Hobbs Act

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether an “official action” is limited to exercise of actual government power. In light of this determination, the court will then decide whether the honest-services statute and Hobbs Act sufficiently define official actions to comply with the Constitution. Robert McDonnell argues that official actions should be limited to the actual exercise of government power and that his conduct as governor was never an exercise of actual government power. Thus, McDonnell argues that his conviction should be overturned on the merits, but he also argues that the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous based on a flawed definition of “official action” given to the jury. In addition, McDonnell argues that the honest-services statute and Hobbs Act are unconstitutionally vague. The United States argues that McDonnell construes the definition of official action too  narrowly,  and that a proper interpretation encompasses McDonnell's conduct in this case.  United States  rejects McDonnell’s jury instruction arguments based by noting that these instructions included a precise definition of “official action” from the statute, with additional information to clarify the definition. Finally, the United States rejects McDonnell’s constitutional challenges by citing a recent and similar Supreme Court challenge to these statutes that failed. 

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Samuel Ocasio, a former officer of the Baltimore Police Department, was involved in a kickback scheme in which officers would refer car accident victims to an unauthorized towing company in exchange for monetary compensation. Ocasio was charged with conspiracy to commit extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In this case, the Supreme Court will address whether the conspirators have to agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. See Brief for Petitioner, Samuel Ocasio at i. Ocasio claims that a defendant must conspire with someone to obtain property from another person outside the conspiracy. See id. at 21. The United States counters that the conspirators in an extortion scheme need to agree only that the public official will obtain property from another person, but that the other person may be one of the co-conspirators. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 15. The decision in this case will implicate the boundaries between state criminal law and federal law for extortion. The decision will also clarify the method of statutory interpretation applied when statutory language is ambiguous. See Brief of Amici Curiae Former United States Attorneys, in Support of Petitioner at 4, 10.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether 28 U.S.C. § 2342, commonly known as the Hobbs Act, required a federal district court to adhere to the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). In 2016, Carlton & Harris Chiropractic sued PDA Network, after the latter sent an unsolicited facsimile announcing a free eBook edition of The Physician’s Desk Reference. Carlton & Harris argued that the fax constituted an advertisement for the purposes of the TCPA, which prohibits unsolicited advertisements. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that the fax was not an advertisement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that, under the Hobbs Act, the district court had failed to properly defer to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA. PDR Network contends that the Hobbs Act does not undermine district courts’ ability to interpret the TCPA in civil suits between private litigants, and that the Hobbs Act should be construed narrowly, to facilitate judicial review and preserve separation of powers. Carlton & Harris argue that the Hobbs Act required the district court to defer to the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA, maintaining that in agency actions such as this one, Congress has explicitly reserved interpretive powers to appellate courts. The outcome of this case will affect judicial decision-making, agency determinations and the corresponding deference, and the scope of the Hobbs Act.

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Petitioner Giridhar C. Sekhar was convicted of extortion under federal law for threatening to expose an extramarital affair unless the General Counsel for the State Comptroller recommended that the state pension fund invest in a fund managed by Sekhar’s company. The Court will determine the limits of the meaning of the word “property” under federal extortion law, and whether the General Counsel's recommendation was "property" that could be subject to extortion. The Court’s decision will have implications for the scope of federal extortion law and, more generally, for the balance between enforcement of federal and state criminal law when the two overlap. Petitioner argues for a narrow definition of property, limited to something of value that is transferable. Respondent calls for a broader view of property to include the legal advice given by lawyers.

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The Supreme Court will clarify the interaction between the Hobbs Act of 1948 (“the Hobbs Act”) and Congress’ commerce power over intra-state activity. The Hobbs Act prohibits obstruction or delay of “the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts . . . to do [so].” Petitioner David Anthony Taylor was convicted in federal court for affecting interstate commerce by attempting to rob a marijuana dealer of his “drugs and drug proceeds.” Taylor argues that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his activity had any effect on interstate commerce, and thus he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process rights. However, the United States contends that the aggregation principle of the Commerce Clause grants federal jurisdiction over the activity as part of a “national market,” even if the stolen drugs remained entirely within one state. Consequently, the United States asserts that the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act is satisfied as a matter-of-law.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the meaning of the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which defines Hobbs Act robbery, and whether the statute is constitutional. In 2015, Davis and Glover were convicted of several robberies under the Hobbs Act robbery statute. The two appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court after the Court in Sessions v. Dimaya held that the similarly worded “crime of violence” definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional because the text was too vague. The United States government argues that the “crime of violence” language is constitutionally valid because the most appropriate reading of the statute implies analyzing an individual’s case and particularized facts, and not a “categorical approach” which looks at the ordinary expectations of the crime. The government further asserts that constitutional avoidance implies a categorical approach in conformity with congressional intent and the Constitution. Davis and Glover counter that the correct reading of Section 924(c)(3)(B) is a categorical approach as suggested by the text and placement within the statute. They further maintain that upholding the subsection under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would upset the rule of lenity. The outcome of this case will determine the scope of the judiciary’s power to construe statute construction based on constitutionality and the occurrence of possible conviction reconsiderations for currently incarcerated individuals.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act qualifies as a “crime of violence” under a federal statute that imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for using a gun during a crime of violence. The United States argues that the Hobbs Act treats an attempted and a completed robbery no differently for the purposes of determining a crime of violence; moreover, even if the attempted use of physical force does not cover attempted robbery, the threatened use of such force does include attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In response, Justin Taylor argues that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, because it does not require an act that would constitute the attempted use or threatened use of force. The outcome of this case has important implications for consistency in the application of law and proportionality in the sentencing system.

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