Controlled Substances Act

Ashcroft v. Raich

 

This case raises the issue of whether Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce allows it to proscribe the use of medical marijuana. The plaintiff-appellees, Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson, suffer from "more than serious medical conditions," including, respectively, an inoperable brain tumor and a degenerative spinal disease. Under the advice of their doctors and the auspicious of California's Compassionate Use Act, they both use California-grown marijuana to treat the symptoms of their diseases. Fearing prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act, the plaintiffs sued for declaratory relief in Federal District Court where they were denied the grant of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit overturned this decision, and the case is now before the Supreme Court. The Court will determine whether the use of California-grown medical marijuana substantially effects interstate commerce based on the four-factor balancing test established in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and refined in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Though none of the factors are particularly weighty in the present case, the majority of them point to Congress' ability to regulate this activity and the Court is likely to overturn the Ninth Circuit's preliminary injunction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for purported personal medicinal use or to the distribution of marijuana without charge for such use.

Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. � 801 et seq.("CSA") as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub .L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. The CSA establishes five "schedules" of certain drugs and other substances designated "controlled substances." 21 U.S.C.

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Brown v. United States

Issues

When sentencing a defendant for a federal firearm offense, how should courts determine whether the defendant’s past state drug conviction is a “serious drug offense” warranting a higher minimum sentencing requirement?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine when the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) (“ACCA”) applies to a defendant with prior state drug offenses who is facing sentencing for a Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) (“GCA”) violation. The ACCA is a “three–strikes” law which imposes a 15–year mandatory minimum imprisonment term on defendants convicted of violating the GCA and at least three prior violent felonies or “serious drug offenses.” However, a prior state drug offense only counts as a “strike” under the ACCA if the relevant state drug prohibition categorically matches its federal counterpart. Brown argues that federal and state laws must match at the time of sentencing for the GCA violation. Brown claims that his interpretation most closely aligns with the ACCA’s plain meaning and serves judicial efficiency because compliance is easier. The United States argues that federal and state laws must match at the time of the prior state drug offense. The United States claims that its interpretation most aligns with the ACCA’s legislative intent and promotes consistency in the criminal justice system. This case touches on important questions regarding fair notice to criminal defendants as well as federal controlled–substances schedules’ responsiveness to scientific and social developments.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense.

The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) imposes a fifteen–year mandatory minimum imprisonment term when a defendant violates the Gun Control Act, codified under 18 U.S.C.

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Burgess v. United States

 

In 2002, a South Carolina state court convicted Keith Burgess of misdemeanor drug possession, an offense punishable by up to two years' incarceration. In 2003, a federal court convicted Burgess of conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base in violation of the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"). The court ruled that Burgess' prior state-court conviction constituted a "felony drug offense" under the CSA and thus qualified Burgess for sentence enhancement from ten to twenty years' imprisonment.� Burgess appealed, claiming that the sentence enhancement provision did not apply.� Burgess argued that court should have applied the CSA's definition of "felony" instead of "felony drug offense," under which the state-court conviction merely constituted a misdemeanor. This case highlights the role of judicial review in the application of mandatory minimum sentences.

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    McFadden v. United States

    Issues

    To obtain a conviction, does the government need to prove that a defendant knew that a substance he was distributing was substantially similar in chemical structure and effect to a controlled substance?

    The Supreme Court will determine whether—to obtain a conviction under the Analogue Act—the government must prove the defendant had knowledge that a substance the defendant was distributing was a controlled substance analogue. McFadden claims that under the Analogue Act, the government must prove a defendant's knowledge of the illegal nature of a substance by showing that the defendant knew the substance was substantially similar to a controlled substance. The United States agrees with McFadden in that Analogue Act violations can be proven by demonstrating the defendant's knowledge of the illegal nature of a substance, but the United States counters that knowledge of illegality can be proven through circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify a long-standing circuit split over the mens rea requirement the government must satisfy to prosecute Analogue Act violations, which will have further implications on the government’s ability to target street-level dealers under the Analogue Act. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether, to convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew that the substance constituted a controlled substance analogue, as held by the Second, Seventh, and Eight Circuits, but rejected by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.

    In July 2011, in Charlottesville, Virginia, Stephen D. McFadden was arrested for illegally distributing a synthetic stimulant known as “bath salts,” whose effect was similar to illegal substances such as “cocaine, methamphetamine, and methcathinone.” United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432, 437 (4th Cir.

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    Mellouli v. Holder

    Issues

    The Supreme Court will determine when a state drug-paraphernalia conviction sufficiently “relates to” a substance listed under the Controlled Substances Act to justify removing a permanent U.S. resident under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Moones Mellouli argues that, even though Adderall is a federally-controlled substance, his deportation was impermissible because his state conviction record did not identify the substance found in his drug paraphernalia and thus did not relate to a federally-controlled substance. United States Attorney General Holder contrastingly argues that deportation is permissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act because a state drug-paraphernalia conviction itself sufficiently relates to a federally controlled substance. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact immigration and safety in the United States. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    To trigger deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), must the government prove the connection between a drug paraphernalia conviction and a substance listed in section 802 of the Controlled Substances Act?

    The United States Attorney General, Eric Holder, is responsible for adding substances to and maintaining the Federal Controlled Substance Schedule. See Brief for Respondent, Eric Holder, at 2–3. Holder and the Department of Justice are also responsible for federal regulation of controlled substances in the United States. See id.

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    Moncrieffe v. Holder (11-702)

    In 2009, Adrian Moncrieffe, a Jamaican permanent resident of the United States, was arrested while in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty in a Georgia court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under Ga. Code § 16-13-30(j)(1) and was sentenced to five years of probation. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security successfully brought removal proceedings against Moncrieffe arguing that his conviction in state court corresponds with an aggravated felony, which made him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Moncrieffe appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which upheld the lower court’s decision. After the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied review, Moncrieffe filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

    Moncrieffe argues that his conviction does not correspond with an aggravated felony because the conduct leading to his conviction instead corresponds with a federal misdemeanor. Holder argues that a state conviction for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute constitutes an aggravated felony. This decision could impact how immigration deportation cases are decided and place stricter limits on the Attorney General’s discretion to seek removal. This decision could also impact how criminal cases are conducted (e.g. whether to go to trial, to plead guilty, to admit evidence) and how courts construct state law in accordance with federal law, specifically in immigration matters.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a conviction under a provision of state law that encompasses but is not limited to the distribution of a small amount of marijuana without remuneration constitutes an aggravated felony, notwithstanding that the record of conviction does not establish that the alien was convicted of conduct that would constitute a federal felony.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, when applying the categorical approach to determine whether a non-citizen should be removed, a conviction under a provision of state law that encompasses both felony and misdemeanor conduct, which lacks the specifics of the underlying conduct, should be treated as a aggravated felony rendering the non-citizen eligible for automa

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    Ruan v. United States

    Issues

    Does a doctor who prescribed controlled substances outside of the usual standard of medical care violate federal drug distribution laws if the doctor believed in good faith that he was adhering to standard medical practice?

     

    This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the requirements for criminal conviction under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1). Two physicians, Petitioners Xiulu Ruan and Shakeel Kahn, were convicted of violating the CSA by prescribing medication without legitimate medical purposes. Both physicians brought good-faith defenses, arguing that they did not intentionally or knowingly violate the CSA. The physicians claim that a subjective lack of knowledge or intent is sufficient to maintain innocence under the CSA. At trial, juries were instructed to find the physicians innocent only if the physicians reasonably believed they were in compliance with the law. Respondent United States claims this objective standard is the correct reading of the statute, and Ruan and Kahn claim the objective standard creates an impermissibly low standard for conviction. This case has important implications for the future of medical practice, medical research, and mens rea requirements in criminal law.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice

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