Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

civil procedure

diversity jurisdiction

Dupree v. Younger

Issues

To preserve the issue for appeal, must a party reassert a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment in a post-trial motion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether litigants can preserve purely legal issues for appellate review without having to raise such issues in a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. This case also asks whether a trial court’s rejection of a litigant’s motion for summary judgment as a matter of law constitutes a final judgment subject to appellate review. Petitioner Neil Dupree argues that the Court should allow the preservation for appeal of purely legal issues rejected by the trial court in summary judgment without raising them again in a Rule 50 motion, according to the principles of the final judgment rule and interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent Kevin Younger counters that the Court must require litigants to file a Rule 50 motion to preserve legal issues for appellate review because a rejection of a motion for summary judgment does not constitute an appealable final judgment. This case also has implications for judicial efficiency and economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether to preserve the issue for appellate review a party must reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment.

In September of 2013, three prison guards attacked Respondent Kevin Younger while he was being held as a pretrial detainee at the Maryland Reception, Diagnostic & Classification Center (“MRDCC”), a state prison in Baltimore. Younger v. Dupree at 3.

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Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections

Issues

Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires that prisoners first exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing a civil rights suit in federal court, mandates that a prisoner's entire civil suit be dismissed from federal court if the prisoner has failed to totally exhaust all available administrative remedies for each claim prior to filing suit? Additionally, does a prisoner, who proceeds to file suit in federal court but fails to attach to his complaint proof and documentation of how he exhausted all available administrative remedies, must have his entire case dismissed from  federal  court? Finally, does a prisoner's entire civil rights case must be dismissed from  federal  court if, during the process of exhausting available administrative remedies, he failed to specifically name the parties whom he later named as defendants in his federal court case?

 

Lorenzo Jones and Timothy Williams both filed suit against the Michigan Department of Corrections on the grounds that the treatment they received in jail violated their Constitutional civil rights. The Circuit Court held that neither plaintiff fulfilled their requirements to totally exhaust available administrative remedies under 42. U.S.C. § 1997e of the PLRA. The Circuit Court held that Jones failed the exhaustion requirement because he failed to either describe or attach proof of how he exhausted administrative remedies in his complaint. See Jones v. Bock, 135 Fed at 839. Although Williams did attach proof of exhaustion to his complaint, the Circuit Court held that he still failed the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement because he did not specifically name the defendant in his initial grievance filings with prison officials. See Williams v. Overton, 136 Fed at 862. In these consolidated cases, Petitioners argue that the Circuit Court's holdings amount to judicially-created pleading requirements that are inconsistent with the PLRA’s text, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and judicial norms. Respondents maintain that the PLRA instituted a “new regime” for inmate Civil Rights Act suits and that the text and structure of the PLRA require the Circuit Court’s heightened pleading requirements. See Brief for Respondents at 27-28. How the Supreme Court decides these condensed cases will reflect its view of the correct balance of burden between inmate plaintiffs and the judiciary. These cases will either require prisoners to be more vigilant in asserting their own civil rights or require the judiciary to be more active in defending prisoners’ rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections:

1. Whether satisfaction of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is a prerequisite to a prisoner's federal civil rights suit such that the prisoner must allege in his complaint how he exhausted his administrative remedies (or attach proof of exhaustion to the complaint), or instead, whether non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proven by the defense.

2. Whether the PLRA prescribes a “total exhaustion” rule that requires a federal district court to dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.

Williams v. Overton:

1. Whether the PLRA requires a prisoner to name a particular defendant in his or her administrative grievance in order to exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to that defendant and to preserve his or her right to sue them.

2. Whether the PLRA prescribes a “total exhaustion” rule that requires a federal district court to dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.

Purpose and Effect of the PLRA

If a prisoner feels that his civil rights have been violated during his incarceration, he has a right to file a civil rights claim in federal court. Each year, thousands of prisoners commence actions on these grounds. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), which was passed by Congress in 1996, was designed in response to an influx of prisoner civil rights litigation.

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Kemp v. United States

Issues

Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorize relief based on a district court’s error of law?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which authorizes relief from a final judgment on the grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” authorizes relief on the grounds that a district court committed an error of law. A federal district court determined that petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp’s motion for relief from legal error under Rule 60(b)(6) should instead be construed as a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and dismissed Kemp’s petition because it was not presented within the one-year limitations period that applies to motions under Rule 60(b)(1) but not to motions under Rule 60(b)(6). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Kemp argues that, because Rule 60(b)(1) replicated identical state statutory provisions that did not allow relief for legal error, the Court cannot construe Rule 60(b)(1) to authorize relief for legal error. The United States responds that both the plain meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) and the fact that Rule 60(b)(1) replicated a California statute allowing relief for legal error establish that Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief for legal error. Because the Court’s decision on the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) will determine for how long after entry of final judgment a litigant is entitled to seek relief for legal error, the resolution of this case will affect the expediency and finality of federal civil litigation. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court’s error of law.

On November 15, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court judgment convicting petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp and several codefendants of various drug and firearm offenses. Kemp v. United States, No. 20-10958, slip op. at 2 (11th Cir.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his insights into this case.

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Krupski v. Costa Crociere

Issues

Whether a plaintiff, who has imputed knowledge of the identity of a defendant, files an amended complaint to add the known defendant after a  one-year statute of limitations, can “relate back” to the filing date of the original complaint through the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)?

 

Wanda Krupski (“Krupski”) suffered an injury as a passenger on a cruise ship owned and operated by Costa Crociere S.p.A. (“Costa Crociere”). In the United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida, her lawyer filed suit against Costa Cruise, N.V., LLC, Costa Crociere’s booking agent. The parties dismissed that suit by stipulation, because the owner and operator of a cruise ship is subject to liability, not the booking agent. Krupski filed an amended complaint against Costa Crociere—the correct party. Costa Crociere filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, finding that Krupski had not made a “mistake” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) (“Rule 15(c)”) that would allow the amendment to relate back to the original filing of the complaint. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify what constitutes a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(l)(C) Permits An Amended Complaint To "Relate Back", For Limitation Purposes, When The Amendment Corrects A, "Mistake Concerning The Proper Party's Identity". Other Circuit Courts of Appeal Construe The Rule As Applying To Substitution Of The Correct Defendant For A Related Corporation With A Similar Name. The Eleventh Circuit Has Concluded That There Can Be No Such "Mistake" Where The Plaintiff Had Imputed Knowledge Of The Identity Of The Added Defendant Prior To Filing Suit. Does The Eleventh Circuit Construction Of Rule 15(c)(l)(C) Undermine The Purpose Of The Rule And Is It Inconsistent With The Decisions In Other Circuits?

Wanda Krupski used a South Carolina-based travel agent to purchase a cruise from Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC (“Costa Cruise”) in Hollywood, Florida. Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 330 Fed.Appx. 892, 893 (11th Cir.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Civil Procedure

·      Wex: Law about Complaint

·      Wex: Law about Pleading

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motion for directed verdict

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