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Bravo-Fernandez v. United States

Issues

Should a vacated conviction based on an improper jury instruction be given preclusive effect under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy clause?

Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martínez-Maldonado were involved in a federal program bribery scheme in which Bravo allegedly paid for Martinez’s trip to Las Vegas to attend a boxing match in exchange for Martínez pushing through beneficial legislation for Bravo’s private security company. A jury convicted both defendants of committing federal bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 but acquitted them of other bribery-related charges.  The convictions were later vacated due to a jury instruction error, and Bravo and Martínez were acquitted on remand.  Bravo and Martínez argue that the jury acquittals retain preclusive effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause despite the fact that jury had originally returned inconsistent verdicts. The government counters that because the jury’s inconsistent verdicts do not allow Bravo and Martínez to show that the jury had decided in their favor, collateral estoppel does not apply. The outcome of this case could potentially affect prosecutorial theories and could disadvantage criminal defendants who face various predicate and conspiracy charges. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under Ashe v. Swenson and Yeager v. United States, can a vacated, unconstitutional conviction cancel out the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause?

Petitioner Juan Bravo-Fernandez traveled from Puerto Rico to Las Vegas, NV with petitioner Hector Martínez-Maldonado in May of 2005 to attend a boxing match. United States v. Bravo-Fernandez, 790 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 2015). Bravo was the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico and Martínez was a member of the Puerto Rico Senate.

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Ocasio v. United States

Issues

Under the Hobbs Act, can a person accused of conspiracy to commit extortion be convicted for extorting a fellow conspirator?

 

Samuel Ocasio, a former officer of the Baltimore Police Department, was involved in a kickback scheme in which officers would refer car accident victims to an unauthorized towing company in exchange for monetary compensation. Ocasio was charged with conspiracy to commit extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In this case, the Supreme Court will address whether the conspirators have to agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. See Brief for Petitioner, Samuel Ocasio at i. Ocasio claims that a defendant must conspire with someone to obtain property from another person outside the conspiracy. See id. at 21. The United States counters that the conspirators in an extortion scheme need to agree only that the public official will obtain property from another person, but that the other person may be one of the co-conspirators. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 15. The decision in this case will implicate the boundaries between state criminal law and federal law for extortion. The decision will also clarify the method of statutory interpretation applied when statutory language is ambiguous. See Brief of Amici Curiae Former United States Attorneys, in Support of Petitioner at 4, 10.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a conspiracy to commit extortion, as defined by the Hobbs Act, require that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy?

Samuel Ocasio is a former officer of the Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”). United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399 (4th Cir.

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Percoco v. United States

Issues

Does an individual owe a fiduciary duty to the public that can serve as the basis of an honest-services fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, notwithstanding the fact that the individual does not have an official government position but only informal influence over government decisionmaking?

This case asks the Court to analyze 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the honest-services fraud statute, and determine if an individual with informal power but no official governmental position can violate the statute. Joseph Percoco and Steven Aiello argue that private individuals lacking formal governmental power cannot commit honest-services fraud because they do not owe the public a duty of honest services. Percoco and Aiello further argue that including private individuals within § 1346 would render the statue unconstitutionally vague, violate the First Amendment, and entrench upon state sovereignty. The United States contends that private individuals can commit honest-services fraud when they have been selected for public office and when they are de facto officeholders in all but name. The United States also argues that § 1346 clearly defines improper behavior and does not limit First Amendment activity. This case touches on important questions regarding lobbying, free speech, and the interaction of state and federal bribery laws.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a private citizen who holds no elected office or government employment, but has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking, owes a fiduciary duty to the general public such that he can be convicted of honest-services fraud.

Petitioner Joseph Percoco served as Executive Deputy Secretary under former Governor Andrew Cuomo from 2011 until 2016, except for eight months in 2014 while Percoco ran the Governor’s reelection campaign. United States v. Percoco at 5. This position required managing both intergovernmental and legislative matters.

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Snyder v. United States

Issues

Does a prohibition on “corruptly accepting anything of value, intending to be influenced or rewarded” include gratuities, or does it only prohibit bribes?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 18 U.S.C. Section 666—the statute for federal-funds bribery—also criminalizes gratuities. Snyder, a former mayor in Indiana, steered city contracts to a local company and then accepted from that company a fabricated consulting job worth $13,000. A jury convicted him of accepting an illegal gratuity under the statute. Snyder argues that the law only criminalizes bribes, however, because Congress has removed the language from the statute that used to refer to gratuities. The United States argues that the statute criminalizes gratuities through the word “rewarded,” while the word “influenced” refers to bribes. This case raises concerns about federal intrusion on state interests depending on how broadly courts will construe federal criminal statutes that seek to prohibit gratuities. It may also affect the outcome of how federal prosecutors will combat corruption at the state and local levels.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.

James Snyder became mayor of Portage, Indiana, in 2012. United States v. Snyder at 2. At the time, he was behind on both his personal taxes and his business’s payroll taxes.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Daniel R. Alonso and Stephen P. Garvey for their excellent guidance and insights into this case.

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