SERVICE OF PROCESS

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) may impose a time limit on motions to set aside a default judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Petitioner Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. (“Coney Island”) contends that Rule 60(c)(1) was intended to govern only voidable judgments, not those that were void from the beginning of the judgment, or ab initio. Coney Island argues that enforcing a judgment void from the outset from lack of personal jurisdiction necessarily violates the fundamental principles of due process, as no court lacking jurisdiction ever has lawful authority to adjudicate a defendant’s rights. Respondent, Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, Jeanne Ann Burton (“Burton”), maintains that the drafters of Rule 60(c)(1) intended the rule to apply to all void judgments regardless of whether they were void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Burton argues that even if the rule is enforced, defendants still have avenues to raise the fact that their original judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction through other procedural means if the judgment is referenced later on. Additionally, Burton argues that the reasonable-time restriction in Rule 60(b)(4) correctly balances the public policy goals. Burton states that the Rule encourages finality in judgments to prevent excess litigation while also allowing for defendants to bring motions, within reasonable limits, when they believe their rights are being violated by the enforcement of a judgment lacking personal jurisdiction. The outcome of this case has implications for the behavior of parties in a suit and the fairness of notice requirements.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can serve a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) by addressing the service of process package to the state’s foreign minister and sending it to the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States. The plaintiff, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”), maintains that, under the FSIA, plaintiffs must serve a foreign state by sending the service of process package to the foreign minister at the ministry of foreign affairs located in that foreign state’s capital. Sudan contends that Article 22 of the Vienna Convention supports this interpretation because it precludes service “via” or “through” a diplomatic mission. However, the respondents—a group of victims of an al-Qaeda attack including named party Rick Harrison (“Harrison”)—contend that, although the FSIA requires plaintiffs to address and send their service of process mail to a state’s foreign minister, it does not direct plaintiffs to send the package to a particular location. Harrison asserts that, because the FSIA’s text unambiguously allows service through an embassy, the Vienna Convention does not apply in this case. This case has large implications for foreign relations, especially as regards to terrorism. A decision for Harrison may better compensate victims of terrorist attacks and restrict state-sponsored terrorism, whereas a decision for Sudan may better protect the United States as a foreign litigant and aid the effective function of embassies.

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Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) begins once a violation occurs or once the violation is discovered. Petitioner Kevin Rotkiske, whose FDCPA lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, argues that the Court should apply the discovery rule and determine that the limitations period begins when the violation is discovered. He argues that the FDCPA should be interpreted in light of common law and precedent which hold that the discovery rule is applicable to suspend statutes of limitations. Respondent Paul Klemm counters that the Court need only read the FDCPA’s plain language to determine that Congress intended the statute-of-limitations period to begin at the time the violation occurred. He too points to precedent that supports his argument that Congress knows how to implement the discovery rule but—based on the FDCPA’s explicit language—chose not to do so. This case has implications for the purpose and history of the FDCPA and its statute of limitations and could affect blameless victims and marginalized communities.

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Issues

In this case the Supreme Court will determine whether the Hague Service Convention permits parties to serve foreign defendants with process through the mail. Water Splash argues that Article 10(a) and surrounding provisions of the Hague Service Convention indicate that the term “send” was intended to include service of process by mail. Water Splash also asserts that sources beyond the text of Hague Service Convention portray this same intention. In opposition, Menon argues that the Hague Service Convention text unambiguously indicates that the word “send” does not include service of process, and the Court should not look to external sources where the text of the treaty is unambiguous.

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