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Lora v. United States

Issues

Does the prohibition on concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes using or possessing a firearm to commit crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes, apply to defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), which covers defendants who cause death through use of a firearm?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s prohibition on concurrent sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) criminalizes using or possessing a firearm to commit a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. To violate 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), an individual must, in the course of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), use a firearm to cause the death of another person. Petitioner Efrain Lora argues that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(d)(ii), which bars courts from sentencing defendants to concurrent terms of imprisonment, applies only to convictions under § 924(c) and not to convictions under § 924(j). Respondent the United States argues that, because § 924(j) can only be violated by also violating § 924(c), a sentence under Section 924(j) qualifies as a conviction under § 924(c) and must therefore also be subject to its sentencing requirements. This case has significant implications for federal sentencing law, including judicial discretion in sentencing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed … under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment,” is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).

In 2002, Efrain Lora was trafficking narcotics in the Bronx. United States v. Lora at 1. In collaboration with four co-conspirators, he decided to kill Andrew Balcarran, a rival drug dealer, over threats Balcarran had made towards Lora and his co-perpetrators regarding their drug territory. Id. On the day of the murder, Lora acted as a scout.

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Shaw v. United States

Issues

Does the term “defraud” in 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) require proof of a specific intent to target the financial institution’s property, in addition to intent to deceive a financial institution?

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether the plain language of the federal bank fraud statute requires proof of, in addition to intent to deceive a financial institution, a specific intent to target the financial institution’s property. See Brief for Petitioner, Lawrence Eugene Shaw at 15. The case arises out of Lawrence Eugene Shaw’s conviction of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1), after Shaw withdrew funds from a Taiwanese businessman’s Bank of America account, albeit without any harm to Bank of America. See United States v. Shaw, 781 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015). Shaw argues the plain language of § 1344(1) requires proof of intent to deprive that institution of its own property. See Brief for Petitioner at 15. The government responds that because the Congressional intent behind the statute was to target all forms of bank fraud, the statute must be interpreted broadly: without concern for schemers’ mental states as to whose property they sought to defraud. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 44–45. Potentially at stake is the balance between federal and state police power, with federal police power increasing the broader the Supreme Court interprets a statute. See Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), in Support of Petitioner at 5.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, subsection (1)’s “scheme to defraud a financial institution” require proof of a specific intent not only to deceive, but also to cheat, a bank, as nine circuits have held?

Lawrence Eugene Shaw was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) for executing a scheme to obtain funds from a Bank of America (“BoA”) account belonging to Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese businessman. See United States v. Shaw, 781 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015). Hsu, while working in the United States, opened an account with BoA.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his insight into this case.

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Whitfield v. United States

Issues

Does a federal bank robbery statute’s forced-accompaniment offense require substantial movement of a victim?

The issue in this case is whether “accompany” should require de minimus or substantial movement of a victim for bank robberies tried in federal court. Whitfield argues that the federal bank robbery statute (18 U.S.C. § 2113(e)) should be interpreted as requiring substantial movement of the victim and that any broader interpretation of “accompany” would yield absurd results. The United States counters that “accompany” should be interpreted literally, and that any finding of accompaniment justifies the imposition of an additional conviction under § 2113(e). This case will impact the interpretation of “accompany” in the context of bank robberies, and may also impact the interpretation of statutes involving other crimes, such as kidnapping.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

A conviction under the federal bank robbery statute carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, but no minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). If the bank robber forces another person “to accompany him” during the robbery or while in flight, however, that additional offense carries a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e).

The question presented is whether § 2113(e)’s forced-accompaniment offense requires proof of more than a de minimis movement of the victim. 

On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted an armed robbery of the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. See United States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288, 292–93 (4th Cir. 2012). Whitfield and McCoy’s weapons triggered an alarm system that prevented them from entering the bank, so they fled in their car.

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