Skip to main content

Communications Act

City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al. and City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Issues

Should a court defer to the decision of an administrative agency when determining the limits of the agency’s power? Additionally, did the Federal Communications Commission exceed its power by setting timeframes on local governments for processing requests to build wireless service facilities?

 

A boom in wireless communications has prompted the building of more facilities for wireless services. While necessary to manage the growing demand for wireless services, these facilities can be unpopular neighbors in a community. Although the Communications Act requires a local government to respond within a reasonable time period to requests for building these facilities, the law does not specify what exactly is a reasonable time period. In 2008, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") set timeframes on zoning authorities for processing requests to build wireless facilities. The Petitioner Cities of Arlington, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, challenged the FCC’s timeframes by arguing that the FCC overstepped its power under the Communications Act. When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the FCC acted within its power, Arlington and New Orleans challenged that the Fifth Circuit improperly submitted its own judgment to that of the FCC on the question of the FCC’s scope of authority. Arguing to uphold the decision of the Fifth Circuit, Respondent FCC contends that Congress intended to empower the FCC to interpret the Communications Act in all its provisions. Differing from the FCC, Respondent Cellco (a partnership of four corporations) argues that although Congress did not empower the FCC to determine the limits of its own authority, the Fifth Circuit was right to defer to the FCC on these timeframes in particular. If the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Arlington and New Orleans, the uniformity in timely construction of wireless facilities may suffer. However, a holding for the FCC may allow the FCC and other agencies to expand their own powers at the expense of local governments. Further, if the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Cellco and the FCC, local governments may lose the flexibility and power to respond to local concerns. 

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This case involves a challenge to the FCC's jurisdiction to implement §332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, titled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority." Section 332(c)(7) imposes certain limitations on State and local zoning authority over the placement of wireless service facilities, but authorizes the FCC to address only one of these limitations; it states that no other provision "in this Act" may ''limit'' or "affect" State and local authority over wireless facilities placement. The FCC concluded that other provisions "in this Act" authorize it to adopt national zoning standards to implement §332(c)(7). The Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC's jurisdictional determination applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet conclusively resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in the context of an agency's determination of its own statutory jurisdiction, and the circuit courts of appeals have adopted different approaches to this issue."

City of Arlington, Texas, et al., v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

1. Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least two other circuits, and in light of this Court's guidance, a court should apply Chevron to review an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the FCC may use its general authority under the Communications Act to limit or affect State and local zoning authority over the placement of personal wireless service facilities.

Cable, Telecommunications, and Technology Committee of the New Orleans City Council v. Federal Communications Commission

1. Should Chevron deference be afforded to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction?

2. If it is determined that an agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction should be evaluated under Chevron, did the Fifth Circuit improperly apply Chevron?

3. Did the FCC usurp the jurisdiction and authority reserved for State and local governments by Congress in its interpretation of 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(C)(7) by creating additional limitations on state and local governments beyond those provided for in the statute?

According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the Communications Act of 1996, Congress balanced the power of local governments to regulate their local land with the goal of allowing telecommunications technologies to develop. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 638 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.

Issues

Whether a payphone service provider can sue a long distance carrier in federal court when that carrier fails to pay compensation for dial-around calls made in violation of Federal Communications Commission regulations.

 

Payphone users can circumvent the usual payment method and avoid inserting a coin by using an access code or 800 number provided by a long distance carrier. These “dial-around” numbers, while convenient for users, leave payphone service providers uncompensated for the call made. The Federal Communications Commission, as instructed by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, created regulations to ensure that payphone service providers receive compensation for these “dial-around” calls. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., a payphone service provider, argues that Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., a long distance provider, has violated these regulations by failing to compensate Metrophones for such calls. Metrophones argues that under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act, Global Crossing Telecommunications’ violation of the Federal Communications Commission regulation constitutes an unjust and unreasonable practice, making it unlawful and actionable in federal court. Both the District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a private cause of action does exist under Section 201(b). The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will define the scope of Section 201(b) of the Communications Act as well as give insight into the amount of deference to agency pronouncements that the court deems fit. It will also either provide a long awaited opportunity for payphone service providers to assert their rights in this area or leave them looking for another way to obtain compensation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 creates a private right of action for a provider of payphone services to sue a long distance carrier of alleged violations of the FCC’s regulations concerning compensation for coinless payphone calls.

Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. (“Metrophones”) is a payphone service provider (“PSP”). Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. (“Global Crossing”) is a long distance provider. The basis of the dispute is compensation Global Crossing is required by law to pay Metrophone for “dial around” calls from payphones.

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to Communications Act