separation of powers

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.

Issues

Does section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act provide a private right of action for Medicaid providers against states under the Supremacy Clause, even when Congress has not explicitly created the right? 

The Supreme Court will consider whether individual Medicaid providers have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act (“§ (30)(A)”), which requires state Medicaid agencies to take provider costs into account when setting reimbursement rates, when Congress has not explicitly granted a private right of action. Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare, argues that individuals do not have a private right of action under § (30)(A) or the Supremacy Clause because a private remedy cannot exist without congressional intent and private litigants should not play a role in determining whether a state gets federal funding. According to Exceptional Child Center, however, when a state law conflicts with federal law, individuals have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause to bring an injunction and prevent harm that would result from the conflicting state statute. The Court’s ruling will impact the right of individuals to recover under the Supremacy Clause as well as the administration of Medicaid and other statutory schemes that provide funding to states as long as they comply with federal law. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Supremacy Clause give Medicaid providers a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) against a state where Congress did not expressly create enforceable rights under that statute?

Exceptional Child Center, Inc., and four other companies (collectively, “ECC”) offer in-home healthcare and other services for those who are Medicaid-eligible in Idaho. See Inclusion, Inc. v. Armstrong, 835 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (D.

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Additional Resources

•    Robert Pear: As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, The New York Times (Dec. 27, 2014). 

•    Peyton M. Sturges: High Court to Review Medicaid Dispute, Providers' Rights to Force Higher Payments, Bloomberg BNA's Health Law Reporter (Oct. 9, 2014). 

•    Steve Vladeck: Enforcing Medicaid Against Recalcitrant States: The Former HHS Officials' Amicus Brief in Armstrong, PrawfsBlawg (Dec. 23, 2014). ​

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Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC

Issues

Does the FTC Act remove subject-matter jurisdiction from district courts to hear constitutional challenges to the FTC’s structure, procedures, and existence by providing for FTC administrative adjudication of antitrust issues and review of these decisions by the courts of appeals?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether claims brought by parties like Axon Enterprise, Inc. (“Axon”) that challenge the structure of the Federal Trade Commission can be reviewed by district courts prior to the completion of agency proceedings. Axon contends that federal district courts should be able to hear constitutional challenges to agency structure concurrently with agency enforcement proceedings because enjoining such proceedings is necessary to avoid “here-and-now” constitutional injury. The FTC counters that the Federal Trade Commission Act implicitly strips district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over these challenges, making judicial review available only in the courts of appeals and only after a final order by the FTC. The case carries significant implications for administrative law because allowing businesses subject to FTC regulation to preemptively challenge agency proceedings could significantly scale back the agency’s enforcement powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Congress impliedly stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedures, and existence by granting the courts of appeals jurisdiction to “affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside” the commission’s cease-and-desist orders.

The Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”) empowers the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to address the use of “unfair methods of competition” by initiating administrative proceedings and issuing cease-and-desist orders. Axon Enter. v. Trade Comm’n at 1189.

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Bank Markazi v. Peterson et al.

Issues

Did Congress violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers by enabling plaintiffs in a single pending case to attach Iranian assets to satisfy their unpaid judgments?

 

In dozens of consolidated cases, Deborah D. Peterson and other plaintiffs (collectively, “Peterson”) representing terror victims collected billions of dollars in judgments against Iran for financing terrorist attacks. See Peterson v. Republic of Iran et al., 758 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2014). In 2010, Peterson sued Bank Markazi, the government-owned Central Bank of Iran, under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”). See id. TRIA allows plaintiffs to attach or garnish the blocked assets of terrorists or their agents. While the action was pending, President Obama issued an executive order blocking the transfer of Bank Markazi’s assets from New York-based accounts, and Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act. See id. at 188–89. The Act’s relevant portion, section 8772, authorized the Peterson plaintiffs to execute against Bank Markazi’s assets to satisfy their unpaid judgments. The law was explicitly limited to Peterson’s action, pending in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Based on section 8772, the district court granted Peterson Summary judgment, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court will decide whether Congress violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers by enacting laws that compelled a certain outcome in Peterson’s case. See Brief for Petitioner Bank Markazi, The Central Bank of Iran at i; Brief for Respondents Deborah D. Peterson, et al., at i. Bank Markazi argues that section 8772 impermissibly determines the outcome of a single pending case, which marks a Congressional expansion of power that is not supported by the Constitution or the Court’s precedent. See Brief for Petitioner at 26, 35. Peterson contends that Bank Markazi’s attack on the statute is unwarranted, because Congress has the constitutional authority to modify the governing law for pending civil litigation in in outcome-determinative ways. See Brief for Respondents at 16, 35–37. The outcome of this case will affect the balance of power between Congress and the courts, and clarify Congress’ power to affect pending litigation. See Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Courts Scholars, in Support of Petitioner at 11–13.   

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does § 8772—a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case—violate the separation of powers?Does § 8772—a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case—violate the separation of powers?

Deborah D. Peterson and several individuals (collectively, “Peterson”) represent people killed in terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran. See Peterson v. Republic of Iran et al., 758 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir.

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Beaird v. United States

Issues

Must federal courts still defer to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as Stinson v. United States held?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether courts must still defer to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary when interpreting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the Court held in Stinson v. United States. Petitioner Kendrick Beaird argues that the Sentencing Reform Act empowers courts, not the Commission, to interpret the Guidelines. Beaird asserts that the Court’s later decisions in Kisor v. Wilkie and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined Stinson’s deference to the Commission. Respondent the United States agrees that Kisor’s limits apply to the commentary but maintains that the commentary will often still warrant deference. Court‑appointed amicus curiae Anthony J. Dick goes further, arguing that because Congress expressly authorized the Commission to interpret its own Guidelines, Stinson stands and Kisor’s limits do not apply. This case will have significant ramifications for both the length and consistency of sentences in federal criminal cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Stinson v. United States still correctly states the rule for deference that courts must give the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”), which created the United States Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) and authorized it to develop federal sentencing guidelines. U.S.

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Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation

Issues

Did the Secretary of the Health and Human Services permissibly include in a hospital’s Medicare reimbursement calculation all the days that a hospital treated patients who satisfied the requirements to be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits, regardless of whether Medicare paid the hospital for those particular days?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an agency had the authority to interpret the Medicare statute and change the calculation of payments distributed to hospitals that serve low-income patients who receive Medicare benefits. Petitioner Xavier Becerra, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, argues that the Department of Health and Human Services properly followed the procedural and substantive requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act when implementing its interpretation of the meaning of “entitled to” Medicare benefits in effecting a new calculation for determining two different pools of low-income patients. Respondent Empire Health Foundation counters that the agency’s rule causes a severe undercount of the low-income patient pool, causing those hospitals that serve indigent patients to receive a significantly lower reimbursement amount. The outcome of this case has important implications for the distribution of Medicaid funding and the extension of deference to government agencies’ reasonable interpretations of legislation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, for purposes of calculating additional payment for hospitals that serve a “significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients,” the secretary of health and human services has permissibly included in a hospital’s Medicare fraction all of the hospital’s patient days of individuals who satisfy the requirements to be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits, regardless of whether Medicare paid the hospital for those particular days.

The Medicare program currently provides additional payments, known as the disproportionate-share-hospital (“DSH”) adjustment, to hospitals that treat a significantly higher number of low-in

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Collins v. Mnuchin

Issues

Does the structure of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) violate the separation of powers; and if so, must the Court invalidate FHFA’s conservatorship of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the structure of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) is unconstitutional. If so, this structure may render the placement of the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) into FHFA’s conservatorship void. Respondent Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin argues that the succession and anti-injunction clauses of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“Recovery Act”) bar Collin’s claim because that claim is derivative. Mnuchin asserts the Recovery Act’s removal clause does not invalidate the challenged amendment to the FHFA’s agreement with the Treasury Department and that the court should sever the removal clause from the rest of the statute. Petitioner Patrick J. Collins counters that neither the succession clause nor the anti-injunction clauses bar a direct suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Collins contends that the Court’s response to the removal clause should set aside both the challenged amendment to FHFA’s agreement with the Treasury and the Recovery Act’s conservatorship clause. This case's outcome has implications for the separation of powers and protections for “for-cause” removal. The case could impact private individuals' incentives to bring constitutional challenges to the court and the government’s ability to intervene in moments of economic crises. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s structure violates the separation of powers; and (2) whether the courts must set aside a final agency action that FHFA took when it was unconstitutionally structured and strike down the statutory provisions that make FHFA independent.

Congress established the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) to stabilize the housing market and to increase the public’s access to mortgage credit in 1938 and 1970, respectively. Collins v. Mnuchin at 564.

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Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads

Issues

Does section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act, which allows Amtrak and the government to cooperate in developing railroad-related metrics and standards, give Amtrak unconstitutional regulatory power under the non-delegation doctrine?

The Supreme Court will consider whether section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (“PRIIA”) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to Amtrak. The Department of Transportation argues that section 207 is a constitutional delegation of power because the government maintains sufficient control over Amtrak and has the final say on any policy that Amtrak develops. The Association of American Railroads, however, argues that section 207 is not a constitutional delegation of power because Amtrak is a private entity with rulemaking authority. The Court’s ruling impacts the government’s accountability for Amtrak’s policies and the efficacy of the passenger rail market. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 207(a) of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L.

No. 110-432, Div. B, 122 Stat. 4916, requires that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Amtrak “jointly * * * develop” the metrics and standards for Amtrak’s performance that will be used in part to determine whether the Surface Transportation Board (STB) will investigate a freight railroad for failing to provide the preference for Amtrak's passenger trains that is required by 49 U.S.C. 24308(c) (Supp. V 2011). In the event that the FRA and Amtrak cannot agree on the metrics and standards within 180 days, Section 207(d) of the Act provides for the STB to “appoint an arbitrator to assist the parties in resolving their disputes through binding arbitration.” 122 Stat. 4917. The question presented is whether Section 207 effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a private entity.

In 1970, Congress adopted the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (“RPSA”), which was intended to aid in maintaining a national passenger railway system. See Assoc. of Am. Railroads v. United States Dept. of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Cynthia R. Farina for her perspective and insights on this case. 

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Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison

Issues

Does Article III of the Constitution permit bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in “core” proceedings as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)? If not, can bankruptcy courts exercise jurisdiction over litigants through their “implied consent”?

In 2011, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall that bankruptcy courts are constitutionally barred from granting final judgments on certain “core” state law claims. Since then, lower courts have tried to determine the scope of the holding, which addresses bankruptcy courts’ ability, as non-Article III courts, to preside over issues traditionally considered to be core bankruptcy issues. Petitioner, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, (“EBIA”) was a third party to a bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor in the proceeding had fraudulently transferred $373,291.28 to EBIA before filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee, Arkison, sued EBIA to recover those funds, and the bankruptcy court granted a judgment against EBIA. EBIA appealed and invoked Stern v. Marshall, claiming that the bankruptcy court could not enter a final judgment on a fraudulent transfer claim. The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court, reasoning that EBIA had impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case will clarify the limits of Stern v. Marshall and define “core” bankruptcy proceeding. The Court will also determine what kind of consent is necessary for bankruptcy courts to have jurisdiction over claims requiring adjudication by Article III judges. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), this Court held that Article III of the United States Constitution precludes Congress from assigning certain “core” bankruptcy proceedings involving private state law rights to adjudication by non-Article III bankruptcy judges. Applying Stern, the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a fraudulent conveyance action is subject to Article III. The court further held, in conflict with the Sixth Circuit, that the Article III problem had been waived by petitioner’s litigation conduct, which the court of appeals construed as implied consent to entry of final judgment by the bankruptcy court. The court of appeals also held, in conflict with the Seventh Circuit, that a bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject to a district court’s de novo review, in “core” bankruptcy proceedings where Article III precludes the bankruptcy court from entering final judgment. The court of appeals’ decision presents the following questions, about which there is considerable confusion in the lower courts in the wake of Stern: 

  1. Whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and, if so, whether “implied consent” based on a litigant’s conduct, where the statutory scheme provides the litigant no notice that its consent is required, is sufficient to satisfy Article III.
  2. Whether a bankruptcy judge may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court in a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 157(b). 

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Facts

Nicholas Paleveda and Marjorie Ewing, a married couple, operated a series of companies, including Aegis Retirement Income Services, Inc. (“ARIS”) and the Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (“BIA”). See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (“EBIA”), 702 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir.

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Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A.

Issues

Can Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alone allow U.S-based plaintiffs to sue Cuban instrumentalities, such as Cuban state-owned oil companies, which would normally be given sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alone abrogates Cuban instrumentalities’ sovereign immunity, or whether plaintiffs must also show an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The FSIA states that foreign states and their instrumentalities are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, except for actions based on commercial activity causing a direct effect in the United States or expropriation, which applies when rights to property taken in violation of international law are at issue. Petitioner, Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”) argues that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act satisfies the clear-statement rule that Congress requires to abrogate foreign sovereign immunity under FSIA. Respondents, Corporación CIMEX and related corporations (collectively “CIMEX”) posit that Congress did not create a clear exception to FISA and that Title III suits must fit within the existing exceptions in FISA that allow for suits against countries or instrumentalities that typically enjoy sovereign immunity. This case touches on the interpretation of Congress’s intent in enacting the Helms-Burton Act and the balancing of interests between recognition of sovereign states and fairness in outcomes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Before Fidel Castro rose to power, Exxon Mobile Corporation (“Exxon”), then known as Standard Oil, owned multiple subsidiaries in Cuba. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Acknowledgments

 

Additional Resources

● Amy Howe, Court Asks for Government’s Views in Decades-Old Exxon Dispute with Cuba, SCOTUSBlog (May 5, 2025). 

● Walter Liu, A 60-Year Grievance: Exxon Takes on Sovereign Immunity; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, Harvard Undergraduate Law Review (October 8, 2025). 

● Walter Spak, Cuban Immunity Crisis: How Sovereign Immunity Impacts Enforcing the Helms-Burton Act Against Business Ventures in Cuba, American University Business Law Review (2023).

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Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research

Issues

Did Congress violate the nondelegation clause when it authorized the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to regulate revenue for the Universal Service Fund, which exists to subsidize access to telecommunications; and, did the FCC unconstitutionally delegate authority to a private entity in the implementation of the Universal Service Fund?

This case asks the Court to determine if Congress’ delegation of authority to the FCC under 47 U.S.C. § 254 was unconstitutional, and whether the FCC’s delegation to a private entity to implement some § 254 provisions was unconstitutional. The FCC argues that the delegation was not unconstitutional because Congress gave the FCC an “intelligible principle” with which to execute the statute. The FCC further contends that it only used a private entity for advice and maintained ultimate authority when it came to the implementation of the statute. Consumers’ Research argues that the statute only announces vague aspirational policy goals and gives too much legislative power to the FCC. Additionally, Consumers’ Research posits that the private entity’s involvement in the implementation of the statute went beyond advice and amounted to private creation of federal law. This case involves questions regarding the separation of powers and how much leeway agencies have in implementing policy. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Universal Service Fund; (2) whether the FCC violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the financial projections of the private company appointed as the fund's administrator in computing universal service contribution rates; (3) whether the combination of Congress’s conferral of authority on the FCC and the FCC’s delegation of administrative responsibilities to the administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine; and (4) whether this case is moot in light of the challengers' failure to seek preliminary relief before the 5th Circuit.

It has been a longstanding congressional policy to ensure that all Americans have access to telecommunications services. Consumers’ Research v. FCC at 2. For many years, Congress achieved this policy by allowing AT&T, which once held a regulated monopoly over the telecommunications industry, to charge urban customers high rates.

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