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City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al. and City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Issues

Should a court defer to the decision of an administrative agency when determining the limits of the agency’s power? Additionally, did the Federal Communications Commission exceed its power by setting timeframes on local governments for processing requests to build wireless service facilities?

 

A boom in wireless communications has prompted the building of more facilities for wireless services. While necessary to manage the growing demand for wireless services, these facilities can be unpopular neighbors in a community. Although the Communications Act requires a local government to respond within a reasonable time period to requests for building these facilities, the law does not specify what exactly is a reasonable time period. In 2008, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") set timeframes on zoning authorities for processing requests to build wireless facilities. The Petitioner Cities of Arlington, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, challenged the FCC’s timeframes by arguing that the FCC overstepped its power under the Communications Act. When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the FCC acted within its power, Arlington and New Orleans challenged that the Fifth Circuit improperly submitted its own judgment to that of the FCC on the question of the FCC’s scope of authority. Arguing to uphold the decision of the Fifth Circuit, Respondent FCC contends that Congress intended to empower the FCC to interpret the Communications Act in all its provisions. Differing from the FCC, Respondent Cellco (a partnership of four corporations) argues that although Congress did not empower the FCC to determine the limits of its own authority, the Fifth Circuit was right to defer to the FCC on these timeframes in particular. If the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Arlington and New Orleans, the uniformity in timely construction of wireless facilities may suffer. However, a holding for the FCC may allow the FCC and other agencies to expand their own powers at the expense of local governments. Further, if the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Cellco and the FCC, local governments may lose the flexibility and power to respond to local concerns. 

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This case involves a challenge to the FCC's jurisdiction to implement §332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, titled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority." Section 332(c)(7) imposes certain limitations on State and local zoning authority over the placement of wireless service facilities, but authorizes the FCC to address only one of these limitations; it states that no other provision "in this Act" may ''limit'' or "affect" State and local authority over wireless facilities placement. The FCC concluded that other provisions "in this Act" authorize it to adopt national zoning standards to implement §332(c)(7). The Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC's jurisdictional determination applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet conclusively resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in the context of an agency's determination of its own statutory jurisdiction, and the circuit courts of appeals have adopted different approaches to this issue."

City of Arlington, Texas, et al., v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

1. Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least two other circuits, and in light of this Court's guidance, a court should apply Chevron to review an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the FCC may use its general authority under the Communications Act to limit or affect State and local zoning authority over the placement of personal wireless service facilities.

Cable, Telecommunications, and Technology Committee of the New Orleans City Council v. Federal Communications Commission

1. Should Chevron deference be afforded to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction?

2. If it is determined that an agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction should be evaluated under Chevron, did the Fifth Circuit improperly apply Chevron?

3. Did the FCC usurp the jurisdiction and authority reserved for State and local governments by Congress in its interpretation of 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(C)(7) by creating additional limitations on state and local governments beyond those provided for in the statute?

According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the Communications Act of 1996, Congress balanced the power of local governments to regulate their local land with the goal of allowing telecommunications technologies to develop. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 638 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir.

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Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency; Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency; National Mining Association v. Environment Protection Agency

Issues

Is the EPA required to consider costs when determining whether it is appropriate and necessary to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities?

 

The United States Supreme Court will consider whether the EPA acted reasonably based on the agency’s interpretation of its obligations under the Clean Air Act when it did not consider the costs, during rulemaking, of regulating the emissions of hazardous air pollutants from oil- and coal-fired electric utilities. The Petitioners argue that because the EPA did not consider  cost  of compliance as a factor in its decision, the EPA’s rule is an incorrect interpretation of the Clean Air Act and is unreasonable. The Respondents counter that the EPA acted reasonably and correctly interpreted the Clean Air Act by not considering  cost  of compliance as a factor in its decision to regulate hazardous air pollutants from electric utility plants. The Court’s decision will implicate the regulation of hazardous air pollutant emissions from electric  utilities,  and may have broader implications for the statutory interpretation of similar regulatory mandates to agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Clean Air Act treats electric utilities differently from other sources of hazardous air pollutants. Other sources are required to limit their emissions if they exceed quantitative thresholds. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) & (d)(1). By contrast, before EPA regulates hazardous air pollutants from electric utilities, it must first conduct a study of the hazards to public health resulting from those emissions even after imposition of all the other requirements of the Clean Air Act, and then decide whether it is "appropriate and necessary" to regulate such residual emissions under § 7412 after considering the results of the study. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).

The question for the Court is:

Whether EPA's interpretation of "appropriate" in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) is unreasonable because it refused to consider a key factor (costs) when determining whether it is appropriate to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities.

THE SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING: Whether the Environmental Protection Agency unreasonably refused to consider costs in determining whether it is appropriate to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities.

Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1970, including what is now § 7412, to address issue of air pollution, focusing on reducing hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”). See White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v.

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Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education

Issues

Should the Supreme Court follow Chevron and defer to the Secretary of Education's formula to determine whether a school district should continue to receive federal funding, although the formula apparently conflicts with the statutory method?

 

The Federal Impact Aid Act provides federal funding to school districts located on Indian Reservations, military bases, or land with federal presence. Under the Act, the Secretary of Education can divert federal aid from the district back to the state if it determines that the state's school district operational funding is “equalized.” After determining that New Mexico's funding for the year 1999-2000 was equalized, the Secretary allowed the state to withhold federal subsidies from certain districts. The Zuni Public School District claims that the Secretary's formula for determining whether a school district receives federal subsidies conflicts with the plain meaning of the Act. In resolving this issue, the Supreme Court will clarify the scope of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the seminal case governing agency interpretations of enabling legislation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Secretary has the authority to create and impose his formula over the one prescribed by Congress and through this process certify New Mexico's operational funding for fiscal year 1999–2000 as “equalized,” thereby diverting the Impact Aid subsidies to the State and whether this is one of the rare cases where this Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to correct a plain error that affects all State school districts that educate federally connected children.

The Zuni Public School District (“Zuni”) is located almost entirely within Zuni and Navajo Reservation lands in New Mexico. Brief for Petitioner at 2. The Federal Impact Aid Act provides subsidies to Zuni as well as other school districts located on Indian Reservations, military bases, or land with other types of federal presence. 20 U.S.C. § 7709 et seq. (2000).

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank for Professor Jonathan Siegel for his insight into this case.

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