rights Act. The resolution of this case will likely address the role courts play in policing redistricting plans enacted by state legislatures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

No. 13-895

Whether Alabama’s legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts.

No. 13-1138

This appeal in a legislative redistricting case presents issues of law in regard to how a State may rely on race in setting district boundaries. It is undisputed that the State had, among its chief goals, the idea that when possible it would redraw each majority--black district to have the same percentage of black population as the district would have had using 2010 census data as applied to the former district lines. This goal, particularly when combined with the new goal of significantly reducing population deviation among districts, led the State to stark racial intentionality in district-drawing, packing more super-majorities of black voters into already-majority-black districts, without regard to whether such efforts were actually necessary in each district to allow black voters to elect candidates of their choice. A divided three-judge District Court rejected the challenge to this map. This appeal presents issues summarized as follows:

a. Whether, as the dissenting judge concluded, this effort amounted to an unconstitutional racial quota and racial gerrymandering that is subject to strict scrutiny and that was not justified by the putative interest of complying with the non-retrogression aspect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?

b. Whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring such a constitutional claim?

After the 2010 census revealed malapportionment in most electoral districts in Alabama, the Republican-controlled Alabama legislature declared that compliance with the Constitution’s mandate of “one person, one vote” would be its highest priority in creating new district lines in 2012.

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Bartlett v. Strickland

Issues

If a racial minority group constitutes less than 50% of a voting district’s population, but enough other voters tend to vote for the minority group’s preferred candidate to enable it to elect the leader of its choice, does Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, require a state to place that group within its own voting district?

 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act declares that a state may not act in a way that impairs or dilutes, on account of race or color, a citizen’s opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of his or her choice. In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew its district lines and created House District 18 with the intention of complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The “controlling majority” of citizens in the new House District 18 consisted of thirty-nine percent African-American voters and enough non-African-American “crossover” voters to allow the African-American voters to elect a leader of their choice. This redistricting decision was challenged on the grounds that the Voting Rights Act does not require the creation of districts in which African-Americans or other ethnic minorities do not, by themselves, constitute a voting majority. The question the Supreme Court will decide is whether a racial minority group must constitute a “controlling majority” or an actual majority in order to trigger the districting requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed district’s population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew voting district lines throughout North Carolina in response to the 2000 decennial census. Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (N.C.

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Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, et al.

Issues

Does a state board of elections violate the Equal Protection Clause if it uses a one-size-fits-all black voting age population floor as part of its redistricting process in an effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act?

This case gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to determine whether a state’s use of a black voting age population (“BVAP”) floor in crafting new legislative districts is permissible if the state also considers other race-neutral criteria. Appellants, Bethune-Hill et al. (“Bethune-Hill”), argue that the Virginia State Board of Elections’ (“BOE”) use of a 55% BVAP floor violated the Equal Protection Clause because the BOE acknowledged that complying with the racial target was the most important factor in the redistricting process. Bethune-Hill argues that racial targets demean minorities, regardless of whether the state also considers race-neutral factors. Appellees, the BOE, contend that their use of the BVAP floor was a lawful way of complying with the demands of the Voting Rights Act. The BOE claims that the fact that the challenged districts conform to traditional race-neutral redistricting standards illustrates that minority voters were not harmed in the way the Equal Protection Clause contemplates because the state grouped them according to communities of interest, not solely according to their skin color. This case will impact what measures states can take in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the court below err in holding that race cannot predominate even where it is the most important consideration in drawing a given district unless the use of race results in “actual conflict” with traditional redistricting criteria?
  2. Did the court below err by concluding that the admitted use of a one-size-fits-all 55% black voting age population floor to draw twelve separate House of Delegates districts does not amount to racial predominance and trigger strict scrutiny?
  3. Did the court below err in disregarding the admitted use of race in drawing district lines in favor of examining circumstantial evidence regarding the contours of the districts?
  4. Did the court below err in holding that racial goals must negate all other districting criteria in order for race to predominate?
  5. Did the court below err in concluding that the General Assembly’s predominant use of race in drawing House District 75 was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest?

In anticipation of the 2010 census results, the Virginia General Assembly began preparing to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia House of Delegates and the Virginia Senate. See Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:14-cv-852, at 3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2015). Delegate Chris Jones, who had been substantially involved in the 2001 redistricting process, led the effort.

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Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

Issues

Do Arizona’s voting policies that impact minorities and limit otherwise legal in-person and early voting violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the scope of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), which provides relief against voting policies that result in discrimination against minority populations. The state of Arizona enacted two voting policies that limit the scope of both in-person and mail-in voting. Arizona’s laws allowed it to discard any ballots cast in the wrong precinct on Election Day and criminalized collecting ballots for mailing purposes. Petitioners Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich and the state of Arizona  (“Arizona”) argue that these policies are racially neutral and do not discriminate against Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous communities. Respondent Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) contends that these laws disproportionately impacted or—in the case of the prohibition on ballot collection—targeted minority communities, and therefore violated the VRA. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the extent of the protections granted by the VRA against discrimination as well as the validity of state laws seeking to address voter fraud.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy, which does not count provisional ballots cast in person on Election Day outside of the voter’s designated precinct, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and (2) whether Arizona’s ballot-collection law, which permits only certain persons (i.e., family and household members, caregivers, mail carriers and elections officials) to handle another person’s completed early ballot, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the 15th Amendment.

The state of Arizona permits both in-person voting at designated voting centers or precincts, and “early voting,” in which voters can either mail in a ballot or drop off ballots at designated locations. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.

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civil rights

equal protection

Harris, et al. v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Issues

  • Does Arizona’s redistricting plan violate the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by creating unequally populated legislative districts?
  • If so, must Arizona explain the deviation between districts; and, are satisfying partisan political objections or achieving preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act permissible rationales?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether Arizona’s redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by diluting the voting power of its residents. The Court will also consider whether Arizona must justify deviations in population between districts, and what kind of justification Arizona may properly raise. In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”), entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D. Ariz., 2014). In 2011–2012, the Commission created a new legislative map, which caused population deviation between districts. On April 27,  2012  appellant Wesley W. Harris and others brought suit against the Commission in District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the new legislative map. See Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. Harris argues that the Commission violates the one-person, one-vote principle of Equal Protection Clause by drawing unequal districts that dilute the voting power of citizens depending on where they live. See Brief for Appellants, Wesley W. Harris, et al. at 50. According to Harris, neither advancing partisan goals nor obtaining preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act are legitimate reasons to draw voting districts of unequal population. See id. at 25-26, 36. The Commission contends that where the difference between the most densely and least densely populated districts is less than 10 percent, the Commission does not need to justify why those districts were not drawn to be precisely equal. See Brief for Appellee, Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n at 29-34. Moreover, the Commission argues that the deviations in  population  were the result of a good-faith effort to satisfy section 5 preclearance. See id. at 38–40. The Court’s decision will affect redistricting plans  nationwide,  and could impact the way in which states consider race or ethnicity in the redistricting process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justify intentionally creating over- populated legislative districts that result in tens of thousands of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, violating the one-person, one-vote principle?
  2. Does the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle? And, even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified, is this still a legitimate justification after Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)?

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp.

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League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, consolidated with Travis County, Texas v. Perry, Jackson v.

Issues

Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 congressional redistricting plan unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of race, constitute unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, and/or dilute the voting strength of minorities in violation of the Voting Rights Act; and can states redraw congressional maps twice in the same decade when a valid plan exists?

 

After a decades-long dominance of the Texas congressional delegation by Democratic representatives, the Republican Party won a majority of seats by virtue of new Congressional district lines as reflected by the state's population growth in the 2000 Census. However, the legislature failed to redistrict the state in time for the elections, which were then governed by a district court-drawn plan. After the elections, the new Republican majority engaged in a rare mid-term redistricting plan to replace the court's map. A number of individuals and organizations sued to prevent the redistricting on a variety of grounds. The Supreme Court will decide the constitutionality of the Texas redistricting plan under analyses of due process, equal protection political, racial gerrymandering, and the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (No. 05-204)

1. Whether the 2003 Texas Congressional Redistricting Plan (Plan 1374C), adopted and developed using outdated, inaccurate 2000 Census data and resulting in malapportioned districts, in violation of one person, one vote when measured against 2003 Census data, and when “the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage” and when such purpose is realized, is an unconstitutional political gerrymander.

2. Whether proof of racially polarized voting is overcome by evidence of partisan affiliation of minority voters in the analysis of the second prong of Gingles in a minority vote dilution claim.

Travis Co., Texas v. Perry (No. 05-254)

Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 replacement of a legally valid congressional districting plan with a statewide plan, enacted for “the singleminded purpose” of gaining partisan advantage, satisfy the stringent constitutional rule of equipopulous districts by relying on the 2000 decennial census and the fiction of inter-censal population accuracy?

Jackson v. Perry (No. 05-276)

1. Whether the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment prohibit States from redrawing lawful districting plans in the middle of the decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing partisan advantage.
 
2. Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act permits a State to destroy a district effectively controlled by African-American voters, merely because it is impossible to draw a district in which African-Americans constitute an absolute mathematical majority of the population.
 
3. Whether, under Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), a bizarre-looking congressional district, which was intentionally drawn as a majority-Latino district by connecting two far-flung pockets of dense urban population with a 300-mile-long rural “land bridge,” may escape invalidation as a racial gerrymander because drawing a compact majority-Latino district would have required the mapmakers to compromise their political goal of maximizing Republican seats elsewhere in the State.
 

GI Forum of Texas v. Perry (No. 05-439)

1. Whether political partisanship is sufficient justification, under section 2 and the Constitution, for dismantling a Latino-majority congressional district in order to elect the Anglo-preferred candidate.
 
2. Whether section 2 permits a state to eliminate a majority-minority district located in one area of the state and create another majority-minority district in a different area of the state.
 
3. Whether the District Court erred by requiring section 2 demonstrative districts to be more compact and to offer greater electoral opportunity to minority voters than the corresponding districts in the challenged redistricting plan.
 
4. Whether the number of majority-minority districts that can be created in the state functions as the upper limit of permissible political opportunity when assessing proportionality under Johnson v. DeGrandy.

 

The U.S. Constitution requires states to reapportion their respective congressional seats based on population changes reflected by the U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial census. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.

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Louisiana v. Callais

Issues

Did the Louisiana State Legislature violate the Equal Protection Clause by implementing congressional district map proposal SB8? 

This case asks whether the Louisiana State Legislature primarily considered race when drawing congressional district map SB8, and whether SB8 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Louisiana asserts that the creation of the second majority-Black district was not motivated by race but was instead a response to a court order. Louisiana maintains that SB8 was necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which Louisiana asserts is a compelling interest, and that therefore Louisiana did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Louisiana also argues that Respondent Phillip Callais and other Louisiana residents who joined him in the litigation lack standing because they have not been personally harmed by racial discrimination in redistricting. Callais, on the other hand, argues that SB8 goes beyond what is necessary to comply with the VRA and fails to follow traditional districting principles, as SB8 combines geographically dispersed Black communities into an irregularly shaped district. This case raises significant issues about racial discrimination in redistricting, the responsibilities of elected officials to their constituents, and the relationship between the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the majority of the three-judge district court in this case erred in finding that race predominated in the Louisiana legislature’s enactment of SB8; (2) whether the majority erred in finding that SB8 fails strict scrutiny; (3) whether the majority erred in subjecting SB8 to the preconditions specified in Thornburg v. Gingles; and (4) whether this action is non-justiciable.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“the VRA”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“the Equal Protection Clause”) both address discrimina

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