firearm

Begay v. United States

 

Federal law prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, and the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) mandates increased prison sentences for violators of this provision who have three or more prior “violent felony” convictions. Petitioner Larry Begay (“Begay”) had at least three prior convictions for felony driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) when he pled guilty to federal firearms possession charges. The trial court held that felony DWI is a “violent felony,” and therefore sentenced Begay to a lengthy prison term under the ACCA. In deciding Begay’s appeal from this sentence, the Court will consider whether the ACCA’s “violent felony” definition encompasses felony DWI. A decision favoring Begay would likely limit the scope of the definition to felonies similar to those specifically listed in the ACCA: burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes using explosives. On the other hand, a decision in favor of the United States would likely extend the reach of the definition to all dangerous felonies. 

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Dean v. United States

Issues

Does a federal law imposing a ten-year minimum additional sentence on a defendant who fired a gun during a violent crime apply even if the firing was an accident?

 

Petitioner Christopher Michael Dean was convicted for a bank robbery in which he fired, probably by accident, a pistol. In addition to his sentence for the bank robbery, Dean was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which imposes a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for the discharge of a firearm during a violent crime. The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether courts can apply the sentence enhancement under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) if the discharge was accidental, or whether prosecutors must first prove that the defendant intended to fire the gun. Dean argues that prosecutors must prove that the defendant intended to fire the gun for the additional ten-year mandatory minimum to apply. The United States, on the other hand, contends that sentence enhancement statutes are not standalone criminal offenses and, therefore, that courts can apply these statutes without proof of intent. The outcome of this case could affect how often convicted individuals will receive enhanced sentences, based on whether the Supreme Court decides that prosecutors must prove intent for sentence enhancement factors, or whether the Court views sentence enhancement statutes as merely tailoring sentences to the specific facts of the underlying offense.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), establishing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant who "discharge[s]" a firearm during a crime of violence, requires proof that the discharge was volitional, and not merely accidental, unintentional, or involuntary.

    Petitioner Christopher Michael Dean and his brother-in-law, Ricardo Curtis Lopez, were convicted in federal district court for a bank robbery that occurred on November 10, 2004, in Rome, Georgia. See United States v.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Submit for publication
    0

    Henderson v. United States

    Issues

    May a court order the government to transfer or sell firearms to a third party on behalf of a convicted felon, who may not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 992(g)?

    In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States will have the opportunity to resolve a circuit split and determine whether a convicted felon may request that the government transfer possession of a felon’s non-contraband firearms to a third party. Henderson, a convicted felon, requested that the FBI transfer possession of the firearms to a third party interested in purchasing the firearms. The FBI denied his request, asserting that convicted felons may not possess firearms and that a transfer to a third party would give Henderson constructive possession in violation of federal law. Henderson, however, argues that his inability to possess firearms under federal law does not terminate his entire ownership interest in non-contraband firearms. The Supreme Court’s ruling will implicate ownership rights of convicted felons’ non-contraband firearms.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    “The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband, should be returned to its rightful owner once * * * criminal proceedings have terminated.” Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. La Fatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977))). 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), however, makes it “unlawful for any person * * * who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year * * * to * * * possess * * * any firearm.”

    The question presented is whether such a conviction prevents a court under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or under general equity principles from ordering that the government (1) transfer non-contraband firearms to an unrelated third party to whom the defendant has sold all his property interests or (2) sell the firearms for the benefit of the defendant. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and the Montana Supreme Court all allow lower courts to order such transfers or sales; the Third, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, bar them.

    Petitioner Tony Henderson is a former Border Patrol Agent who was charged with distributing marijuana, a felony under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See U.S. v. Henderson, 555 Fed. Appx. 851, 852 (11th Cir. 2014). He was arrested on June 7, 2006.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    Logan v. United States

    Issues

    Should the ACCA treat convictions that allow persons to retain their civil rights the same as convictions that take away and then restore civil rights, and thereby exclude convictions "with civil rights retained" from the mandatory sentencing scheme?

     

    James Logan, a citizen of Wisconsin with a prior felony drug conviction, was convicted of felony firearm possession after his girlfriend led the police to find a gun in his glove compartment. Under state law, Logan should have been sentenced to a maximum of ten years. The federal district court sentenced him to fifteen years. The United States claimed that Logan fell under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), which mandates an enhanced penalty for a gun-carrying felon who has three prior violent felony convictions. Logan had three prior misdemeanor battery convictions, all of which counted as "violent felonies" under the ACCA because they were each punishable by more than two years' imprisonment.

    Logan's prior misdemeanor battery convictions did not result in the loss of his civil rights. Logan therefore argued that these convictions should not count under the ACCA, which exempts a prior conviction if that conviction has had "civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision. Noting that there was no legislative history for the meaning of "restored," the appellate court interpreted "restored" to mean to give back something that had been taken away, and determined that rights that had never been lost could not be restored. Logan now appeals, arguing that "restored" should be interpreted broadly to avoid sentencing disparities and a result that Congress did not intend. At issue before the Supreme Court is whether convictions where rights were never taken away should be treated the same as convictions where rights were lost and then later regained. The Court's decision will resolve the current circuit split, as well as provide more insight into the continuing debate over mandatory sentencing schemes and the interpretation of federal sentencing laws.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the "civil rights restored" provision of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) applies to a conviction for which a defendant was not deprived of his civil rights, thereby precluding such a conviction as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)?

    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume for his insights into this case.

    Submit for publication
    0

    Wooden v. United States

    Issues

    Are crimes that occur in sequence during a criminal spree “committed on occasions different from one another” under the Armed Criminal Career Act?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to determine how sentencing courts should interpret the “occasions” provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for defendants who have three or more prior convictions for a serious felony or drug offense occurring on separate occasions. Petitioner William Dale Wooden (“Wooden”) argues that multiple offenses arising from the same criminal opportunity cannot serve as more than one “occasion” under the ACCA. Wooden maintains that his interpretation is consistent with the ACCA’s legislative history and Congressional record. Respondent United States counters that the focus of a sentencing court’s “different occasions” analysis should decide whether the crimes occurred at different times. The United States maintains that its position provides sentencing courts with a straightforward and uniform approach. This case has significant implications for criminal sentencing, recidivism, and the notion of what constitutes a “career” criminal.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether offenses that were committed as part of a single criminal spree, but sequentially in time, were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

    While searching for a wanted fugitive, police asked Wooden if they could enter his home. United States v. Wooden at 500. According to the police, Wooden gave them permission to enter. Id. While in his home, police observed Wooden pick up a firearm. Id. One of the officers was aware that Wooden was a convicted felon and that he could not legally possess a firearm.

    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professor Geoffrey Corn for his insights into this case.

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0
    Subscribe to firearm