hearsay

Davis v. Washington

Issues

Are 911 calls — previously admissible as evidence in court even when the witness was absent under exceptions to the hearsay rule — "testimonial" statements and therefore no longer admissible under the new Crawford standard?

 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment codifies the long-recognized right of an accused to confront his/her accuser, and the corresponding “hearsay rule” requires that if the  accuser  does not testify at trial his/her statements can not be used as evidence.  The trial  judge in this case  allowed a 911 call made by Davis' alleged victim into evidence even though the victim failed to appear at trial.  The Washington Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme Court upheld that decision based on a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule for reliable or spontaneous statements. Davis now appeals that these decisions were improper in light of the recent Crawford standard which forbids "testimonial" statements from being introduced in the absence of the witness.  Davis claims that the Framers of the Constitution understood the Confrontation Clause to apply to immediate reports of crime to government agents, and therefore, despite the change of technological context, the Clause also applies to 911 calls.  Washington responds that the motivation of the Confrontation Clause — preventing prosecutorial abuse — will not be served by Davis’s interpretation since 911 operators are unlikely to be soliciting testimony with an eye towards trial.  This case, which will be heard back-to-back with Hammon v. Indiana, is the first in which the Court will address the admissibility of the content of 911 calls in the absence of the witness under the reformulated Crawford standard.  Along with the rights of defendants, the case will also have a significant effect on the ability of prosecutors nationwide to convict the accused in "evidence-based" cases where the alleged victim is unavailable to testify, which are especially prevalent in the domestic violence context.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an alleged victim's statements to a 911 operator naming her assailant — admitted as "excited utterances" under a jurisdiction's hearsay law — constitute "testimonial" statements subject to the Confrontation Clause restrictions enunciated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

At 11:54 a.m. on February 1, 2001, a 911 operator in Kent, Washington, picked up a call only to hear a dial tone — the party on the other end had hung up before speaking.  Brief for Respondent at 1, State v.

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Hammon v. Indiana

Issues

Can  a accusation  made to an officer attempting to secure and investigate a scene of an alleged crime scene be entered into evidence without giving the defendant an opportunity to  cross examine  the accuser, or is the accusation a testimonial statement and thus open to cross-examination?

Court below

 

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, the Supreme Court held that a wife’s out of court statement against her husband could only be admitted as testimonial evidence subject to cross-examination.  The instant case presents a similar question, with the added complication of whether statements made at a crime scene during the investigative stage should be admitted as testimonial or non-testimonial statements. Hershel Hammon’s wife made a statement to police officers responding to a domestic disturbance call—there is no question that such a statement is admissible, but the real issue is whether once admitted the statement is a testimonial statement subject to the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If it is not a testimonial statement within the meaning of Crawford, then the defendant does not have a right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine his wife. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an oral accusation made to an investigating officer at the scene of an alleged crime is a testimonial statement within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

On the evening of February 26, 2003, Officers Jason Mooney and Rod Richard of the Peru Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005).

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hearsay

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of whatever it asserts, which is then offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter. The problem with hearsay is that when the person being quoted is not present, it becomes impossible to establish credibility. As a result, hearsay evidence is generally not admissible in court.

Smith v. Cain

Issues

Whether evidence proffered by Smith, which he claims was suppressed and thus not available to the defense at trial, is material, and whether there is a reasonable possibility that this evidence could have affected the outcome of the trial.

 

Petitioner Juan Smith was the sole person convicted of killing five people in a Louisiana home. His conviction was primarily based on the testimony of a witness, a survivor of the shooting, who identified Smith as one of the gunmen responsible for the crime. In subsequent applications for review, Smith contended that his trial was unfair because the prosecution intentionally suppressed material evidence. In this case, Smith argues that the suppression of that evidence constituted a violation of his constitutional due process rights; he supports this argument by seeking to show that the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the jury’s verdict against him. While Smith insists that he is entitled to a new trial, Respondent Burl Cain, warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, insists that the evidence was neither material nor suppressed, thus opposing a new trial. This case may affect the standard to which a prosecutor is held with regard to disclosure of evidence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In this criminal case, the state trial court, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, and the Louisiana Supreme Court, without making any factual findings, or providing any reasons for their rulings, denied Petitioner Juan Smith post-conviction relief. Smith contends that the state courts reached this result only by disregarding firmly established precedents of this Court regarding suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence by a prosecutor.

1. Is there a reasonable probability that, given the cumulative effect of the Brady and Napue/Giglio violations in Smith’s case, the outcome of the trial would have been different?

2. Did the Louisiana state courts ignore fundamental principles of due process in rejecting Smith’s Brady and Napue/Giglioclaims?

A Louisiana state court convicted Petitioner Juan Smith of participating in the 1995 shooting murder of five people, and sentenced Smith to life in prison without parole. See Brief for Petitioner, Juan Smith at 2; Brief for Respondent

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Whorton v. Bockting

Issues

1. Does the new ruling in Crawford v. Washington, that a witness must have been cross–examined in order for their hearsay testimony to be admitted as evidence, “significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures” and “implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial,” allowing it to apply retroactively?

2. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2254 incorporate the analysis from Teague v. Lane to allow federal courts to review cases decided correctly under then-current law, but rendered incorrect by subsequent Supreme Court decisions?

 

Marvin Bockting, a criminal defendant, was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison by a Nevada Court. He challenges the constitutionality of the court’s admitting hearsay testimony of his victim without opportunity for cross-examination. While no such requirement was in place at the time of his conviction, the Supreme Court has since decided that such cross-examination is necessary for the admission of hearsay testimony. The Supreme Court is now asked to determine whether this new rule must be retroactively applied. This case will represent another data point in the set defining the scope of retroactivity of criminal procedure rules. Moreover, it will clarify federal courts’ powers to hear cases on writs of habeas corpus when the issue at hand is the retroactive application of a criminal procedure rule.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether, in direct conflict with the published opinions of the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) regarding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay evidence under the Sixth Amendment, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral review violates this court's ruling in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

3. Whether, in direct conflict with the published decisions of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1) and (2) adopted the Teague exceptions for private conduct which is beyond criminal proscription and watershed rules.

Autumn, a six year old girl, lived with her mother, Laura, and step-father, Marvin Bockting, in a one room motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1013 (2005). One evening Autumn awoke upset.

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