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Board of Immigration Appeals

Mata v. Holder

Issues

Does a circuit court have jurisdiction to review a  Board of Immigration Appeals’ rejection of a petitioner’s request to equitably toll the 90-day deadline on his motion to reopen removal proceedings on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review a non-citizen’s request that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) equitably toll the 90-day filing deadline on the non-citizen’s motion to reopen the non-citizen’s removal proceeding due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Peterson, arguing by Court appointment in support of the lower court’s judgment, argues that the Fifth Circuit properly characterized Mata’s request to reopen his removal proceeding as an invitation for the BIA to reopen the proceeding sua sponte, and that the Fifth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision. However, Mata contends that the Fifth Circuit erred in construing his request for equitable tolling as a request for the BIA to reopen the proceeding sua sponte, and that Congress specifically grants courts of appeals the jurisdiction to review final orders of removal and BIA decisions on motions to reopen via statute. Holder agrees with Mata that the Fifth Circuit mischaracterized Mata’s request to reopen and that Congress provided courts of appeals a statutory basis upon which to review final orders of removal and BIA decisions on motions to reopen. Holder further contends that courts should apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing agency determinations. The Supreme Court’s ruling implicates the due process rights of non-citizens and the fairness and substantive legality of the immigration system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying a request for equitable tolling of the ninety-day statutory period for filing a motion to reopen removal proceedings as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The United States ordered removal of Noel Reyes Mata, a native and citizen of Mexico, from the county in 2010. See Mata v. Holder, 558 F. App'x 366, 367 (5th Cir. 2014). Mata filed a timely petition for appeal of his order of removal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).

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Mellouli v. Holder

Issues

The Supreme Court will determine when a state drug-paraphernalia conviction sufficiently “relates to” a substance listed under the Controlled Substances Act to justify removing a permanent U.S. resident under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Moones Mellouli argues that, even though Adderall is a federally-controlled substance, his deportation was impermissible because his state conviction record did not identify the substance found in his drug paraphernalia and thus did not relate to a federally-controlled substance. United States Attorney General Holder contrastingly argues that deportation is permissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act because a state drug-paraphernalia conviction itself sufficiently relates to a federally controlled substance. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact immigration and safety in the United States. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

To trigger deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), must the government prove the connection between a drug paraphernalia conviction and a substance listed in section 802 of the Controlled Substances Act?

The United States Attorney General, Eric Holder, is responsible for adding substances to and maintaining the Federal Controlled Substance Schedule. See Brief for Respondent, Eric Holder, at 2–3. Holder and the Department of Justice are also responsible for federal regulation of controlled substances in the United States. See id.

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Nijhawan v. Holder

Issues

Whether the petitioner's conviction for fraud where he stipulated that his fraud caused a loss of more than $100 million but where the jury did not find the amount of the loss for which the petitioner was individually responsible qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

 

Manoj Nijhawan was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud, and for conspiracy to commit money laundering. Upon his conviction, Immigration Court proceedings were brought against him and he was found to be subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) ("Subsection (M)(i)"). Subsection (M)(i) provides that an "aggravated felony," for purposes of deportation, includes a conviction for "an offense that (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000." On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the loss determination used for sentencing was sufficient to meet the loss requirement under Subsection (M)(i), even though it was not a necessary element of his conviction. Nijhawan challenges this ruling arguing that both the "fraud or deceit" and "loss" elements must be found by a jury in order for Subsection (M)(i) to apply. Accordingly, he argues that he cannot be deported because the elements of the criminal statute under which he was convicted do not match those required for deportation under Subsection (M)(i). The United States argues that the loss element follows a "qualifier" and therefore need not be an element of the conviction for Subsection (M)(i) to apply.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud qualifies as a conviction for conspiracy to commit an ‘offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,' 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and (U), where petitioner stipulated for sentencing purposes that the victim loss associated with his fraud offense exceeded $100 million, and the judgment of conviction and restitution order calculated total victim loss as more than $680 million.

Manoj Nijhawan, an Indian citizen, lawfully entered the United States in July, 1985 and became a permanent resident. See Nijhawan v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2008); On the Docket: Supreme Court News: Nijhawan v.

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Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio

Issues

Does the Child Status Protection Act grant relief to an alien who qualifies as a child derivative beneficiary at the time a visa petition is initially filed, but who reaches age 21 (“ages out”) when the visa becomes available to the principal beneficiary? 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows aliens to immigrate to the United States through a family-sponsored process. This process allows a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident to petition for certain family members, known as primary beneficiaries, to obtain visas to immigrate. If a qualifying relationship exists between the family members, then the primary beneficiary can legally immigrate once the priority date becomes current. Furthermore, the primary beneficiary’s “child”—an unmarried person under the age of twenty-one—receives the same priority date as the parent. However, if, while waiting for a visa, the child reaches the age of twenty-one, that child does not get the same priority date as the parent, and the child “ages out.” Petitioner Mayorkas argues that the Child Status Protection Act does not give aged-out children the same priority date as their parents.  Respondent Cuellar de Osorio counters that the Act seeks to keep families together, and therefore a child should retain the parent’s priority date.  The Supreme Court will decide whether the CSPA grants an original visa priority date to an alien who formerly qualified as a child beneficiary but now has aged out of this benefit. This case will have a significant impact on families and individuals seeking to immigrate to the U.S. through the INA’s family-sponsored immigration framework.The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) permits United States citizens and lawful permanent resident aliens to petition for certain family members to obtain visas to immigrate to the United States or to adjust their status in the United States to that of a lawful permanent resident alien. The family member sponsored by the petitioner is known as the primary beneficiary. The primary beneficiary's "spouse or child" may be a derivative beneficiary of the petition, "entitled to the same status[] and the same order of consideration" as the primary beneficiary. 8 U.S.C. 1153(d). Section 203(h)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(3), grants relief to certain persons who reach age 21 ("age out"), and therefore lose "child" status, after the filing of visa petitions as to which they are beneficiaries.

The questions presented are: 

  1. Whether Section 1153(h)(3) unambiguously grants relief to all aliens who qualify as "child" derivative beneficiaries at the time a visa petition is filed but age out of qualification by the time the visa becomes available to the primary beneficiary. 
  2. Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals reasonably interpreted Section 1153(h)(3).

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Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) permits United States citizens and lawful permanent resident aliens to petition for certain family members to obtain visas to immigrate to the United States or to adjust their status in the United States to that of a lawful permanent resident alien. The family member sponsored by the petitioner is known as the primary beneficiary. The primary beneficiary's "spouse or child" may be a derivative beneficiary of the petition, "entitled to the same status[] and the same order of consideration" as the primary beneficiary. 8 U.S.C. 1153(d). Section 203(h)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(3), grants relief to certain persons who reach age 21 ("age out"), and therefore lose "child" status, after the filing of visa petitions as to which they are beneficiaries.

The questions presented are: 

  1. Whether Section 1153(h)(3) unambiguously grants relief to all aliens who qualify as "child" derivative beneficiaries at the time a visa petition is filed but age out of qualification by the time the visa becomes available to the primary beneficiary. 
  2. Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals reasonably interpreted Section 1153(h)(3).

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Facts

The family-sponsored immigration process is one path a foreign national can take to obtain lawful residence in the United States.  See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012).

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