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freedom of association

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Rodriquez

Issues

Does California’s Schedule B charitable donor disclosure requirement violate the First Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a state charitable donor disclosure regulation unconstitutionally infringes on donors’ and charitable organizations’ free speech and association rights. California recently started enforcing its Schedule B regulation, which requires charitable organizations to provide the confidential names of their financial donors. Petitioners Americans for Prosperity Foundation and Thomas More Law Center argue that this compelled disclosure is facially unconstitutional because it fails “exacting” scrutiny and unconstitutional as applied to them because of the extreme risks to their political minority donors. Respondent Matthew Rodriquez, the Attorney General of California, argues that the regulation is necessary to enforce charitable fraud laws and that California can meet its regulatory objectives while simultaneously protecting donors’ confidential data. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine whether charities in California must disclose the names of their donors to state regulators and will also determine the bounds of organizational free association rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the exacting scrutiny the Supreme Court has long required of laws that abridge the freedoms of speech and association outside the election context – as called for by NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and its progeny – can be satisfied absent any showing that a blanket governmental demand for the individual identities and addresses of major donors to private nonprofit organizations is narrowly tailored to an asserted law-enforcement interest.

California has a law that requires charitable organizations to submit various tax forms to the state, including Schedule B to IRS Form 990 (“Schedule B”), which contains certain donor information. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra at 1183. That information is normally considered confidential.

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Christian Legal Society v. Martinez

Issues

Whether a state law school may officially require that a student organization make its membership open to all students as a condition of receiving certain benefits associated with official recognition.

 

The Hastings Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) required that members agree with its core religious beliefs and pledge to live accordingly. Due to this requirement, the University of California-Hastings College of Law refused to recognize CLS as a registered student organization. Specifically, CLS’s membership requirement violated a nondiscrimination policy prohibiting registered student organizations from discriminating on the basis of religion or sexual orientation. CLS argued that Hastings violated its First Amendment right to free association and free exercise of religion by denying it an exemption from the nondiscrimination policy. The Ninth Circuit rejected CLS’s claims, holding that the school’s policy was viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the school’s educational mission. The Supreme Court’s decision will settle a circuit split over whether a public school can require a religious student organization to open its membership to all students, regardless of their beliefs

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it held, directly contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006), that the Constitution allows a state law school to deny recognition to a religious student organization because the group requires its officers and voting members to agree with its core religious viewpoints.

Respondent University of California-Hastings College of Law (“Hastings”) is a public law school in San Francisco. See Brief for Petitioner, Hastings Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) at 2. Hastings maintains a program to support registered student organizations (“RSO”), providing, among other benefits, funding and access to school facilities. See 

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• Annotated U.S. Constitution: First Amendment, Right of Association

• Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Reviews a Conflict Between Equality and Freedom of Association, Findlaw’s Writ (Dec. 14, 2009).

• Dorf on Law: Another Perspective on Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (Dec. 14, 2009)

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Harris v. Quinn

Issues

  1. Can a State compel in-home caregivers to financially support a union to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes?  
  2. Since the State has failed thus far to designate a union to be a particular group’s representative, do individuals falling within that group have standing to bring their claim?

Under Illinois law, caregivers who provide in-home assistance to disabled individuals through certain Medicaid-waiver programs may be compelled to support a private organization to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes. According to Illinois, the purpose of the mandate is to prevent inter-union rivalries that might hinder collective-bargaining negotiations and to prevent non-union members from “free-riding” off union members.  In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether compelled support for exclusive representation in this specific context violates the Constitution. Petitioners argue that forcing in-home service providers to unionize infringes upon their First Amendments rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of association.  Respondents counter that the Supreme Court’s precedent allows the government to force public workers to unionize when there is a compelling government interest for doing so. However, the fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on such a narrow issue has many commentators speculating that the Court may be intending to decide much more than is immediately apparent, including decisions that may have drastic consequences for the very future of labor unions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, compel personal care providers to accept and financially support a private organization as their exclusive representative to petition the State for greater reimbursements from its Medicaid programs?   
  2. Did the lower court err in holding that the claims of providers in the Home Based Support Services Program are not ripe for judicial review?  

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Facts

Petitioners in this case are individuals who provide in-home assistance to disabled persons in Illinois. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). Some of the petitioners operate under Illinois’s Home Services Program (“Rehabilitation Program”) while the rest operate under Illinois’s Home-Based Services Program (“Disabilities Program”).

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Heffernan v. City of Paterson

Issues

To raise a First Amendment retaliation claim, must public employees show they were fired for actually engaging in constitutionally protected activities?

 

In Paterson, New Jersey’s 2006 mayoral election, Mayor Jose Torres faced former police chief Lawrence Spagnola. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2015). Although he was friends with Spagnola and supported him privately, Paterson police detective Jeffrey Heffernan did not campaign for Spagnola, vote in the election, or consider himself politically active. But the day after picking up a Spagnola campaign yard sign at his mother’s request, Heffernan was demoted for his alleged political activities. See id. The Supreme Court will decide if Heffernan, to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim, must show that he actually engaged in constitutionally protected activity, or merely demonstrate that the City of Paterson fired him based on its belief that he engaged in protected activity. Heffernan argues that the First Amendment protects government employees from adverse action that is based upon political expression or association, regardless of the true nature of employees’ activities. See Brief for Petitioner, Jeffrey Heffernan at at 14. But Paterson maintains that the First Amendment protects only the literal exercise of association and speech. See Brief for Respondent, City of Paterson et al. at 8–12. The Court’s decision will impact how public employees engage in political activity, and the amount of litigation surrounding retaliation claims. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the First Amendment bar the government from demoting a public employee based on a supervisor’s perception that the employee supports a political candidate?

After twenty years in Paterson, New Jersey's police department, Jeffrey Heffernan was named a detective in 2005. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 149 (3d Cir.

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