Skip to main content

labor unions

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

Issues

Does an access regulation promulgated by the California Agricultural Relations Board constitute an unconstitutional governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment because it allows union organizers to speak to agricultural workers on their employer’s land at specified times during certain periods of the year?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a state access regulation that requires agricultural employers to allow union organizers to enter their property to speak with their employees during certain parts of the workday constitutes a governmental taking of the employer’s private property without just compensation. Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing Company contend that allowing union organizers on their land is a per se regulatory taking because it is essentially the same as a permanent physical occupation of the employer’s land for a public purpose, and without compensation, this taking is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Victoria Hassid, the Chair of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board that promulgated the regulation at issue, argues that only narrow categories of regulations have been recognized as per se regulatory takings and that if the Court expanded the categories to include this access regulation, it would imperil many existing state and federal regulations. The outcome of this case has serious implications for agricultural workers’ access to information about labor unions, existing state and federal regulations that allow access to private property, and the rights enjoyed by private property owners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.

In 1975, California passed the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA” or “Act”), which established the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“ALRB” or “Board”). Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma at 526. The ALRB found that there were few opportunities for unions to communicate with agricultural workers, which interfered with the workers’ right to organize.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Davenport v. Washington Education Association; Washington v. Washington Education Association

Issues

  1. Does a labor union have a First Amendment right to spend the wages of non-union members for political purposes?
  2. Does a law requiring labor unions to obtain the permission of non-union members before using their paid fees for political purposes (instead of allowing the unions to use such fees from any nonmembers who do not expressly opt out of such use) unconstitutionally violate the unions' First Amendment rights?

 

The State of Washington and several Washington educational employees brought suit against the Washington Education Association alleging that the union impermissibly used non-union member “shop fees” to finance political activities in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760's requirement that the union receive affirmative authorization from nonmembers before using their fees for political purposes. The Washington Supreme Court sided with the union and struck down § 760 as unconstitutional. Washington argues that the union does not have a First Amendment right to use shop fees for political purposes. The union responds that § 760 essentially blocks its ability to assert a collective political voice and must survive strict scrutiny to pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court's decision will determine the balance of First Amendment protection granted to a labor union relative to the protection afforded to dissenting nonmembers who pay shop fees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Do labor union officials have a First Amendment right to seize and use for politics the wages of employees who have chosen not to become union members?
  2. Does a state campaign finance law that prohibits labor unions and their officials from seizing and using the wages of nonmembers for partisan political campaigns without obtaining the nonmembers' affirmative consent violate the First Amendment rights of labor unions?
  3. Does the requirement in Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760 that nonmembers must affirmatively consent (opt-in) before their fees may be used to support the union's political agenda violate the union's First Amendment rights?

The Washington Employment Association (WEA) is the exclusive bargaining agent for 70,000 Washington state educational employees. Washington State Public Disclosure Commission v. Washington Education Association (WEA), 130 P.3d 352, 354 (2006).

Submit for publication
0

Harris v. Quinn

Issues

  1. Can a State compel in-home caregivers to financially support a union to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes?  
  2. Since the State has failed thus far to designate a union to be a particular group’s representative, do individuals falling within that group have standing to bring their claim?

Under Illinois law, caregivers who provide in-home assistance to disabled individuals through certain Medicaid-waiver programs may be compelled to support a private organization to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes. According to Illinois, the purpose of the mandate is to prevent inter-union rivalries that might hinder collective-bargaining negotiations and to prevent non-union members from “free-riding” off union members.  In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether compelled support for exclusive representation in this specific context violates the Constitution. Petitioners argue that forcing in-home service providers to unionize infringes upon their First Amendments rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of association.  Respondents counter that the Supreme Court’s precedent allows the government to force public workers to unionize when there is a compelling government interest for doing so. However, the fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on such a narrow issue has many commentators speculating that the Court may be intending to decide much more than is immediately apparent, including decisions that may have drastic consequences for the very future of labor unions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, compel personal care providers to accept and financially support a private organization as their exclusive representative to petition the State for greater reimbursements from its Medicaid programs?   
  2. Did the lower court err in holding that the claims of providers in the Home Based Support Services Program are not ripe for judicial review?  

top

Facts

Petitioners in this case are individuals who provide in-home assistance to disabled persons in Illinois. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). Some of the petitioners operate under Illinois’s Home Services Program (“Rehabilitation Program”) while the rest operate under Illinois’s Home-Based Services Program (“Disabilities Program”).

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

top

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to labor unions