divorce

Abbott v. Abbott

Issues

Whether a ne exeat order confers a right of custody to the non-custodial parent under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction.

 

Petitioner Timothy Abbott and Respondent Jacquelyn Abbott divorced in Chile. The Chilean court granted the mother custody of their son while allowing the father only visitation rights. At the mother’s request, the Chilean court issued a ne exeat order prohibiting either parent from removing the child from Chile without the agreement of both parents. Without the father’s consent, the mother brought her son to the United States. The father asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the ne exeat order constitutes a right of custody under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. A right of custody ruling would mandate return to Chile. This case will primarily impact international child custody battles where one parent abducts a child to or from the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction requires a country to return a child who has been “wrongfully removed” from his country of habitual residence. Hague Convention art. 12. A “wrongful removal” is one that occurs “in breach of rights of custody.” Id. art. 3. The question presented is: Whether a ne exeat clause (that is, a clause that prohibits one parent from removing a child from the country without the other parent’s consent) confers a “right of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction.

In 1992, Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, married Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, in England. See Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008). Their son was born in the United States in 1995, and the family moved to Chile in 2002. See id. In 2003, Mr. and Mrs.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Child Custody

·      Hague Conference: Child Abduction

·      ConflictofLaws.Net: A Divided Opinion on the Hague Abduction Convention

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guardian ad litem

A guardian ad litem (GAL) is a person appointed by a court to look after and protect the interests of someone who is unable to take care of themselves, typically a minor or someone who is determined to be legally incompetent. They are appointed to a specific case, and their role is to watch over the ward and make sure their interests are protected.

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Hillman v. Maretta

Warren Hillman named his wife, Judy Maretta, the beneficiary of his Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA) in 1996. The two subsequently divorced and Hillman remarried, but never changed the named beneficiary on his plan to his new wife, Jacqueline Hillman. Upon Warren Hillman’s death, Jacqueline Hillman attempted to claim death benefits under this policy, but her claim was denied because she was not the named beneficiary. Maretta received the benefits instead and Jacqueline Hillman commenced a suit against Maretta for the full amount of the death benefits.

Under Virginia state law, when a couple is divorced their beneficiary designations are automatically revoked. However, the  FEGLIA states that the beneficiary named on the policy shall receive the death benefits regardless of current marital status. The Supreme Court will now decide whether FEGLIA preempts Virginia’s state law regarding named beneficiaries, which will determine whether Jacqueline Hillman or Judy Maretta receives Warren Hillman’s death benefits. This case involves the proper balance of the federal government’s interest in uniform rules for the distribution of FEGLI benefits and the state of Virginia’s interest in seeing the intended beneficiary, rather than the named beneficiary, receive the death benefits.

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Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(A) (2011) provides that a life insurance policy's revocable beneficiary designation naming a then spouse is deemed revoked upon the entry of a Final Decree of Divorce. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) provides that the proceeds from a Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy should be paid to the beneficiaries properly designated by the employee, and if none, then to the widow of the employee. If VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1 (A) is preempted by 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) or any other federal law, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(D) (2011), gives the widow (or whoever would otherwise be entitled to the insurance proceeds), after FEGLI insurance proceeds have been distributed to an ex-spouse, a domestic relations equitable remedy against the ex-spouse for the amount of the insurance proceeds received.

The Supreme Court of Virginia, in agreement with the Supreme Court of Alabama, the First, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals and several lower federal courts, but in direct conflict with the Indiana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, the Appellate Court of Illinois, the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals of Texas, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, held that 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) preempts a state domestic relations equitable action against the beneficiary of a FEGLI policy after the insurance proceeds of such policy have been paid to such beneficiary in accordance with the statutory order of precedence in 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a).

The question presented is whether 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a), any other provision of the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA) or any regulation promulgated thereunder preempts a state domestic relations equitable remedy which creates a cause of action against the recipient of FEGLI insurance proceeds after they have been distributed, like the one contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(D).

Issue

Whether any provision of the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 preempts states from creating an equitable remedy where a third party can recover the amount of the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance benefit from the original beneficiary.

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Howell v. Howell

Issues

Does the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act preempt state domestic relations law when a veteran waives part of his military retirement pay in order to receive veterans’ disability benefits and an ex-spouse seeks to collect reimbursement for the resultant decrease in her court-ordered half of his retirement pay, as ordered at the time of divorce? 

Court below

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”) overrides state domestic relations law. In deciding this matter, the Court will determine whether a divorced veteran, who waives a portion of the total allocated military retirement pay (“MRP”) in order to receive disability benefits, must reimburse an ex-spouse for lost MRP when there exists a divorce decree ordering the equal division of the full MRP between the parties. Petitioner John Howell argues that the USFSPA overrides an Arizona divorce court order granting fifty percent of his MRP to his ex-wife, Respondent Sandra Howell, as the parties agreed during their divorce, without regard for Mr. Howell’s subsequent disability waiver. Mr. Howell contends that, because the court order directly conflicts with the USFSPA and its objectives, the court order is not legally valid. Respondent Sandra Howell counters that the divorce court’s order is valid because there is no direct conflict between the order and the USFSPA. This case will clarify the scope of the Military Powers Clauses and the Supremacy Clause for cases involving veterans’ benefits and domestic relations issues that have been traditionally left to the states to regulate, such as divorce. This case will also address the effects on retired and active-duty military personnel as well as their ex-spouses in navigating disability payments, partially-waived MRPs, and divorce decrees that allocate a portion of pre-waiver MRP to the ex-spouse. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act preempts a state court’s order directing a veteran to indemnify a former spouse for a reduction in the former spouse’s portion of the veteran’s military retirement pay, where that reduction results from the veteran’s post-divorce waiver of retirement pay in order to receive compensation for a service-connected disability. 

Petitioner John Howell and Respondent Sandra Howell, residents of Arizona, divorced in 1991. See Brief for Petitioner, John Howell at 8. Mr. Howell, who was anticipating retiring from the Air Force shortly after the divorce, came to an agreement with Ms.

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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)

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