original jurisdiction

Alabama v. North Carolina

Issues

Whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission, jointly with four compacting States, from asserting claims in a Supreme Court original action, that North Carolina has violated the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact and is subject to the Commission’s sanctions order.

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

 

Original Jurisdiction: On Motion of North Carolina to Dismiss Claims of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission

This case involves a lawsuit brought by several states and the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission against the State of North Carolina for its alleged breach of contract under the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact to license a waste disposal facility. In June 2002, the member states of the Compact and the Commission filed a Bill of Complaint, which the Supreme Court granted. The Special Master then filed his Preliminary and Second Reports with this Court on April 2, 2009. The Supreme Court subsequently received these Reports and ordered them filed. This case is now before the Supreme Court as both an original and exclusive jurisdiction case; it also addresses issues of contract law. The Supreme Court’s decision in Alabama v. North Carolina may have significant effects on constitutional law, most notably on the extent of the Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction over a judicial case or controversy between States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Plaintiffs except to the following conclusions of the Special Master:

1.     Article 79F) of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (the “Compact”), which states that the Commission may “sanction[]” “[a]ny party state which fails to comply with the provisions . . . or . . . fulfill the obligations” of “this compact,” does not give the Commission the authority to level monetary sanctions against a party State when it fails to comply with the Compact. Preliminary Report 15–25.

2.     Even if North Carolina violated the Compact, it was not subject to the sanctions authority of the Commission because it withdrew from the Compact before sanctions were imposed. Preliminary Report 25–29.

3.     North Carolina did not waive its right to contest the legality of the sanctions proceedings even though it attended and refused to participate in the hearing. Preliminary Report 29–30.

4.     Even though the Compact expressly provides that the Commission is “the judge of the [party States’] compliance with the conditions and requirements of this compact,” Art. 7(C), the Commission’s determination that North Carolina breached the Compact is neither conclusive nor entitled to any deference from the Court. Second Report 1920.

5.     While it is undisputed that North Carolina ceased taking any steps to license a facility in December 1997, more than 18 months before it withdrew from the Compact, North Carolina, as a matter of law, did not breach its duty under the Compact to “take appropriate steps to ensure that an application for a license to construct and operate a facility . . . is filed.” Art. 5 (C). Second Report 10?24.

6.     The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to interstate compacts and North Carolina did not withdraw from the Compact in bad faith. Second Report 29–35.

7.     North Carolina did not repudiate the Compact when it informed the Commission that it would take no further steps to license a facility. Second Report 24–28.

The State of North Carolina takes exception to the following conclusions of the Special Master:

1.     The recommended denial of North Carolina’s motion to dismiss all claims brought by plaintiff Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission. Under both the Eleventh Amendment and common-law sovereign immunity principles, only the United States or a sister State may sue a non-consenting State in federal court, absent a valid congressional abrogation of the State’s sovereign immunity. Because North Carolina has not waived, and Congress has not abrogated, North Carolina’s sovereign immunity from suit by the Commission, the Commission’s claims cannot proceed in this Court. In this case, this Court has jurisdiction to the Special Master’s recommendation, North Carolina’s motion to dismiss the Commission’s claims should be granted.

2.     The failure to recommend granting North Carolina’s motion for summary judgment on the quasi-contract claims asserted in Counts III, IV, and V of the Bill of Complaint. It is a settled common-law rule that where the parties’ relationship concerning a given subject matter is governed by the terms of an express contract, no equitable claim will lie in addition to a claim for breach of contract. The Special Master declined to address North Carolina’s motion at this stage in the proceedings, but the motion is legally and factually ripe for adjudication, and should be granted.

This is an original jurisdiction case brought by the States of Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia, joined by the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission (the "Commission") (collectively "petitioners") seeking remedy for the State of North Carolina's alleged breach of the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (the "Compact").

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Florida v. Georgia

Issues

Should the Supreme Court equitably apportion the water of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin between Florida and Georgia? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether it should equitably apportion the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin between Georgia and Florida. There is a long history of conflict between the states over Georgia’s use of water from the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers. Florida argues that the Supreme Court should impose a water consumption cap on Georgia because Georgia’s unreasonable water consumption inflicts real harm on Florida and its ecosystems. Georgia counters that Florida is not entitled to relief in this original jurisdiction action because Florida has not proven that the consumption cap will provide effective redress and Florida has failed to include a necessary party in the litigation. Florida contends that Georgia’s water usage has caused a reduction in the flow of the Apalachicola River that has harmed the region’s oyster population damaging the regional economy. Moreover, Florida suggests that it is the Court’s duty to intervene and apportion the water rights equally between the two states. Georgia disputes that it harmed the oyster population and organizations supporting it argue that upstream states have no duty to maintain or protect water flows to benefit downstream states. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This is an action by the State of Florida to equitably apportion the interstate waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (“ACF Basin”). 

The state of Florida has sued the state of Georgia over the use of water from the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (the “ACF Basin”) in the United States Supreme Court, which has original jurisdiction over the matter—i.e., this case begins in the Supreme Court.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Florida v. Georgia

Issues

Can Florida obtain an apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin to permit fresh water to flow into the Apalachicola Region?

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Florida is entitled to an apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin against Georgia. Plaintiff Florida argues that Georgia’s use of the water is unreasonable because of mismanagement and waste and that Georgia’s use harms Florida’s oyster fisheries. Florida argues that it is entitled to relief because even an extra 1,000 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) of water will greatly benefit Florida, whereas the cost to Georgia is low and can be mitigated by water conservation methods. Defendant Georgia argues that Georgia’s use is reasonable because Florida’s models for consumption are incorrect and that the water is used for important purposes such as irrigation. Georgia also argues that a cap on its consumption would yield little benefit to Florida because of how the United States Army Corps of Engineers operates its dams and reservoirs and would be extremely costly for Georgia to implement. The outcome of this case will have implications for the sharing of water resources by neighboring states, state economies, and the environment. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of fresh water into the Apalachicola Region. 

The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin is an interstate basin created by the confluence of three rivers—the Chattahoochee River, the Flint River, and the Apalachicola River. Florida v.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

 

Submit for publication
0

Kansas v. Colorado

Issues

When the Supreme Court hears a case under its exclusive, original jurisdiction, is it bound by rules set by Congress concerning the award of expert witness costs?

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

 

Since 1902, Kansas and Colorado have been disputing the proper use of the Arkansas River. Each time a new issue arises, the Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over this type of case, has called upon a Special Master to hear the arguments and make a determination. In the most recent case, Kansas claimed that Colorado violated the Arkansas River Compact by depleting the river of water that the Compact reserves for Kansas. Extensive expert witness testimony was required in the case, and ultimately the Special Master ruled in favor of Kansas. The Special Master also decided that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), expert witness fees would be limited to $40 per day. Kansas, having spent more than $9 million dollars on expert witnesses throughout the case, disagrees with this determination, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) does not apply to cases in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will decide whether it is bound by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) when hearing a case under its original jurisdiction or whether, as argued by Kansas, the Court is free to make its own determination regarding fees. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The State of Kansas excepts to the ruling of the Special Master that, in the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court is bound by the Congressional limit on the federal district courts in awarding costs for expert witnesses.

Because this case is between “two or more states,” this is one of the rare cases where the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. U.S.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado

Issues

In a water compact between two states, what remedies are available to an injured state if the other state breaches the compact?

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes arising between states. In this case, Kansas has revived previous litigation regarding a water compact between itself and Nebraska, seeking damages ranging from monetary relief to contempt of court and injunctive relief. Kansas and Nebraska disagree on what type of relief is proper when a state breaches a compact and how the compact at hand should calculate water usage. The Court’s ruling in this case will impact the remedies available for a state when another state breaches a water rights agreement and could serve as important precedent for water rights cases as the Western United States potentially enters into a period of sustained drought.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Should the Court reform the RRCA Accounting Procedures to correct what Nebraska and Colorado contend is a mistake in those procedures? By what amount of water did Nebraska fail to meet the applicable 2006 compliance test? And what is the remedy to which Kansas is entitled as a result? (Report of the Special Master at 14).

On May 3, 2010, Kansas filed a Motion with the Supreme Court of the United States that revived previous litigation between Kansas and Nebraska concerning a water rights dispute. See Report of the Special Master at 9. The dispute reflects ongoing tensions between Kansas and Nebraska concerning a water rights agreement signed in 1943.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Steve Eder: Kansas vs. Nebraska Heads Back to Court, The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 13, 2012).

Submit for publication
0

Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.

Issues

Do federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits against the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) based soley on the sue-and-be-sued clause in its congressional charter? 

The Supreme Court will decide whether the sue-and-be-sued clause in Fannie Mae’s congressional charter under 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a) confers original jurisdiction to federal district courts for cases to which Fannie Mae is a party. Petitioners Crystal Lightfoot and Beverly Hollis-Arrington argue that the clause is not sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. In doing so, they contend that the clause requires an independent determination of subject matter jurisdiction, and that the Court’s decision in Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992), did not establish an “if federal, then jurisdiction” rule, which diverges from the Court’s past methods of statutory interpretation and creates confusion. Respondent Fannie Mae argues that Lightfoot and Hollis-Arrington misconstrue Red Cross and asserts that the statutory language, legislative history, context, and purpose of Fannie Mae as a government sponsored enterprise (GSE) confirm that Fannie Mae’s charter confers federal question jurisdiction. This case will clarify the scope of jurisdiction for GSEs under Article III and will settle whether private individuals can file suit against GSEs in federal district court based on state-law causes of action.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The congressional charter of the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) grants it the power “to sue and to be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.” 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a).

The questions presented are:

  1. whether the phrase “to sue and be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal” in Fannie Mae’s charter confers original jurisdiction over every case brought by or against Fannie Mae to the federal courts; and
  2. whether the majority’s decision in Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992) (5-4 decision), should be reversed. 

In 2001, Petitioner Hollis-Arrington filed a suit, pro se, in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Cendant Mortgage Corporation, Fannie Mae, and Attorneys Equity National Corporation, all of which had participated in foreclosure proceedings against the home that Hollis-Arrington shared with Petitioner Crystal Lightfoot in California.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Mississippi v. Tennessee

Issues

Can the state of Mississippi obtain damages or injunctive relief without an equitable apportionment of groundwater from the Middle Claiborne Aquifer, which Mississippi claims was stolen by the state of Tennessee through Tennessee’s pumping operations in Shelby County?

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if groundwater should be classified as an interstate resource and fall within federal common law equitable apportionment jurisprudence. The Special Master determined that the Middle Claiborne Aquifer is an interstate resource and that the Supreme Court should allow Mississippi to amend its complaint to include an equitable apportionment claim. Mississippi disputes the Special Master’s conclusions and argues that groundwater naturally flows from its territorial boundaries. Mississippi asserts that Tennessee's underground pumping violates Mississippi’s territorial sovereignty by disrupting the groundwater’s natural flow within Mississippi’s borders. Tennessee argues that the Special Master is correct in identifying the aquifer as an interstate resource, but that the Supreme Court should not allow Mississippi to amend its complaint because any amendment would create additional costly and time-consuming litigation. The outcome of this case has serious implications for interstate water rights and the apportionment of belowground natural resources.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Court will grant Mississippi leave to file an original action to seek relief from respondents’ use of a pumping operation to take approximately 252 billion gallons of high-quality groundwater; (2) whether Mississippi has sole sovereign authority over and control of groundwater naturally stored within its borders, including in sandstone within Mississippi’s borders; and (3) whether Mississippi is entitled to damages, injunctive, and other equitable relief for the Mississippi intrastate groundwater intentionally and forcibly taken by respondents.

The Middle Claiborne Aquifer is a “hydrogeological unit” that extends through Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama and consists of the “Sparta Sand” in the South and the “Memphis Sand” in the North. Report of the Special Master, Eugene E. Siler, Jr.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

New York v. New Jersey

Issues

Does the language of the Waterfront Commission Compact, which grants the Waterfront Commission broad policing and regulatory powers, permit New Jersey to unilaterally withdraw from the compact? 

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

This case asks the Court to determine whether New Jersey can unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact, which it signed with New York in 1953. New York argues that New Jersey cannot withdraw without New York’s agreement because the Compact’s writers intended to bar unilateral withdrawal. New York also argues that unilateral withdrawal would violate New York sovereignty. New Jersey argues that indefinite compacts with continuing duties, like the Waterfront Commission Compact, always allow unilateral withdrawal unless specifically stated otherwise. New Jersey further alleges that requiring mutual withdrawal would prevent New Jersey from reclaiming its sovereign powers. The outcome of this case will impact interstate compacts throughout the nation, state sovereignty, and anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts within the waterfront of New York and New Jersey.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue declaratory judgment and/or enjoin New Jersey from withdrawing from its Waterfront Commission Compact with New York, which grants the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor broad regulatory and law-enforcement powers over all operations at the Port of New York and New Jersey.  

In order to address criminal activity and corrupt hiring practices within the Port of New York, former New York Governor Thomas Dewey ordered an investigation of the port in November 1951. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor v. Murphy at 2. The New York State Crime Commission, in conjunction with the New Jersey Law Enforcement Council, subsequently investigated the port, discovering rampant criminal activity. Id.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to original jurisdiction