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Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC

Issues

Does exemption from the Federal Arbitration Act depend on the specific industry that employs transportation workers, or on the nature of the work they perform? 

This case asks the Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) exemption includes employees who do not work within the transportation industry but conduct work related to transportation. Employee Petitioners argue that the Court should not adopt the Second Circuit's interpretation that industry is dispositive because doing so would be inconsistent with the ruling in Saxon. Additionally, Petitioners argue that Congress specifically phrased the statute to include all workers whose work aided the transportation industry. Employer Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the Court should consider industry as dispositive because this would be consistent with the ruling in Circuit City. Further, Respondents argue that workers who historically fell under similar acts passed by Congress have been those who worked within the transportation industry and—in the case of seamen—had employment contracts that distinguished them as such. This case touches on important questions regarding discrepant treatment of employees and the availability of arbitration as an alternative to judicial action. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, to be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation must also be employed by a company in the transportation industry.

In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to enforce employer-employee agreements to arbitrate; however, the act excluded “seamen, railroad employees, and any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Reuters, US Supreme Court to decide scope of arbitration exemption for transp

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New York v. New Jersey

Issues

Does the language of the Waterfront Commission Compact, which grants the Waterfront Commission broad policing and regulatory powers, permit New Jersey to unilaterally withdraw from the compact? 

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

This case asks the Court to determine whether New Jersey can unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact, which it signed with New York in 1953. New York argues that New Jersey cannot withdraw without New York’s agreement because the Compact’s writers intended to bar unilateral withdrawal. New York also argues that unilateral withdrawal would violate New York sovereignty. New Jersey argues that indefinite compacts with continuing duties, like the Waterfront Commission Compact, always allow unilateral withdrawal unless specifically stated otherwise. New Jersey further alleges that requiring mutual withdrawal would prevent New Jersey from reclaiming its sovereign powers. The outcome of this case will impact interstate compacts throughout the nation, state sovereignty, and anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts within the waterfront of New York and New Jersey.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue declaratory judgment and/or enjoin New Jersey from withdrawing from its Waterfront Commission Compact with New York, which grants the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor broad regulatory and law-enforcement powers over all operations at the Port of New York and New Jersey.  

In order to address criminal activity and corrupt hiring practices within the Port of New York, former New York Governor Thomas Dewey ordered an investigation of the port in November 1951. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor v. Murphy at 2. The New York State Crime Commission, in conjunction with the New Jersey Law Enforcement Council, subsequently investigated the port, discovering rampant criminal activity. Id.

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