domestic violence

Issues

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment codifies the long-recognized right of an accused to confront his/her accuser, and the corresponding “hearsay rule” requires that if the  accuser  does not testify at trial his/her statements can not be used as evidence.  The trial  judge in this case  allowed a 911 call made by Davis' alleged victim into evidence even though the victim failed to appear at trial.  The Washington Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme Court upheld that decision based on a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule for reliable or spontaneous statements. Davis now appeals that these decisions were improper in light of the recent Crawford standard which forbids "testimonial" statements from being introduced in the absence of the witness.  Davis claims that the Framers of the Constitution understood the Confrontation Clause to apply to immediate reports of crime to government agents, and therefore, despite the change of technological context, the Clause also applies to 911 calls.  Washington responds that the motivation of the Confrontation Clause — preventing prosecutorial abuse — will not be served by Davis’s interpretation since 911 operators are unlikely to be soliciting testimony with an eye towards trial.  This case, which will be heard back-to-back with Hammon v. Indiana, is the first in which the Court will address the admissibility of the content of 911 calls in the absence of the witness under the reformulated Crawford standard.  Along with the rights of defendants, the case will also have a significant effect on the ability of prosecutors nationwide to convict the accused in "evidence-based" cases where the alleged victim is unavailable to testify, which are especially prevalent in the domestic violence context.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Hague Convention, a court may consider ameliorative measures, such as protective orders or custody determinations, to prevent grave danger to a child when ordering a child back to their home country. The Hague Convention requires that children abducted in violation of parental custody rights must be returned to their country of habitual residence. Narkis Golan, a United States citizen living in Italy, brought her Italian-born child to the United States, and did not return to Italy because she was a victim of domestic abuse by her Italian husband, Isaac Saada. Saada then sued Golan under the Hague Convention. Golan claims that her case falls under an exception within the Hague Convention that stops the return of the child if there is risk that the child will be in grave danger. While the lower court found sufficient ameliorative measures to prevent potential danger and granted Saada’s petition, Golan argues that the ameliorative measures are counter to the goals of the Hague Convention and should not be required or considered, especially where there is domestic violence. Saada responds that ameliorative rights must be considered to fairly assess the child’s return to their habitual residence. The outcome of this case could affect the safety of children, Hague Convention proceedings, and cooperation between foreign nations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case arises out of a custody dispute between an Italian father, Domenico Taglieri, and an American mother, Michelle Monasky, whose marriage had deteriorated, and where the mother had removed the child to the United States before a court could determine the parents’ custody rights. To determine whether the child must be returned to Italy, the Supreme Court must decide whether to uphold the Sixth Circuit’s order to return the child based on its affirmation of the district court’s determination that the child habitually resided in Italy. Monasky argues that the Hague Convention’s text supports an actual-agreement standard for habitual residence, and that the Hague Convention does not contemplate courts imposing habitual residence on a child when the child’s situation in the state would be precarious and the child lacks meaningful connections with the state. She further argues that the statute, appellate history, and the mixed legal and factual nature of habitual residence support de novo review. Taglieri responds that the lower courts properly applied a fact-sensitive analysis of the child’s situation in Italy and, furthermore, that if “actual agreement” were required, the Hague Convention would under-protect children in hotly disputed custody cases who most need protection. He also contends that clear-error review should apply because habitual residence issues are more factual than legal, and because such review is more expedient, consistent with the Hague Convention’s aims. The outcome of this case will have implications for international child abduction and custody cases involving claims of domestic violence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine whether the United States Government ("Government") can use uncounseled tribal court convictions to satisfy the predicate offense requirement outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). Section 117(a) is a domestic assault statute under which the Government may prosecute a person who has committed sexual assault within the U.S. or Indian country and who has already been twice convicted in State, Federal, or Indian court, of assault against a spouse or intimate partner. The Government argues that it may use Bryant’s prior convictions in his § 117 prosecution because the convictions did not violate the U.S. Constitution but were instead obtained on tribal lands where the Constitution is inapplicable. The Government further argues that using the convictions would not violate due process because the statute passes the rational-basis standard of review and is consistent with the principles of comity. Bryant counters, arguing that the Court’s precedent establishes a bright-line rule that invalidates convictions obtained in a manner that violates the Constitution, including Bryant’s convictions here, and that the Government’s reading of Court precedent is overly broad. Bryant further contends that allowing these convictions would lead to either admittance of an abundance of suspect convictions or a complex process requiring courts to determine the validity of each conviction. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will significantly impact the validity of tribal court judgments for purposes of predicate-offense crimes as well as the ability of prosecutors to prevent domestic abuse crimes in Indian Country.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In 1996, Congress passed what is now Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18, which criminalizes the possession of firearms by certain individuals. Section 922(g)(9) makes it a federal crime for a person convicted in state court of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm if the misdemeanor involved the use or attempted use of physical force. In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was convicted in Tennessee of misdemeanor domestic assault, which requires proof of causing bodily injury to another. Seven years later, Castleman was indicted for possessing a firearm in violation of Section 922(g)(9). The Supreme Court will address whether Castleman’s conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for Section 922(g)(9) and whether the language “physical force” in Section 922(g)(9) requires violent contact. The Court’s ruling will affect the scope of limitations on domestic violence offenders’ possession of firearms, and may serve as precedent for other misdemeanor offenses which contain the language “physical force.”  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Issues

In 1994, Randy Edward Hayes pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense under West Virginia law for the battery of his then-wife, Mary Ann Hayes. Ten years later, police arrested Hayes and charged and convicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Hayes challenged the charge, alleging that since the West Virginia statute under which he was originally convicted did not have a domestic relationship between offender and victim as an element, he could not later be prosecuted under § 921(a)(33)(A), which, he argues, does require a domestic relationship between offender and victim as an element. The Government, while not denying that a domestic relationship is necessary for application of the statute, contends that a domestic relationship is not an element of the predicate offense of a violent misdemeanor in § 921(a)(33)(A). The Government points out that nine other courts of appeal have read the statute in this way. Hayes argues that the Government’s interpretation of the statute illegitimately broadens it beyond its intended meaning.  He says that the Fourth Circuit, which overturned his conviction, was correct in reading the statute’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to include a domestic relationship element in the predicate offense. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which bans firearm possession for someone under a civil protective order due to domestic violence, violates the Second Amendment on its face. Petitioner United States argues that the ban does not violate the Second Amendment because the history and tradition of firearm regulations in the United States allow Congress to disarm individuals who are not law-abiding, responsible citizens, such as those subject to civil protective orders. In opposition, Respondent Zackey Rahimi contends that § 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment on its face because the Second Amendment protects the firearm rights of all United States citizens and § 922(g)(8) bears no resemblance to any firearm regulations in American history. The outcome of this case will affect the constitutionality of laws that address domestic violence, as well as how future gun regulations will be analyzed.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“section 922”), to prohibit domestic abusers from obtaining firearms. Section 922 covers individuals convicted for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which includes state misdemeanors that constitute “the use of physical force.” The Supreme Court will consider whether convictions under Maine’s domestic assault law satisfy this predicate offense requirement. Stephen Voisine was convicted under Maine’s domestic assault statute, which criminalizes “the intentional, knowing, or reckless causation of bodily injury or offensive physical contract to another person.” Voisine was then convicted under section 922. But Voisine asserts that common law battery requires a mens rea greater than recklessness and that the “use of physical force” implies intentional conduct. The United States argues that recklessness meets the standard for common law battery, and contends that section 922 would be pointless if it did not cover misdemeanors like Maine’s domestic assault statute. The Court’s decision will affect the ability of misdemeanants to possess firearms and the health and safety of domestic violence victims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources