Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton

    Issues

    Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) create any time limit to dismiss a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction?

    Oral argument:
    November 04, 2025
    Court below:
    United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

     

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) may impose a time limit on motions to set aside a default judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Petitioner Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. (“Coney Island”) contends that Rule 60(c)(1) was intended to govern only voidable judgments, not those that were void from the beginning of the judgment, or ab initio. Coney Island argues that enforcing a judgment void from the outset from lack of personal jurisdiction necessarily violates the fundamental principles of due process, as no court lacking jurisdiction ever has lawful authority to adjudicate a defendant’s rights. Respondent, Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, Jeanne Ann Burton (“Burton”), maintains that the drafters of Rule 60(c)(1) intended the rule to apply to all void judgments regardless of whether they were void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Burton argues that even if the rule is enforced, defendants still have avenues to raise the fact that their original judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction through other procedural means if the judgment is referenced later on. Additionally, Burton argues that the reasonable-time restriction in Rule 60(b)(4) correctly balances the public policy goals. Burton states that the Rule encourages finality in judgments to prevent excess litigation while also allowing for defendants to bring motions, within reasonable limits, when they believe their rights are being violated by the enforcement of a judgment lacking personal jurisdiction. The outcome of this case has implications for the behavior of parties in a suit and the fairness of notice requirements.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

    Facts

    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) permits substantive relief from a judgment that is void, including when a court rules it lacked personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Personal jurisdiction requires that a defendant be properly served and subject to the court’s authority before judgment is entered. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), which governs the timing of motions, requires that motions under Rule 60(b) be brought “within a reasonable time.”

    In November 2014, Vista-Pro Automotives, LLC (“Vista-Pro”), a Tennessee-based auto-parts manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy in the Middle District of Tennessee. . During their Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Vista-Pro filed an adversary complaint against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. (“Coney Island”), a New York corporation. Vista-Pro alleged nonpayment of $48,696 in outstanding invoices against Coney Island. On February 23, 2015, Vista-Pro served a summons and complaint by first-class mail addressed to “Coney Island Auto Parts Unltd., Inc.” at its Brooklyn, New York business address. The mailed complaint was not addressed to any officer or agent.  Coney Island did not respond, and in May 2015, the Middle District of Tennessee bankruptcy court entered a default judgment against them.  In 2016, Vista-Pro’s bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, and Respondent Jeanne Ann Burton (“Burton”) was appointed as trustee. Burton assumed responsibility for collecting Vista-Pro’s receivables, including Coney Island’s default judgment. Between 2016 and 2021, Burton repeatedly attempted to enforce the judgment. In April 2016, she mailed Coney Island a demand letter addressed to its CEO. Coney Island has since acknowledged receipt of the letter but never responded. In 2018, Burton issued subpoenas to Coney Island’s vendors, and Coney Island again failed to reply. In 2020, Burton registered the Middle District of Tennessee’s default judgment in the Southern District of New York. In February 2021, in response to the subpoena, Burton obtained a bank restraint on Coney Island’s account in the amount of $97,000, twice the judgment value.

    In October 2021, Coney Island filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate the May 2015 judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction.   The Southern District of New York bankruptcy court denied the motion on comity grounds. The court held that the motion should be brought in the original Tennessee bankruptcy court. In July 2022, Coney Island renewed its motion in the Tennessee bankruptcy court. The Tennessee bankruptcy court denied relief, finding that the motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1), which requires Rule 60 motions to be filed “within a reasonable time.” The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee affirmed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the ruling in a divided decision. The majority held that even motions alleging a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) are subject to the reasonable-time limit.  Judge McKeague dissented, emphasizing that a judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction is a legal nullity that cannot be revived by the passage of time.

    Coney Island filed a petition for certiorari on January 30, 2025, which the Supreme Court of the United States granted on June 6, 2025. 

    Analysis

    “REASONABLE TIME” APPLICATIONS TO RULE 60(b)(4) MOTIONS

    Coney Island contends that applying Rule 60(c)(1)’s time limitation to motions under Rule 60(b)(4) contravenes both the case law and the actual text of the Rule. Coney Island asserts that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio, or a nullity that cannot be revived by the passage of time. Coney Island explains that for over 150 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void from the outset and cannot gain validity through delay. Coney Island asserts that prior Supreme Court precedent reinforces the idea that due process requires jurisdiction as a precondition to binding judgment. In addition, Coney Island argues that Rule 60 was never intended to alter this longstanding constitutional rule. Coney Island notes that the 1938 and 1946 FRCP Advisory Committee records confirm that void judgments were “subject to collateral attack in any forum at any time.” Coney Island highlights that Rule 60(b)(4) contains no explicit time restriction and that the “reasonable time” clause in Rule 60(c)(1) was meant to govern voidable judgments rather than those void ab initio. Moreover, Coney Island asserts that a temporal limit does not fit within the Rule’s structure. Coney Island explains that while Rule 60(c)(1) explicitly sets a one-year limit for subsections (b)(1)-(3) for motions, it does not separately list subsection (b)(4). Coney Island suggests that because of this, the drafters at the time did not intend a time bar for jurisdictional defects. Furthermore, Coney Island argues that the Sixth Circuit misconstrued Rule 60(c)(1) by failing to distinguish between void (null forever) and voidable (valid unless overturned) judgments. In addition, Coney Island suggests that if Rule 60(c)(1) was construed to bar relief from a judgment rendered without jurisdiction, it would violate due process by enforcing a void order.  

    On the other hand, Burton contends that the text of Rule 60(c)(1) is explicit and controlling because the Rule states “[A] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.”  Burton claims that Rule 60(b)(4) motions are undeniably motions under Rule 60(b), and thus fall squarely within this requirement. Burton emphasizes that the plain language of Rule 60(c)(1) leaves no room for a judicially created exception, and thus emphasizes that courts may not infer carveouts not explicitly written in the statute. Burton maintains that the structure of Rule 60 confirms the original drafters’ deliberate choice. Burton states that the drafters explicitly provided a one-year limit for three specific categories: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); and (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” However, Burton claims that the drafters retained a general “reasonable time limit” for the remaining grounds enumerated under the statute, including void judgments. Burton contends that this structure demonstrates that the drafters understood how to impose differentiated timing rules and intentionally applied the reasonable-time standard to all other subsections listed in Rule 60(b). In addition, Burton further emphasizes that the Rule’s drafting history supports this reading. Burton rejects Coney Island’s use of remarks from members of the Advisory Committee to support the assertion that void judgments are not subject to Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable time requirement. For instance, Burton explains that during the 1946 amendments, the Advisory Committee rejected proposals to exempt void judgments from any time constraint. Burton emphasizes that the Rule itself, not comments by members of the Committee, should be prioritized because ultimately the drafters decided to adopt the Rule. Burton also rejects Coney Island’s reliance on historical practice, as even before the adoption of the Federal Rules, some courts imposed time limits on motions to vacate void judgments. In any case, Burton emphasizes that historical practice cannot override unambiguous procedural text. Finally, Burton stresses that Coney Island’s delay, which was over six years after learning of the judgment, was unreasonable by any standard. Burton highlights that Rule 60(c)(1) does not resuscitate void judgments, but it merely governs when litigants may seek relief.

    WHETHER VOID JUDGMENTS CAN BECOME VALID OVER TIME

    Coney Island asserts that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction remains forever void. Coney Island claims that the absence of jurisdiction means that a court never had authority in the first place. Thus, Coney Island argues that the absence of jurisdiction cannot be waived or cured by time. Coney Island emphasizes that the Supreme Court describes void judgments as “nullities.” Thus, Coney Island argues that putting time limits on challenges to void judgments makes an illegal judgment valid. Furthermore, Coney Island argues that limiting the time to seek vacatur, which means a court cancellation of the original judgment, is not reflected in court decisions. Coney Island stresses that courts in multiple circuits have recognized that Rule 60(b)(4) contains no temporal limitation on challenges to void judgments. This absence, Coney Island argues, reflects the established understanding that judgments entered without jurisdiction are null from the outset and remain open to attack at any time. Accordingly, Coney Island concludes that void judgments, unlike merely voidable ones, cannot acquire legitimacy through delay or procedural default.  

    Burton recognizes that a judgment entered without jurisdiction is substantively void, but argues that Rule 60 governs the procedural mechanism for obtaining relief from that void judgment. In other words, Burton claims that the Rule does not make an invalid judgment valid, but it simply defines the conditions under which courts will entertain motions to set such judgments aside. Burton claims that the Supreme Court, as well as other courts, have placed many limits on vacatur that permit void judgments to remain final. Burton emphasizes that time limits are common in procedural law and do not violate due process so long as they afford reasonable opportunity to be heard. Burton highlights that the Supreme Court enforces appeals deadlines, one form of procedure, even when consequences could be life, death, or imprisonment. Moreover, Burton notes that Rule 60’s flexibility accommodates a broad range of what is “reasonable.” Burton explains that courts can excuse delay when a party lacked notice or acted promptly after learning of the defect. Burton emphasizes that Rule 60(c)(1) precludes strategic or negligent delays, such as Coney Island’s six-year inaction, despite knowledge of the judgment. Burton concludes that by enforcing the reasonable-time requirement, courts ensure that relief from void judgments remains available but not limitless.

    Discussion

    UNREASONABLE DELAY

    Coney Island argues that applying Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time restriction to motions seeking to vacate a void judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction would encourage plaintiffs to engage in unethical conduct. For instance, Coney Island highlights that a plaintiff might effect service through a technically valid method, such as through the mail, while knowing that the defendant is unlikely to actually receive it. Additionally, Coney Island contends that abandoning the reasonable-time restriction on defendants in this case will not necessarily lead to an increase in their ability to intentionally delay litigation. Coney Island furthers that a plaintiff can protect against such delays by promptly reviewing the judgment for defects, including service of process, and bringing any necessarily motions to determine the judgment’s validity. Finally, Coney Island notes that when a judgment is determined void for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs have multiple alternative avenues to preserve their claims apart from relying on Rule 60(c)(1)’s time limitation, such as filing a new action with an amended pleading that relates back to the original under Rule 15(c).

    Burton argues that any gamesmanship on behalf of the plaintiff could be accounted for by the fact-specific inquiry that courts conduct when determining if a defendant brought a Rule 60(b)(4) motion under Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time restriction. Burton also contends that if Rule 60(c)(1) is not interpreted to limit the time for filing a motion under Rule 60(b)(4), defendants will be incentivized to engage in unscrupulous conduct by intentionally not responding to service of process in a timely fashion. Burton argues that this delay would cause a plaintiff to face prejudice when the case is raised after the reasonable period of time.  Burton states that this prejudice could create issues at trial, such as preventing the plaintiff from presenting any key witnesses or evidence essential to their case.

    FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS

    Coney Island contends that a party’s fundamental liberty is at stake if there is any limitation on their ability to bring a motion to attack a void judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. Coney Island argues that a void judgment inherently attests to the fact that the defendant did not receive a fair opportunity to be notified of their lawsuit. This lack of fair notice eliminates any legal force it should have, because the defendant should not have to follow a null judgment. The dissent in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, arguing that the enforcement of these judgments will only delegitimize the courts and erode public confidence in the rule of law. 

    Burton responds that defendants who were not properly served still have sufficient opportunity to seek relief under Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time requirement, which balances the right to challenge void judgments with the need to prevent abuse of the judicial process through excess litigation. Burton adds that a party’s liberty is not compromised when they voluntarily forfeit their rights by failing to act within the reasonable-time requirement of Rule 60(c)(1). Burton further contends that multiple procedural doctrines recognize that parties may lawfully lose the right to vacate a void judgment. Burton provides examples such as the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes jurisdictional challenges that could have been raised earlier, and a party’s failure to assert a jurisdictional defect on direct appeal, among others. The Sixth Circuit agreed, adding that it would be unfair if Rule 60(b)(4) carved out an exception for judgments that were void for lack of personal jurisdiction while treating other void judgments, such as those entered without subject matter jurisdiction, differently, because both judgments are null.

    Conclusion

    Authors

    Written by:  Emma Babashak and Audrey Hager

    Edited by:     Zac Jacobson

     

    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for his guidance and insights into this case. 

    Additional Resources