justiciability

Beverly R. Gill, et al. v. William Whitford, et al.

Issues

Can individual voters challenge a state-wide redistricting plan as unconstitutional? Is a re-districting plan constitutional so long as it complies with traditional districting criteria? Was the issue of entrenchment properly litigated?

In what Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called the most important case presently before the Supreme Court, the Court will venture into the thicket of redistricting. Wisconsin Republicans redrew Wisconsin’s State Assembly district maps in 2011, allowing them to win the majority of Assembly seats with only 48.6% of state votes and prompting Wisconsin Democrats to sue. A U.S. District Court held for the Wisconsin Democrats, finding the re-districting plan unconstitutional because it was gerrymandered with the intent of disenfranchising Democrats, had such an effect, and lacked a legitimate justification for its effects. Four issues will decide the outcome of this case: are the Democrats entitled to have their claim heard in court; is the test that the district court adopted judicially “discernable” and “manageable” enough for courts to apply; does compliance with traditional districting criteria render a redistricting plan non-discriminatory notwithstanding the district court’s test; and did the parties fully litigate the issue of entrenchment? Will the Court intervene in partisan gerrymandering and expand federal power or will it abstain from this politically charged question to protect federalism?

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the district court correctly held that Appellees have standing to challenge in its entirety the district plan for Wisconsin’s State Assembly as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander?
  2. Whether the district court correctly held that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable pursuant to the test the court adopted—requiring discriminatory intent, a large and durable discriminatory effect, and a lack of any legitimate justification?
  3. Whether the district court correctly held that compliance with traditional districting criteria is not a safe harbor that precludes any possibility of liability for partisan gerrymandering?
  4. Whether Appellants are entitled to a remand on the issue of entrenchment even though Appellees and the district court emphasized the durability of a party’s advantage throughout the litigation?

Wisconsin has long faced difficulty drawing its electoral districts—a process commonly known as redistricting. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, at *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016). In the 1980s, after a Republican governor repeatedly vetoed any redistricting plans proposed by the Democratic Assembly, a federal court had to determine the districts. Id. at 5.

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Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk

Issues

Does a purported collective action become moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff in the case receives a complete offer of judgment from the defendants and all other potential plaintiffs have not yet joined the case?

 

In a putative collective action, Laura Symczyk alleged that Genesis HealthCare Corporation violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by automatically deducting break time from her and other employees’ pay, regardless of whether they performed compensable work during their breaks. Before any other plaintiffs joined the action, Genesis made an offer of judgment for full relief of Symczyk’s claims. Symczyk did not accept the offer, but the district court dismissed the case because the offer of judgment left Symczyk without a personal stake in the litigation. Symczyk argues that she continues to have a personal stake and that the interests of plaintiffs yet to join the action creates jurisdiction. Genesis argues that a complete offer to satisfy a lone plaintiff’s claim renders the case moot. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will decide whether an unaccepted offer of judgment can render a case moot and whether courts may consider the interests of unnamed, hypothetical parties in determining whether the parties have a personal stake in the litigation. The decision will affect collective-action trial practices for both plaintiffs and defendants, including plaintiffs’ use of the discovery process to join class members and defendants’ use of individual offers of judgment to forestall or avoid collective actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s claims.

Between April and December 2007, Laura Symczyk worked as a Registered Nurse at a healthcare facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 190 (3d Cir.

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas

Issues

Under the Hobbs Act, can someone who wasn’t directly involved in a case challenge a government agency’s decision in court if they believe the agency went beyond its legal power? Second, do the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to temporarily store nuclear fuel away from nuclear-reactor sites? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether parties like Texas can challenge an agency’s decision in court, despite not participating in the agency’s earlier hearing concerning the decision. Texas claims it has standing as an aggrieved party because it only needs to participate even slightly in the original decision-making process, while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) argues Texas misinterprets the law because Texas was required to be a party in the decision-making process, not just a general participant, to be an aggrieved party. The case also asks the Supreme Court to decide if federal laws regulating nuclear energy production allow the NRC to license private companies to store nuclear waste away from the nuclear energy facilities, specifically in the Permian Basin in Texas. Texas argues that federal statutes only empower the NRC to license on-site or federal controlled off-site storage, while the NRC asserts that they have that power because the statutes do not explicitly limit its authority to license temporary, private off-site storage. The outcome of this case has future implications for both nuclear energy expansion, and oil and gas production in the Permian Basin region.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Hobbs Act, which authorizes a “party aggrieved” by an agency’s “final order” to petition for review in a court of appeals, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency’s statutory authority.

Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.

In 1942, the first nuclear reactor was created in the United States. Texas v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 3. In 1946, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act, which allowed civilian use of atomic power.

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Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski

Issues

Does a subsequent change of an unconstitutional policy moot plaintiffs’ claims that the policy violated their constitutional rights when their only remaining claims are for nominal damages?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a college’s change of an unconstitutional speech policy moots a claim that the original policy violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights when their claims are only for nominal damages. Petitioner Chike Uzuegbunam argues that a claim for nominal damages is not mooted by a subsequent policy change because nominal damages serve to vindicate plaintiffs’ past injuries. Uzuegbunam also argues that nominal damages serve an important function because they are distinct from declaratory judgments and there are no alternative remedies for victims of unconstitutional government conduct. Respondent Stanley C. Preczewski counters that nominal damages merely serve a prospective purpose, and therefore nominal-damages claims are moot when a constitutional violation is not reasonably expected to continue. Preczewski also argues that when a constitutional violation is completed, nominal damages only serve to provide declaratory relief and that other remedies, such as declaratory judgments, injunctions, and compensatory damages, can be used to address government violations of a victim’s constitutional rights. This decision will impact how governments respond to constitutional challenges and the administrative burdens imposed on the courts and government defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a government’s post-filing change of an unconstitutional policy moots nominal-damages claims that vindicate the government’s past, completed violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional right.

 

Chike Uzuegbunam and Joseph Bradford were both students attending Georgia Gwinnett College (“GGC”) who shared similar religious beliefs and a desire to express those beliefs publicly. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski at 3–4. In July 2016, Uzuegbunam was distributing literature that promoted his religious beliefs in an outdoor plaza on campus when a campus police officer approached him. Id. at 3.

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Zivotofsky v. Clinton

Issues

Whether a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem can demand that the State Department record his place of birth as Jerusalem, Israel under Section 214 (d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act in spite of U.S. foreign policy against expressing an official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel.

 

The U.S. Embassy refused to record the place of birth of Petitioner Menachem Zivotofsky as “Jerusalem, Israel” in accordance with U.S. foreign policy to refrain from expressing an official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. His parents filed suit on his behalf, demanding that the State Department comply with Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires the State Department to record the place of birth of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem as Israel, if the child’s legal guardians so request. The district court held that the judiciary has no authority to order the executive branch to change its foreign policy under the political question doctrine; the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this holding. Petitioner Zivotofsky (through his parents) argues that the political question doctrine does not apply because the case involves a question of statutory interpretation. Secretary of State Clinton contends that Section 214 is unconstitutional because Congress has no authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will clarify the political question doctrine, and may shed light on the issue of separation of powers among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the “political question doctrine” deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to enforce a federal statute that explicitly directs the Secretary of State how to record the birthplace of an American citizen on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a passport.

2. Whether Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, impermissibly infringes the President’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns.

Since the United States recognized the state of Israel in 1948, the executive branch has remained neutral on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. See Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir.

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Zivotofsky v. Kerry

Issues

Does a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, upon an American citizen’s request, to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in “Jerusalem, Israel” on a United States passport and on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad infringe upon the President’s authority to recognize foreign states and governments?

When the United States does not have an official position regarding which country controls a city, United States passports will list the city of birth but not a country of birth. The Supreme Court will now determine two legal issues: (1) whether Foreign Relations Authorization Act’s Section 214(d) is an exercise of regulating the issuance of passports or an exercise of recognizing foreign nations; and (2) if Section 214(d) is an act of recognition, whether the President has exclusive authority to recognize foreign nations. Zivotofsky argues that Section 214(d) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power to regulate the issuance of passports and also contends that the Constitution does not vest exclusive recognition authority in the President. The Secretary of State argues that Section 214(d) is a constitutional exercise of the President’s power to recognize foreign nations and also contends that the Constitution vests exclusive recognition authority in the President. The Supreme Court’s decision could affect U.S. foreign policy and the allocation of powers between the legislative and executive branches.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, on request, to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in “Israel” on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport is unconstitutional on the ground that the statute “impermissibly infringes on the President’s exercise of the recognition power reposing exclusively in him.”

Due to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the "political status of Jerusalem has been in dispute since 1948." Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F.Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2007). As part of peacekeeping efforts, the United States government does not recognize Jerusalem as belonging to any sovereign nation.

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