Antitrust refers to the regulation of the concentration of economic power, particularly in regard to monopolies and other anticompetitive practices. Antitrust laws exist as both federal statutes and state statutes. The three key federal statutes in Antitrust Law are;
Warren Hillman named his wife, Judy Maretta, the beneficiary of his Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA) in 1996. The two subsequently divorced and Hillman remarried, but never changed the named beneficiary on his plan to his new wife, Jacqueline Hillman. Upon Warren Hillman’s death, Jacqueline Hillman attempted to claim death benefits under this policy, but her claim was denied because she was not the named beneficiary. Maretta received the benefits instead and Jacqueline Hillman commenced a suit against Maretta for the full amount of the death benefits.
Under Virginia state law, when a couple is divorced their beneficiary designations are automatically revoked. However, the FEGLIA states that the beneficiary named on the policy shall receive the death benefits regardless of current marital status. The Supreme Court will now decide whether FEGLIA preempts Virginia’s state law regarding named beneficiaries, which will determine whether Jacqueline Hillman or Judy Maretta receives Warren Hillman’s death benefits. This case involves the proper balance of the federal government’s interest in uniform rules for the distribution of FEGLI benefits and the state of Virginia’s interest in seeing the intended beneficiary, rather than the named beneficiary, receive the death benefits.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(A) (2011) provides that a life insurance policy's revocable beneficiary designation naming a then spouse is deemed revoked upon the entry of a Final Decree of Divorce. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) provides that the proceeds from a Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy should be paid to the beneficiaries properly designated by the employee, and if none, then to the widow of the employee. If VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1 (A) is preempted by 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) or any other federal law, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(D) (2011), gives the widow (or whoever would otherwise be entitled to the insurance proceeds), after FEGLI insurance proceeds have been distributed to an ex-spouse, a domestic relations equitable remedy against the ex-spouse for the amount of the insurance proceeds received.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in agreement with the Supreme Court of Alabama, the First, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals and several lower federal courts, but in direct conflict with the Indiana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, the Appellate Court of Illinois, the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals of Texas, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, held that 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) preempts a state domestic relations equitable action against the beneficiary of a FEGLI policy after the insurance proceeds of such policy have been paid to such beneficiary in accordance with the statutory order of precedence in 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a).
The question presented is whether 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a), any other provision of the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA) or any regulation promulgated thereunder preempts a state domestic relations equitable remedy which creates a cause of action against the recipient of FEGLI insurance proceeds after they have been distributed, like the one contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(D).
Whether any provision of the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 preempts states from creating an equitable remedy where a third party can recover the amount of the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance benefit from the original beneficiary.
Minimum wage laws establish a base level of pay that employers are required to pay certain covered employees. The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. In addition to a federal minimum wage, some states also have their own minimum wages, codified either in a state statute or in the state's constitution. States are broken up into 4 classifications for minimum wage:
Does amending a complaint to omit a federal question after removal to federal court defeat federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? Does a post-removal amendment restrict a federal district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the post-removal amendment of a complaint can defeat federal-question subject matter jurisdiction and preclude a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. On one hand, Royal Canin and Purina argue both that federal-question jurisdiction cannot be extinguished by amending a complaint and also that a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction even after the resolution of all federal claims. On the other hand, Anna Wullschleger and Gerald Brewer contend that the amended complaint determines federal-question jurisdiction, and a federal district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when no federal claim remains in the lawsuit. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for forum manipulation and federalism.
(1) Whether a post-removal amendment of a complaint to omit federal questions defeats federal-question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) whether such a post-removal amendment of a complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Anastasia Wullschleger and Geraldine Brewer purchased prescription pet food from Royal Canin and Purina under the impression that the companies formulated the food to treat their pets’ health and disease problems. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Anastasia Wullschleger at 4.
The authors would like to thank Professor Maggie Gardner for her guidance and insights into this case.
Can a party bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a state law that prohibits the dissemination of known false statements about political candidates, if the statement is designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate?
In March 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). Steven Driehaus, a congressman from Ohio who voted in favor of the ACA, was up for re-election later that year. During the lead-up to that election, Susan B. Anthony List ("SBA List"), a pro-life nonprofit organization, planned to run an advertisement attacking Driehaus for voting for the ACA. Before the advertisement ran, Driehaus successfully filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission claiming that SBA List would violate two Ohio statutes that prohibit the use of false statements in campaign advertisements. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether SBA List has standing to challenge those laws based on a theory of past or future harm. If the Court determines that SBA List has standing, then the Court will consider whether such laws violate the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. This case has important implications for political speech, including the extent to which it can be curtailed and the proper method for challenging its proscription.
In March 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 525 Fed. App’x. 415, 416 (6th Cir. 2013). Susan B. Anthony List (“SBA List”) is a pro-life nonprofit organization that opposes the ACA, claiming that the bill uses taxpayer money to fund abortions.
Can a litigant recover attorney fees pursuant to a private contract when the issues litigated involve matter exclusively governed by federal bankruptcy law?
Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America (“Travelers”) is appealing a Ninth Circuit decision denying it attorney fees for claims governed entirely by federal bankruptcy law. Travelers maintains that it is entitled to the indemnity rights it negotiated for under its private contract with Pacific Gas and Electric (“Pacific Gas”). Travelers relies on precedent to conclude that the substantive rights under a private contract are governed by state law and therefore the Ninth Circuit decision is wrongly decided and should be reversed. Pacific Gas argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in prior cases that attorneys’ fees pursuant to a private contract may be granted in cases where the rights are governed by state law, but not when they are peculiar to federal bankruptcy law. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that state law cannot govern federal issues such as indemnity of attorney fees for claims resulting from objections to debt restructuring plans and disclosure statements implemented by a company under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Ninth Circuit is concerned that a decision in support of non-prevailing creditors whose conditional rights have not been triggered or impaired in cases where the debtor has not defaulted in bankruptcy cases would flood the court dockets with these premature claims. The Supreme Court decision will resolve whether private parties can contract for rights which have not been explicitly granted by federal bankruptcy law. The decision will impact the legal protective strategies that creditors use to shield their investments from debtors who have filed for bankruptcy.
Whether a litigant may recover attorneys’ fees under a contract or state statute where the issues litigated involve matters of federal bankruptcy law?
This matter arises out of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case initiated by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (“Pacific Gas”), Respondent. Before Respondent commenced its bankruptcy case, Travelers Casualty & Surety Company (“Travelers”), Petitioner, issued surety bonds to various third parties on Pacific Gas’s behalf. One of these bonds was a $100 million surety bond issued to the California Department of Industrial Relations. This bond guarantees Pacific Gas’ payment of state workers compensation benefits to injured employees.
Law about... Bankruptcy
