gerrymandering

Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama; Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama (Consolidated)

Issues

  1. Does Alabama’s legislative redistricting plan violate the Equal Protection Clause because its drafters attempted to maintain black voting population percentages in order to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?
  2. Does the Alabama Democratic Conference have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Alabama’s redistricting plan?

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely clarify the extent that state redistricting plans may take race into consideration when trying to comply with the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic Conference allege that Alabama’s 2012 redistricting plan impermissibly focused on race in drawing new district lines. Alabama responds that the 2012 redistricting plan’s primary motivations were compliance with the Constitution’s requirement of “one person, one vote” and prevention of retrogression under the Voting Rights Act. The resolution of this case will likely address the role courts play in policing redistricting plans enacted by state legislatures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

No. 13-895

Whether Alabama’s legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts.

No. 13-1138

This appeal in a legislative redistricting case presents issues of law in regard to how a State may rely on race in setting district boundaries. It is undisputed that the State had, among its chief goals, the idea that when possible it would redraw each majority--black district to have the same percentage of black population as the district would have had using 2010 census data as applied to the former district lines. This goal, particularly when combined with the new goal of significantly reducing population deviation among districts, led the State to stark racial intentionality in district-drawing, packing more super-majorities of black voters into already-majority-black districts, without regard to whether such efforts were actually necessary in each district to allow black voters to elect candidates of their choice. A divided three-judge District Court rejected the challenge to this map. This appeal presents issues summarized as follows:

a. Whether, as the dissenting judge concluded, this effort amounted to an unconstitutional racial quota and racial gerrymandering that is subject to strict scrutiny and that was not justified by the putative interest of complying with the non-retrogression aspect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?

b. Whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring such a constitutional claim?

After the 2010 census revealed malapportionment in most electoral districts in Alabama, the Republican-controlled Alabama legislature declared that compliance with the Constitution’s mandate of “one person, one vote” would be its highest priority in creating new district lines in 2012.

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Alexander v. South Carolina NAACP

Issues

Did the South Carolina redistricting process violate the Equal Protection Clause in setting a racial target in the design process for one of its districts?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the district court panel erred in ruling that South Carolina’s Congressional District 1 (“CD1”) was a racial gerrymander prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (“the NAACP”) asserts that the panel correctly found that the redistricting board set a 17% black voting age population (“BVAP”) target for their new map of CD1 to create a partisan tilt favoring Republican candidates. Appellant Thomas Alexander (“Alexander”) asserts that racial data was not a factor in the redistricting process and that, instead, the designers of CD1 relied on political data, mainly the precinct-level voting patterns from the 2020 election. Thus, Alexander argues that CD1 does not violate equal protection jurisprudence which permits a political, but not racial, gerrymander. Because of the small majority the Republican Party holds in the US House of Representatives, this case has the potential to have a major shift on both South Carolina’s congressional delegation, but also the political tilt of the House as a whole.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the district court erred when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze South Carolina Congressional District 1 and the South Carolina General Assembly’s intent;

(2) whether the district court erred in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case;

(3) whether the district court erred when it failed to disentangle race from politics;

(4) whether the district court erred in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District 1’s compliance with traditional districting principles;

(5) whether the district court clearly erred in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data; and

(6) whether the district court erred in upholding the intentional-discrimination claim when it never even considered whether—let alone found that—District 1 has a discriminatory effect.

In 2022, the South Carolina Senate adopted a reapportionment plan (“Senate Plan”) to redesign the congressional districts.  South Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP v Alexander at 6-7.  Although Congressional districts should have almost equal population, Congressional District No.

Additional Resources

  • Zack Montellaro, Supreme Court to hear racial redistricting case from South Carolina, Politico (May 15, 2023).
  • Caitlin Byrd, Federal judges strike down SC’s 1st Congressional District as racial gerrymandering, The Post and Courier (Jan. 6, 2023).
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Harris, et al. v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Issues

  • Does Arizona’s redistricting plan violate the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by creating unequally populated legislative districts?
  • If so, must Arizona explain the deviation between districts; and, are satisfying partisan political objections or achieving preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act permissible rationales?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether Arizona’s redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by diluting the voting power of its residents. The Court will also consider whether Arizona must justify deviations in population between districts, and what kind of justification Arizona may properly raise. In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”), entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D. Ariz., 2014). In 2011–2012, the Commission created a new legislative map, which caused population deviation between districts. On April 27,  2012  appellant Wesley W. Harris and others brought suit against the Commission in District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the new legislative map. See Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. Harris argues that the Commission violates the one-person, one-vote principle of Equal Protection Clause by drawing unequal districts that dilute the voting power of citizens depending on where they live. See Brief for Appellants, Wesley W. Harris, et al. at 50. According to Harris, neither advancing partisan goals nor obtaining preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act are legitimate reasons to draw voting districts of unequal population. See id. at 25-26, 36. The Commission contends that where the difference between the most densely and least densely populated districts is less than 10 percent, the Commission does not need to justify why those districts were not drawn to be precisely equal. See Brief for Appellee, Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n at 29-34. Moreover, the Commission argues that the deviations in  population  were the result of a good-faith effort to satisfy section 5 preclearance. See id. at 38–40. The Court’s decision will affect redistricting plans  nationwide,  and could impact the way in which states consider race or ethnicity in the redistricting process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justify intentionally creating over- populated legislative districts that result in tens of thousands of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, violating the one-person, one-vote principle?
  2. Does the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle? And, even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified, is this still a legitimate justification after Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)?

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp.

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Lamone v. Benisek

Issues

Is partisan gerrymandering a form of unconstitutional First Amendment retaliation that is justiciable by the courts?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Maryland’s 2011 redistricting of the Sixth Congressional District constituted unlawful partisan gerrymandering in violation of the First Amendment, and whether the First Amendment retaliation framework used by the district court provided manageable standards to decide this case. Specifically, the Court will consider whether legislators redrew electoral maps in retaliation to citizens’ political affiliations and voting histories. Appellant Linda H. Lamone argues that although the redistricting process may be tainted by partisan bias, redistricting does not necessarily indicate an intent to punish citizens for their party affiliations and voting histories. Appellee O. John Benisek counters that the proper question is whether electoral maps were redrawn because of citizens’ political affiliations and voting histories, irrespective of malicious retribution. This case could have a meaningful impact on the scope of lawful electoral redistricting and whether the Court should consider legislators’ subjective intent when making this determination.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court are unmanageable; (2) whether the three-judge district court erred when, in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, it resolved disputes of material fact as to multiple elements of plaintiffs’ claims, failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and treated as “undisputed” evidence that is the subject of still-unresolved hearsay and other evidentiary objections; and (3) whether the three-judge district court abused its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief, rendering the remedy applicable to at most one election before the next decennial census necessitates another redistricting.

After the 2010 census, the State of Maryland engaged in the redistricting of its eight congressional districts and forty-seven legislative districts to equalize each district’s population. Benisek v.

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League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, consolidated with Travis County, Texas v. Perry, Jackson v.

Issues

Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 congressional redistricting plan unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of race, constitute unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, and/or dilute the voting strength of minorities in violation of the Voting Rights Act; and can states redraw congressional maps twice in the same decade when a valid plan exists?

 

After a decades-long dominance of the Texas congressional delegation by Democratic representatives, the Republican Party won a majority of seats by virtue of new Congressional district lines as reflected by the state's population growth in the 2000 Census. However, the legislature failed to redistrict the state in time for the elections, which were then governed by a district court-drawn plan. After the elections, the new Republican majority engaged in a rare mid-term redistricting plan to replace the court's map. A number of individuals and organizations sued to prevent the redistricting on a variety of grounds. The Supreme Court will decide the constitutionality of the Texas redistricting plan under analyses of due process, equal protection political, racial gerrymandering, and the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (No. 05-204)

1. Whether the 2003 Texas Congressional Redistricting Plan (Plan 1374C), adopted and developed using outdated, inaccurate 2000 Census data and resulting in malapportioned districts, in violation of one person, one vote when measured against 2003 Census data, and when “the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage” and when such purpose is realized, is an unconstitutional political gerrymander.

2. Whether proof of racially polarized voting is overcome by evidence of partisan affiliation of minority voters in the analysis of the second prong of Gingles in a minority vote dilution claim.

Travis Co., Texas v. Perry (No. 05-254)

Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 replacement of a legally valid congressional districting plan with a statewide plan, enacted for “the singleminded purpose” of gaining partisan advantage, satisfy the stringent constitutional rule of equipopulous districts by relying on the 2000 decennial census and the fiction of inter-censal population accuracy?

Jackson v. Perry (No. 05-276)

1. Whether the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment prohibit States from redrawing lawful districting plans in the middle of the decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing partisan advantage.
 
2. Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act permits a State to destroy a district effectively controlled by African-American voters, merely because it is impossible to draw a district in which African-Americans constitute an absolute mathematical majority of the population.
 
3. Whether, under Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), a bizarre-looking congressional district, which was intentionally drawn as a majority-Latino district by connecting two far-flung pockets of dense urban population with a 300-mile-long rural “land bridge,” may escape invalidation as a racial gerrymander because drawing a compact majority-Latino district would have required the mapmakers to compromise their political goal of maximizing Republican seats elsewhere in the State.
 

GI Forum of Texas v. Perry (No. 05-439)

1. Whether political partisanship is sufficient justification, under section 2 and the Constitution, for dismantling a Latino-majority congressional district in order to elect the Anglo-preferred candidate.
 
2. Whether section 2 permits a state to eliminate a majority-minority district located in one area of the state and create another majority-minority district in a different area of the state.
 
3. Whether the District Court erred by requiring section 2 demonstrative districts to be more compact and to offer greater electoral opportunity to minority voters than the corresponding districts in the challenged redistricting plan.
 
4. Whether the number of majority-minority districts that can be created in the state functions as the upper limit of permissible political opportunity when assessing proportionality under Johnson v. DeGrandy.

 

The U.S. Constitution requires states to reapportion their respective congressional seats based on population changes reflected by the U.S. Census Bureau’s decennial census. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.

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Louisiana v. Callais

Issues

Did the Louisiana State Legislature violate the Equal Protection Clause by implementing congressional district map proposal SB8? 

This case asks whether the Louisiana State Legislature primarily considered race when drawing congressional district map SB8, and whether SB8 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Louisiana asserts that the creation of the second majority-Black district was not motivated by race but was instead a response to a court order. Louisiana maintains that SB8 was necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which Louisiana asserts is a compelling interest, and that therefore Louisiana did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Louisiana also argues that Respondent Phillip Callais and other Louisiana residents who joined him in the litigation lack standing because they have not been personally harmed by racial discrimination in redistricting. Callais, on the other hand, argues that SB8 goes beyond what is necessary to comply with the VRA and fails to follow traditional districting principles, as SB8 combines geographically dispersed Black communities into an irregularly shaped district. This case raises significant issues about racial discrimination in redistricting, the responsibilities of elected officials to their constituents, and the relationship between the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the majority of the three-judge district court in this case erred in finding that race predominated in the Louisiana legislature’s enactment of SB8; (2) whether the majority erred in finding that SB8 fails strict scrutiny; (3) whether the majority erred in subjecting SB8 to the preconditions specified in Thornburg v. Gingles; and (4) whether this action is non-justiciable.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“the VRA”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“the Equal Protection Clause”) both address discrimina

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Louisiana v. Callais

Issues

Did the Louisiana State Legislature act unconstitutionally when it created SB8 to remedy a Section 2 violation?

 

This case asks whether the Louisiana State Legislature’s creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Appellant Press Robinson argues that not only does SB8 comply with both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but that it is a valid and necessary remedy to a particularly dangerous form of racial discrimination. Callais counters that SB8 is a presumptively invalid form of racially based governmental action and is neither narrowly tailored nor furthers a compelling governmental interest. This case raises significant issues about racial discrimination in redistricting, the responsibilities of elected officials to their constituents, and the relationship between the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

The Supreme Court first heard this case on March 24, 2025, but later ordered supplemental briefing and reargument. SCOTUSblog. On June 27, 2025, the Court directed the parties to focus on whether Louisiana’s second majority-minority distric

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Rucho v. Common Cause

Issues

Do voters targeted by partisan gerrymandering have standing to bring a constitutional claim; is such a claim justiciable, or is it barred by the political question doctrine; and, how would voters then prove a constitutional violation?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether claims of partisan gerrymandering may be heard by the courts, and if so, upon what standards such claims should be evaluated. In 2016, North Carolina adopted a new congressional district map with the express purpose of protecting Republican congressional delegates. Federal district court judges from the Middle District of North Carolina invalidated the map after voters and related groups claimed that the new district map violated voters’ rights under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Elections Clause. As part of this ruling, the lower court determined that there was an injury sufficient to give the voters standing while also holding that the issue of partisan gerrymandering is not barred from judicial review by the political question doctrine. The case was then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which will seek to answer the procedural and substantive questions while wrestling with a large body of competing jurisprudence. The decision could potentially open the courts to additional challenges by voters in several states and have implications for the scope of lawful electoral redistricting.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering claims.
  2. Whether plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable.
  3. Whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map is, in fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

North Carolina’s congressional redistricting takes place every ten years in a process overseen by both chambers of the state’s General Assembly. Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 599 (M.D.N.C.

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