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14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett

Issues

Is an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement which precludes an employee from bringing a lawsuit in court for an alleged violation of statutory anti-discrimination law enforceable?

 

Steven Pyett, Thomas O’Connell, and Michael Phillips (the "employees") claim that their employer, Temco Service Industries, Inc., and the company, 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, that owns the building in which they worked, discriminated against them on the basis of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). The employees are members of Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB"), of which Temco and 14 Penn Plaza are members. The CBA stated that the sole and exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims, including those brought under the ADEA, is the union’s grievance and arbitration procedure. The issue in this case is whether a union has the power to bargain away its members’ rights to litigate employment discrimination claims. The employees argue that the answer should be no, while the employers argue the opposite. The outcome of this case will clarify whether a union has the power to waive its members' statutory right to sue their employers in federal court for certain types of discrimination in favor of a mandatory arbitration procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is an arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement, freely negotiated by a union and an employer, which clearly and unmistakably waives the union members’ right to a judicial forum for their statutory discrimination claims, enforceable?

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American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant

Italian Colors Restaurant, along with other merchants, sued American Express in a class action lawsuit for alleged antitrust violations for compelling merchants to accept American Express credit cards and pay exorbitant rates. In the agreements those merchants signed with American Express, they agreed to use bilateral arbitration rather than class actions in resolving any disputes. Italian Colors argues that this bilateral arbitration clause would create prohibitive costs for any pursuit of their legal rights. This effectively immunizes American Express from any liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Therefore, courts must not enforce the arbitration agreement in this context. American Express contends that courts should adhere to the terms of arbitration agreements unless the terms would violate substantive United States law. From a policy standpoint, Italian Colors claims that arbitration is a poor vehicle to vindicate antitrust claims because the length of time an arbitral proceeding would take would create problems for potential claimants, creating difficulty in pursuing a claim before the statute of limitation expires and removing a disincentive for corporate abuse. American Express notes the myriad benefits of arbitration over litigation, specifically arguing that arbitration is more beneficial to lower income plaintiffs and less subject to abuse by frivolous or vengeful lawsuits.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether federal arbitration law recognizes an “effective vindication” exception to class-arbitration waivers that allows courts to ignore arbitration agreements and permit class-action lawsuits where individual plaintiffs’ claims are so small that no single plaintiff would rationally bring a bilateral, one-on-one arbitration to vindicate federal rights.

Issue

Can courts refuse to enforce class-arbitration waivers and permit class-action lawsuits where a plaintiff’s individual claim is worth much less than the cost of bringing that claim? 

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BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina

Issues

  1. Does an arbitrator or a court decide whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied?
  2. To what extent can federal courts review such decisions?

The United Kingdom and Argentina signed the Bilateral Investment Treaty in 1990 to promote international investment in Argentina. The Treaty requires that disputes first be submitted to Argentine courts for a certain period before being arbitrated. After the Argentine economic crisis in 2001 and 2002, Argentina enacted several measures that restrained investors from litigating effectively. BG Group filed for arbitration in the United States against Argentina without first submitting the dispute to Argentine courts. After the arbitral tribunal issued an award, Argentina argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction over the parties. The issue here is whether the arbitrators or the courts should determine whether a precondition for arbitration has been satisfied. BG Group argues that the purpose of international arbitration is to allow experienced arbitrators to decide issues in a neutral forum, not governed by a particular country. Argentina argues that the purpose of arbitration is to give the parties what they agreed to and that judicial review is necessary for securing international treaties. The Supreme Court will determine whether courts or arbitrators decide these threshold questions of arbitrability. This decision will impact the substance of international arbitration agreements and how the United States is perceived as a seat for international arbitration.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. In disputes involving a multi-staged dispute resolution process, does a court or instead the arbitrator determine whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied?
  2.  Whether a federal court with jurisdiction over an application to vacate an arbitral award may independently decide whether a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate has been created under the terms of a bilateral investment treaty?

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Facts

On December 11, 1990, the United Kingdom and Respondent Argentina signed the Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”). See Republic of Arg. v. BG Group PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir.

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Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC

Issues

Does exemption from the Federal Arbitration Act depend on the specific industry that employs transportation workers, or on the nature of the work they perform? 

This case asks the Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) exemption includes employees who do not work within the transportation industry but conduct work related to transportation. Employee Petitioners argue that the Court should not adopt the Second Circuit's interpretation that industry is dispositive because doing so would be inconsistent with the ruling in Saxon. Additionally, Petitioners argue that Congress specifically phrased the statute to include all workers whose work aided the transportation industry. Employer Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the Court should consider industry as dispositive because this would be consistent with the ruling in Circuit City. Further, Respondents argue that workers who historically fell under similar acts passed by Congress have been those who worked within the transportation industry and—in the case of seamen—had employment contracts that distinguished them as such. This case touches on important questions regarding discrepant treatment of employees and the availability of arbitration as an alternative to judicial action. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, to be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation must also be employed by a company in the transportation industry.

In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to enforce employer-employee agreements to arbitrate; however, the act excluded “seamen, railroad employees, and any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Reuters, US Supreme Court to decide scope of arbitration exemption for transp

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Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna

Issues

Whether a court or an arbitrator should resolve an allegation that a contract is void for illegality when that contract contains an arbitration clause.

Court below

 

Buckeye Check Cashing, a service provider in the payday loan industry, agreed to loan money to John Cardegna. The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause that compelled the parties to use arbitration, and not the courts, in case of dispute. Cardegna brought a class action lawsuit against Buckeye for allegedly charging interest rates higher than Florida usury law allows. Buckeye responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. Cardegna resisted arbitration, maintaining that the arbitration clause was part of an illegal contract and therefore void ab initio—the clause had never come into existence as a matter of law. The issue before the Court is thus whether a court or an arbitrator should determine whether the underlying contract is void for illegality before enforcing the arbitration clause. The outcome will depend on whether the Supreme Court believes the separability doctrine applies to such contracts. If the Court affirms and holds that Cardegna's claims should be decided by the courts, the payday industry and its consumers, businesses that use arbitration clauses, and the policies behind the Federal Arbitration Act may suffer. If the Court instead decides that the claims should be sent to arbitration, low-income consumers, consumer protection regulation, and the integrity of the judicial system as a whole may be negatively affected.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Florida Supreme Court erred by holding, consistent with the Alabama Supreme Court but in direct conflict with six federal courts of appeals, that the Federal Arbitration Act allows a party to avoid arbitration by claiming that the underlying contract containing an arbitration clause (but not the arbitration clause itself) is void for illegality.

John Cardegna needed money. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, 894 So.2d 860, 861 (Fla. 2005), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 2937 (2005).

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CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited v. Antrix Corp. Ltd.

Issues

When seeking to enforce an international arbitration award in U.S. court, must parties show a sufficient connection with the United States?

This case asks whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Antrix, which is an Indian state-owned corporation, repudiated its contract with Devas, which is a private Indian corporation. Devas argues that federal courts in the United States can exercise personal jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award Devas had won. Antrix counters that because their dispute lacks minimum contact with the United States, federal courts in the United States lack personal jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award. The outcome of this case has significant implications for international relations and post-judgment asset discovery. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Petitioner Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. (“Devas”) is a private Indian corporation. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. at 3. Respondent Antrix Corp. Ltd. (“Antrix”) is a corporation owned by the Government of India.

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Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski

Issues

Is a district court deprived of jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal when a non-frivolous appeal is filed in response to a denial of a motion to compel arbitration?  

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration automatically strips the district court of its jurisdiction to continue the litigation on the merits of the case pending the results of the appeal. The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have all held that district courts are deprived of jurisdiction in this situation, while the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held the opposite. Coinbase, Inc. argues that the “Divestiture Rule” applies here—the district court is divested of jurisdiction pending an appeal of a motion to compel arbitration. Abraham Bielski counters that the traditional discretionary test applies, which grants the district court the discretion to grant or deny a stay of the proceedings until the appeal is resolved. This case touches on important questions regarding judicial economy, economic efficiency, and the treatment of arbitration agreements in relation to other contracts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration ousts a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal.

Coinbase, Inc. (“Coinbase”) is a cryptocurrency exchange platform, which stores cryptocurrency for account holders in digital wallets. Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc. at 1. Abraham Bielski (“Bielski”) created an account with Coinbase and set up a digital wallet on the platform in 2021. Id. at 2.

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Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski

Issues

Can a subsequent agreement to a platform’s contest terms alter the terms of an arbitration delegation clause originally agreed to in the platform’s general user agreement?

Petitioner Coinbase seeks to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that a subsequent contract regarding the terms for a contest with the contest platform’s registered users limits the scope of the platform’s general user agreement on arbitration and how that scope is determined. The parties dispute whether original agreement’s text forecloses subsequent modification and whether the Federal Arbitration Act and California contract law govern that determination. The outcome of this case carries implications for contract predictability, the authority of arbitrators, and the power of the Federal Arbitration Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, an arbitrator or a court should decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation. 

In January 2018, David Suski opened a Coinbase account. Suski v. Marden-Kane. Upon opening his account, Suski agreed to the arbitration provision listed in the Coinbase User Agreement. Suski v. Coinbase.

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CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood

Issues

Does the plain language of the CROA create a non-waivable right to sue, thereby  voiding  a consumer contract’s binding arbitration agreement?

 

Respondents Wanda Greenwood, Ladelle Hatfield, and Deborah McCleese each applied for an Aspire Visa credit card that petitioner CompuCredit Corporation marketed. Petitioner Synovus Bank issued the Aspire Visas after each respondent signed an agreement containing a binding arbitration provision. When respondents were charged card-related fees, they filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated alleging that petitioners engaged in deceitful marketing in violation of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq. (“CROA”). CompuCredit moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The district court acknowledged the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, but held that the CROA created a non-waivable right for consumers to sue in court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under the CROA. Petitioners argue that the contract between the parties should be honored and the binding arbitration clause enforced. Respondents contend, however, that Congress intended to preserve the right to bring a claim in court when it enacted the CROA. The Supreme Court’s decision will consider the balance between consumers’ right to contract and providing adequate protections for vulnerable consumers. This decision will affect the enforceability of consumer contracts’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the extent to which arbitration may act as an acceptable substitute for an individual’s access to court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether claims arising under the CROA are subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.

CompuCredit Corporation considered a credit repair organization for purposes of this case, marketed a subprime credit card called Aspire Visa to consumers with impaired credit records. See Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). As the card’s exclusive marketer and advertiser, CompuCredit Corp.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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DIRECTV, Inc. v. Amy Imburgia et al.

Issues

Can parties to a consumer arbitration agreement incorporate otherwise preempted state law into their agreement, or does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt that law in all cases?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether an arbitration provision in a Customer Agreement purportedly governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires the application of state law preempted by, or independent from, the FAA. See Brief for Petitioner, DIRECTV, Inc. at 1.  DIRECTV argues that the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes, that state law is always subject to the preemptive force of federal law, and that in any  event  the FAA requires courts to resolve ambiguities in favor of arbitration. See id. at 18-19. Imburgia counters that the FAA requires agreements to be interpreted according to their express terms and that courts should interpret the express reference to state law in the agreement as California state contract law, independent from the preemptive force of federal law. See Brief for Respondent, Amy Imburgia et al. at 15. The Court’s decision may affect the enforcement of arbitration agreements in other contexts, as well as impact the way in which state courts interpret arbitration agreements. See Brief of Equal Employment Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Petitioner at 21–25.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the California Court of Appeal err by holding, in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act?

In September 2008, Amy Imburgia and a class of litigants filed a class action complaint against DIRECTV in California Superior Court, alleging violations of state contract law after receiving a series of early termination fees following the cancellation of their accounts with the company. See Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App.

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