Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A.
Issues
Can Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alone allow U.S-based plaintiffs to sue Cuban instrumentalities, such as Cuban state-owned oil companies, which would normally be given sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alone abrogates Cuban instrumentalities’ sovereign immunity, or whether plaintiffs must also show an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The FSIA states that foreign states and their instrumentalities are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, except for actions based on commercial activity causing a direct effect in the United States or expropriation, which applies when rights to property taken in violation of international law are at issue. Petitioner, Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”) argues that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act satisfies the clear-statement rule that Congress requires to abrogate foreign sovereign immunity under FSIA. Respondents, Corporación CIMEX and related corporations (collectively “CIMEX”) posit that Congress did not create a clear exception to FISA and that Title III suits must fit within the existing exceptions in FISA that allow for suits against countries or instrumentalities that typically enjoy sovereign immunity. This case touches on the interpretation of Congress’s intent in enacting the Helms-Burton Act and the balancing of interests between recognition of sovereign states and fairness in outcomes.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Facts
Before Fidel Castro rose to power, Exxon Mobile Corporation (“Exxon”), then known as Standard Oil, owned multiple subsidiaries in Cuba. These subsidiaries owned oil and gas assets in the country. When Fidel Castro’s government took control of Cuba, the Cuban government seized property owned by these subsidiaries. The government took geographical exploration records from Standard Oil offices in the country, stopping Standard Oil’s exploration efforts in Cuba. In 1960, the Cuban government expropriated all property owned by Standard Oil’s subsidiaries, including refineries, service stations, and equipment.The government also stopped the subsidiaries from operating refineries and service stations in Cuba. To combat this and similar issues, Congress passed legislation allowing U.S. nationals to bring expropriation claims against Cuba to the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“the Commission”). In 1969, the Commission determined that Standard Oil lost $71,611,002.90 from Cuba’s actions in 1960. In addition, the Commission stated that Standard Oil was entitled to interest at an annual rate of six percent for this loss. The Cuban government has never paid Exxon any money in connection to this claim.
In 1996, Congress responded to the death of four Americans shot down while flying off the coast of Cuba by enacting the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, also known as the Helms-Burton Act.Title III of the Helms-Burton Act allows U.S. nationals to sue any “person” who “traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated on or after January 1, 1959.” The Helms-Burton Act entitles the President to suspend Title III’s private right of action for up to six months when doing so is necessary to protect U.S. national interests. Since then, each president has continued to use this power, effectively suspending Title III’s private right of action until May 2019, when President Trump stated that he would end the suspension.
In May 2019, Exxon sued Corporación CIMEX (Cuba), Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Panama), and Unión Cuba-Petróleo (collectively “CIMEX”), all owned by Cuba, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.Exxon alleged that these companies traffic in Exxon’s confiscated property by using the confiscated property to extract, import, and refine crude oil. Exxon sought damages equivalent to the amount certified by the Commission in 1969, adjusted for the six percent annual interest rate. CIMEX moved to dismiss Exxon’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). CIMEX claimed that each state-owned entity had sovereign immunity under the FSIA, so they were immune from a Title III action unless one of FSIA’s exceptions applied. The district court denied the motion to dismiss for Corporación CIMEX (Cuba), finding that it had jurisdiction over Corporación CIMEX (Cuba) under FSIA’s commercial-activity exception, but it had no jurisdiction over the other two defendants. During the court’s inquiry into jurisdiction, it also rejected Exxon’s argument that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act creates jurisdiction over CIMEX despite the FSIA. When CIMEX appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Exxon cross-appealed the court’s decision that Title III cannot confer jurisdiction independently of the FSIA.
On July 30, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of CIMEX’s motion to dismiss, and it remanded the case back to district court to determine whether CIMEX had sufficient awareness that the goods it sells originate from the U.S. In the same opinion, the circuit court rejected Exxon’s jurisdictional argument, finding that jurisdiction over a foreign state must come from the FSIA, not Title III.
Exxon petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari on December 27, 2024, which was granted on October 3, 2025.
Analysis
TEXTUAL READING OF TITLE III
Exxon first argues that the plain language of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act illustrates Congress’s intent to limit sovereign immunity. Exxon claims that because the statute defines “person” as “any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” the language, on its own, repeals the defendants’ sovereign immunity. Exxon highlights that the Supreme Court held in Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz that a statute waives sovereign immunity when it creates a “cause of action and explicitly authorizes suit against a government on that claim.” Exxon argues that because this authorization is incompatible with invoking sovereign immunity as a defense, the statute’s plain language in Kirtz was enough to affect a waiver of immunity. Exxon claims that Kirtz establishes that, through language authorizing remedies against a government entity, Congress may waive a sovereign immunity defense without directly providing a sovereign immunity waiver in the statute. Exxon also highlights that the Helms-Burton Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the statute at issue in Kirtz, were enacted by the same Congress. Exxon claims that both statutes use similar language, authorizing similar causes of action. In fact, Exxon argues, a finding that the Helms-Burton Act does not waive the sovereign immunity of Cuba would mean that foreign agencies have more protection from liability than domestic agencies, which can be sued under the FCRA. In addition, Exxon asserts that Congress’s intent to limit sovereign immunity is more prevalent in the Helms-Burton Act than in the FCRA. For instance, Exxon points to legislative findings that state-owned corporations such as Unión Cuba-Petróleo and Corporación CIMEX (Cuba) held property to argue that Congress knew when drafting the Helms-Burton Act that Cuban entities would most frequently violate the Act. Further, Exxon notes that the language of the FSIA limits the “commercial activity” exception to commercial activity within the U.S. Exxon argues that the Helms-Burton Act concerns conduct outside of the U.S. and requiring any claim to also meet the FSIA’s requirement of domestic commercial activity would negate a much larger set of claims defined in the Helms-Burton Act.
In response, CIMEX argues that the Helms-Burton Act allows Title III actions where there is an FSIA exception, meaning that Title III does not abrogate FSIA sovereign immunity. CIMEX asserts that, under the current FSIA statutory scheme, Exxon cannot demonstrate a waiver of the defendants’ sovereign immunity. Furthermore, CIMEX rejects Exxon’s reliance on Kirtz to support the assertion that the defendants should not receive sovereign immunity. CIMEX claims that the Court’s decision in Kirtz reflected the concern that any other finding would automatically dismiss the same suits against the government that the FCRA was intended to create. CIMEX argues that, here, courts would not dismiss Title III actions if the case met a FSIA exception. Specifically, CIMEX highlights that Title III and the FSIA can be read together, since the FSIA allows plaintiffs to bring Title III claims in two ways, either through the commercial activity exception or the expropriation exception. In addition, CIMEX rejects Exxon’s argument that the similarity between the language in Title III and the FCRA requires a similar interpretation. CIMEX argues that by focusing on similarities in specific language, Exxon ignores the text of Title III in context. In other words, CIMEX argues that the interpretation of a statute should not be determined by resemblance to other statutes, especially since the FCRA and Title III of the Helms-Burton Act operate within different types of immunity. CIMEX states that the FCRA deals with absolute immunity, while Title III contains restrictive immunity with some statutory exceptions. CIMEX concludes that because the FSIA enables Title III claims, the textual language of Title III does not support limiting sovereign immunity.
PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF TITLE III
Exxon argues that the purpose of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is to displace the FSIA and abrogate sovereign immunity. Exxon claims that before creating the Helms-Burton Act, Congress would have known that most lawsuits against Cuban state-owned companies that appropriated property would be unsuccessful in satisfying an FSIA exception. Exxon suggests that it would be illogical for Congress to enact the Helms-Burton Act just to have Title III be subject to FSIA restrictions. Furthermore, Exxon claims that Congress could not have intended for Title III plaintiffs to prove tenuous commercial connections with the U.S. because, in enacting this statute, Congress wanted these plaintiffs to receive judicial remedies. For instance, Exxon alleges that Cuba criminalizes providing any information that could assist a Title III plaintiff, including information that would support an FSIA exception. Additionally, Exxon argues that Congress would have considered the challenges of proving an FSIA exception during the Cuban embargo. Exxon argues that Congress could not have intended for Title III plaintiffs to navigate these complex Cuban restrictions to receive a Title III remedy. In addition, Exxon claims that Congress could not have intended for culpable defendants to escape liability for appropriating U.S. assets. Exxon alleges that applying the FSIA to Title III of the Helms-Burton Act would contradict Congress’s intention to develop Title III as a foreign policy tool to be used by the Executive Branch. Exxon highlights that Congress included a provision in Title III that allows the President to suspend any private right of action under Title III if a suspension would “expedite a transition to a democracy in Cuba.”In addition, Exxon claims that the legislative history supports abrogation of sovereign immunity for Title III claims. For example, Exxon notes that the Conference Report for the Helms-Burton Act emphasizes the importance of creating a “unique but proportionate remedy” for wrongful appropriation of U.S. property by the Cuban government. Exxon claims that Congress wanted to deny Castro and the Cuban regime any benefit from exploiting appropriated capital. Finally, Exxon highlights the drafting history of Title III, and Exxon specifically recognizes that a previous version of the bill would have contained a specific exception from the FSIA. Exxon concludes that Congress’s purpose in creating Title III, as well as the legislative history, supports finding an abrogation of sovereign immunity.
In response, CIMEX cites the statutory amendments of the Helms-Burton Act to argue that if Congress intended for an abrogation of sovereign immunity under Title III, it would have explicitly amended the Act. For instance, CIMEX points out that during the same session it adopted Title III, Congress addressed sovereign immunity in its adoption of an amendment to the FSIA creating a state sponsor of terrorism exception. CIMEX argues that this statutory history emphasizes that Congress did not intend for Title III to limit sovereign immunity. CIMEX cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, which held that when Congress sought to rescind immunity, Congress knew how to do so explicitly, especially when it failed to include considered amendments. In addition, CIMEX disagrees with Exxon’s argument that Congress discarded the FSIA exception from the final version of Title III because it was unnecessary. CIMEX argues that this interpretation of the legislative history is implausible. CIMEX states that the Supreme Court has often relied on Congress’s failure to amend statutory provisions to determine the meaning of a statute’s text. CIMEX points out that the final version of Title III did explicitly include an amendment to the FSIA’s execution immunity provisions, making it more likely that Congress purposefully did not amend the FSIA’s immunity from suit provisions. CIMEX argues further that Exxon’s interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act improperly distinguishes Cuba from other third-party instrumentalities. Instead, CIMEX argues that Congress did not intend to single out, or “cherry-pick,” certain governments when creating the Helms-Burton Act, as evidenced by the broad language of Title III’s liability provision. Lastly, CIMEX rejects Exxon’s argument that the Cuban embargo encourages an abrogation of sovereign immunity to fulfill Title III’s purpose. CIMEX concludes that Exxon assumed and speculated on Congress’s legislative purpose with respect to such an embargo, which CIMEX states is a task best left for Congress rather than a court.
Discussion
LITIGATION DETERRENCE AND LEGITIMACY
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (“Chamber of Commerce”), in support of Exxon, argues that requiring plaintiffs to show an FSIA exception before they can bring a Title III claim would result in more costly and time-consuming litigation in order to establish threshold factual issues under the FSIA. The Chamber of Commerce argues that these costs could also deter victims who lack the resources to endure long bouts of litigation, citing the case in question, which litigants filed more than six years ago. King Ranch and other owners of claims of property confiscated by Cuba (collectively “King Ranch”), in support of Exxon, argue that multiple claimants have not brought suits under Title III because the value of their claims does not justify the resources that must go toward the years of litigation. In fact, King Ranch argues, there is currently $8.5 billion worth of Title III claims against Cuba certified by the FCSC, yet of the 5,913 certified claims, only sixteen have been litigated. King Ranch maintains that this is because the costs of bringing these claims to court is so high, and because no claim has ever resulted in the payment of damages.
Law professors with expertise in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“Foreign Sovereign Immunity Scholars”), in support of CIMEX, argue that if the Court rules in favor of Exxon, there will be less predictability for foreign governments and U.S. plaintiffs and defendants about when a foreign state and its agencies would be subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Scholars posit that Congress promulgated the FSIA to assure foreign litigants that Courts made their decisions solely on a legitimate legal basis and that the procedures gave due process of law. Foreign international law scholars and jurists (“International Scholars”), in support of CIMEX, argue that the fundamental principles of international law mandate sovereign equality of states and a principle of non-interference in the international affairs of other states. International Scholars argue that the Congressional discretion of FSIA is crucial to ensuring that the Court’s ruling does not violate existing international law norms, which applies because FSIA itself is essentially an implementation of international law.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FAIRNESS
King Ranch, in support of Exxon, posit that international comity interests, typically a justification for recognizing foreign sovereign immunity, do not apply in this case because of the Cuban government’s history of atrocities and confiscation of property. King Ranch notes that foreign relations would be better upheld through Title III’s remedy for victims of confiscation than giving Cuba sovereign immunity because it would hold the Cuban government responsible for its atrocities, a goal of U.S. foreign policy. The Atlantic Legal Foundation (“ALF”) and DRI Center for Law and Public Policy (“DRI”), in support of Exxon, argue that the fundamental right to just compensation overrides any international comity concerns with Cuba. The ALF and DRI argue that creating a remedy for theft of property from U.S. nations by the Castro government would serve U.S. foreign policy objectives by deterring the exploitation of property described in Title III of the Act as “personal despotism.”
International Scholars, in support of CIMEX, argue that ensuring Cuba’s sovereign immunity is necessary to avoid international friction that would potentially harm the interests of the U.S. International Scholars posit that the reliance of the U.S. on foreign domestic courts to uphold their immunity in matters related to U.S. military bases and embassies could be put into jeopardy if other countries act reciprocally. Foreign relations scholars with expertise in separation of powers (“Foreign Relations Scholars”), in support of CIMEX, further contend that allowing Title III to supersede the FSIA would generally upset the balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches because the President should not have the power to unilaterally decide foreign policy. Foreign Relations Scholars put forth the idea that even if there are foreign policy consequences to these actions, the Framers created the checks and balances to ensure the integrity of the U.S. system of government, particularly in situations like these.
Conclusion
Authors
Written by: Emma Babashak and Audrey Hager
Edited by: Kehan Rattani
Acknowledgments
Additional Resources
● Amy Howe, Court Asks for Government’s Views in Decades-Old Exxon Dispute with Cuba, SCOTUSBlog (May 5, 2025).
● Walter Liu, A 60-Year Grievance: Exxon Takes on Sovereign Immunity; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, Harvard Undergraduate Law Review (October 8, 2025).
● Walter Spak, Cuban Immunity Crisis: How Sovereign Immunity Impacts Enforcing the Helms-Burton Act Against Business Ventures in Cuba, American University Business Law Review (2023).