confrontation clause

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This case involves how a state can comply with the Confrontation Clause when presenting certificates of forensic analysis into evidence, rather than having the forensic analyst testify to the results of the evidence testing. In June 2009, the Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts that certificates of analysis must be accompanied by an opportunity to cross-examine the forensic analyst who prepared the report. However, Virginia Code Sections 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 allow for a defendant to question a forensic analyst at trial by calling him as a defense witness. Petitioners Mark Briscoe and Sheldon Cypress argue that this violates Melendez-Diaz and the Confrontation Clause by shifting the burden to the defendant and creating a waiver of a constitutional right through inaction. Virginia claims that the scheme is constitutional because the defendants are on notice of the charges against them and may still call the forensic analyst as a witness themselves. This case could affect trial strategy and the cost of presenting forensic evidence, as well as provide an opportunity for the Court to examine the recent 5-4 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts decision, where recently retired Justice David Souter cast a deciding vote.

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Following an arrest for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), Petitioner Donald Bullcoming’s blood was tested at the New Mexico Department of Health in order to determine his blood alcohol content (BAC). At trial, the laboratory’s report was admitted into evidence even though the actual analyst who performed the test was not a witness. Instead, another analyst from the Department of Health testified to the laboratory’s procedures and the machinery used to conduct the BAC test. On appeal, Bullcoming argues that the information in the report was testimonial and that, because the actual analyst was not a witness subject to cross-examination, his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated. Respondent New Mexico contends that the report is not testimonial because the testing analyst merely transcribed raw data and that, even if it is testimonial, Bullcoming’s confrontation rights were satisfied by the opportunity to retest the sample and cross-examine another analyst. To decide this case, the Supreme Court must balance a defendant’s right to confrontation against the burden that requiring the actual analyst to testify imposes on the state.

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The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment codifies the long-recognized right of an accused to confront his/her accuser, and the corresponding “hearsay rule” requires that if the  accuser  does not testify at trial his/her statements can not be used as evidence.  The trial  judge in this case  allowed a 911 call made by Davis' alleged victim into evidence even though the victim failed to appear at trial.  The Washington Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme Court upheld that decision based on a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule for reliable or spontaneous statements. Davis now appeals that these decisions were improper in light of the recent Crawford standard which forbids "testimonial" statements from being introduced in the absence of the witness.  Davis claims that the Framers of the Constitution understood the Confrontation Clause to apply to immediate reports of crime to government agents, and therefore, despite the change of technological context, the Clause also applies to 911 calls.  Washington responds that the motivation of the Confrontation Clause — preventing prosecutorial abuse — will not be served by Davis’s interpretation since 911 operators are unlikely to be soliciting testimony with an eye towards trial.  This case, which will be heard back-to-back with Hammon v. Indiana, is the first in which the Court will address the admissibility of the content of 911 calls in the absence of the witness under the reformulated Crawford standard.  Along with the rights of defendants, the case will also have a significant effect on the ability of prosecutors nationwide to convict the accused in "evidence-based" cases where the alleged victim is unavailable to testify, which are especially prevalent in the domestic violence context.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to balance state criminal evidence rules and Sixth Amendment rights. New York’s opening-the-door rule allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence if a party has given an incomplete and misleading impression of the issue. Under this rule, if a criminal defendant “opens the door” to responsive evidence, the defendant also forfeits their right to exclude that evidence on the grounds that it is barred by the Confrontation Clause. Darrell Hemphill contends that New York violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser by ruling that the state’s opening-the-door rule superseded the Confrontation Clause. New York argues that the opening-the-door rule does not infringe on Hemphill’s constitutional rights. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment and the states’ trial procedures.

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As Anthony Covington lay on the ground injured from a gunshot wound, he provided police officers on the scene with a description of his alleged shooter, before dying a few hours later. The police arrested the suspected shooter, Richard Bryant, based on Covington’s statements, and Bryant was subsequently convicted of second-degree murder after the Michigan trial court admitted Covington’s statements into evidence. Bryant claims that the admission of Covington’s statements violated his right to cross-examine an opposing witness, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The State of Michigan argues that Covington’s statements were obtained during the police’s response to an “ongoing emergency” and that its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely offer further guidance on what statements are “nontestimonial” under its landmark decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, which redefined the ambit of the Confrontation Clause.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether teachers who are obligated to report suspected child abuse are agents of law enforcement and whether a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher about child abuse are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Ohio asserts that a child’s statements made to teachers about potential child abuse are not testimonial because their primary purpose is not intended to further investigation, but rather to protect children. Also, Ohio argues and that teachers that must report suspected child abuse to authorities are not agents of the state. Darius Clark counters that teachers intend to report the potential child abuse when they question children and thus, teachers are agents of the state in doing so. The Additionally, Clark contends that the children’s statements are testimonial because they are meant to further the prosecution of the suspected abuser. The Court’s ruling impacts the admissibility of children’s statements about potential child abuse under the Confrontation Clause when children make statements to teachers who are obligated to report suspected child abuse to state authorities. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether admitting a co-defendant's redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on the surrounding context results in a Confrontation Clause violation. Adam Samia was convicted of murder and other criminal charges at a joint trial after the United States introduced as evidence the redacted confession of Samia’s co-defendant that mentioned and described an accomplice. Samia argues that admitting his co-defendant’s confession violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right because the jury likely inferred that he was the unidentified accomplice in his co-defendant’s confession. Samia asserts that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruton v. United States, his co-defendant’s confession should have been excluded. The United States counters that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred, and the co-defendant’s confession was properly admitted because, consistent with Bruton, all references to Samia were redacted and a limiting instruction was given. This case has significant implications for the role of trial judges as gatekeepers, prosecutorial discretion and power, and the scope of protection the Sixth Amendment provides.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State employs an expert who uses another expert’s notes as the basis of their own opinion. Jason Smith argues that the Confrontation Clause forbids the introduction of testimonial statements for their truth from expert witnesses whom a defendant has not had the opportunity to cross-examine, and that the testifying expert’s testimony in his case relied on the nontestifying expert’s testimonial notes and conclusions. Arizona argues that the Confrontation Clause allows experts to testify using facts that are not otherwise admissible when the facts are not submitted for their truth, and that the nontestifying expert’s notes in Smith’s case were not testimonial because they were not created for the purpose of testifying and lacked formality. The outcome of this case has serious implications for defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights and prosecutors’ ability to pursue cases that require forensics.

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