collective bargaining

collective bargaining

Friedrichs, et al. v. California Teachers Association, et. al

Issues

Do unions violate public employees’ First Amendment rights through public sector “agency shop” arrangements or by requiring them to affirmatively object to subsidizing public sector union nonchargeable speech? 

 

Under California law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public school employees in a particular school district if it can show that a majority of the employees agree to be represented by that union. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). Such a union may establish an “agency shop” arrangement with the school district, under which employees, not members of the union, are required to pay an agency fee, and may only opt out from funding union activities not related to collective bargaining. See Friedrichs, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1. Friedrichs asserts that because of the political nature of collective bargaining, compelled agency fees are a violation of the First Amendment, and the opt-out system takes advantage of dissenters unaware of the affirmative objection requirement. See Brief for Petitioner, Rebecca Friedrichs, et al. 22, 30, 55–56, 61. In opposition, the Union argues that there is no justifiable reason to modify the opt-out arrangements, and that “agency shop” arrangements do not infringe employees’ First Amendment rights but are necessary to prevent a free riding problem. See Brief for Respondent, California Teachers Association, et al. at 15–17, 32, 55. The Court’s  decision in this case  will impact unions’ abilities to raise funds and the First Amendment rights of non-members of the union. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, in Support of Respondents at 19–20, 26–29.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Should Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), be overruled, and should public sector “agency shop” arrangements be invalidated under the First Amendment?
  2. Does requiring public employees to affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public sector unions, rather than requiring employees to affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech, violate the First Amendment?

Under California law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public school employees in a school district if it can show that a majority of the employees consent to its representation. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec.

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Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Issues

Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt an employer’s state tort claims against a labor union for intentionally destroying the employer’s property during a strategically-timed labor strike?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an employer can bring a tort claim in state court against a union or its members for intentionally destroying the employer’s property during a strike. The Court will decide if the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which allows employers and unions to tactically use “economic weapons” such as strikes to gain leverage during collective bargaining, preempts such tort claims. The parties agree that tort claims involving conduct which is “arguably protected” under the NLRA are preempted. Glacier Northwest contends that intentional destruction of private property is not “arguably protected” because it is unlawful. Glacier Northwest additionally argues that, even if intentional destruction of private property is “arguably protected,” a “local interest” exception to preemption applies. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 174 counters that intentional destruction of private property is “arguably protected” and that the “local interest” exemption does not apply. The Supreme Court’s decision could significantly impact labor law by opening the door to more frequent employer lawsuits and recalibrating the legal protections for activities that unions engage in to secure bargaining leverage.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the National Labor Relations Act impliedly preempts a state tort claim against a union for intentionally destroying an employer's property in the course of a labor dispute.

The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) gives employees the right to collectively bargain and to undertake “concerted activities for… mutual aid or protection.” Glacier Nw. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 at 15. Concerted activities include the right to strike.

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Granite Rock Company v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Issues

Whether a federal court or an arbitrator decides in the first instance if a contract containing an arbitration provision was formed.

Whether §301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, which governs federal jurisdiction for contract violations, not only applies to contracting parties but also to entities not party to the contract that may have interfered with the contract.

 

Petitioner, Granite Rock, and respondent, Teamsters Local 287, negotiated a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) which included no-strike and arbitration clauses. A dispute arose regarding the validity of the agreement after Local 287 initiated a strike with the support of respondent, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”). Granite Rock sued Local 287 and IBT under §301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act. The district court found that the agreement including the arbitration clause was valid and, therefore, referred Granite Rock and Local 287 to arbitration. The court, however, dismissed the claim against IBT, holding that §301(a) did not apply. The Ninth Circuit upheld IBT’s dismissal but held that the district court should have also deferred the question of whether a contract was formed to arbitration. The Supreme Court must now decide if a federal court has initial jurisdiction to determine the validity of a contract containing an arbitration clause and whether §301(a) allows plaintiffs to sue others not party to the contract.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does a federal court have jurisdiction to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement was formed when it is disputed whether any binding contract exists, but no party makes an independent challenge to the arbitration clause apart from claiming it is inoperative before the contract is established?

2. Does Section 30l(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, which generally preempts otherwise available state law causes of action, provide a cause of action against an international union that is not a direct signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, but effectively displaces its signatory local union and causes a strike breaching a collective bargaining agreement for its own benefit?

For years, petitioner, Granite Rock, a California cement company, and respondent, Teamsters Local 287 (“Local 287”) (the local chapter of respondent, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”)), had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). See 

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Collective Bargaining
 
·      Concrete Products: Granite Rock Jury Delivers Teamsters Crushing Breach of     Contract Verdict
 
·      Cornell ILR: Collective Bargaining Subject Guide

 

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Harris v. Quinn

Issues

  1. Can a State compel in-home caregivers to financially support a union to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes?  
  2. Since the State has failed thus far to designate a union to be a particular group’s representative, do individuals falling within that group have standing to bring their claim?

Under Illinois law, caregivers who provide in-home assistance to disabled individuals through certain Medicaid-waiver programs may be compelled to support a private organization to be their exclusive representative for collective-bargaining purposes. According to Illinois, the purpose of the mandate is to prevent inter-union rivalries that might hinder collective-bargaining negotiations and to prevent non-union members from “free-riding” off union members.  In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether compelled support for exclusive representation in this specific context violates the Constitution. Petitioners argue that forcing in-home service providers to unionize infringes upon their First Amendments rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of association.  Respondents counter that the Supreme Court’s precedent allows the government to force public workers to unionize when there is a compelling government interest for doing so. However, the fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on such a narrow issue has many commentators speculating that the Court may be intending to decide much more than is immediately apparent, including decisions that may have drastic consequences for the very future of labor unions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, compel personal care providers to accept and financially support a private organization as their exclusive representative to petition the State for greater reimbursements from its Medicaid programs?   
  2. Did the lower court err in holding that the claims of providers in the Home Based Support Services Program are not ripe for judicial review?  

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Facts

Petitioners in this case are individuals who provide in-home assistance to disabled persons in Illinois. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). Some of the petitioners operate under Illinois’s Home Services Program (“Rehabilitation Program”) while the rest operate under Illinois’s Home-Based Services Program (“Disabilities Program”).

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Locke v. Karass

Issues

Whether a state may constitutionally require its nonunion employees to pay fees to a union for representation, if the union may use the income from those fees to represent individuals outside of the state employees’ bargaining unit.

 

The state of Maine has designated the Maine State Employees Association (“MSEA”) as the exclusive “collective bargaining agent” for Maine state employees, including certain employees who are not members of the union. As a result, the nonmembers are required to pay service fees to MSEA, with part of the nonmembers’ fees pooled into the resources of a larger umbrella union. A group of nonmembers recently sued MSEA, claiming that this pooled arrangement with MSEA violates their First Amendment  rights,  because some of these litigation fees end up contributing to units outside MSEA. The District Court for the District of Maine held that the arrangement was constitutional and ruled for the unions, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court is whether such a pooling arrangement for extra-unit, collective-bargaining litigation expenses is constitutional. The Court’s decision will affect the financial burden on both nonmembers and local unions. Moreover, several circuit courts have decided differently on the issue of extra-unit litigation. With this case, the Court has the opportunity to reaffirm, clarify, or change the existing law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, this Court unanimously “determined that the [Railway Labor Act], as informed by the First Amendment, prohibits the use of dissenters’ [union] fees for extraunit litigation.” Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991) (opinion of Blackmun, J., citing Ellis, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984)). In Lehnert, a four-member plurality therefore held “that the Amendment proscribes such assessments in the public sector.” Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion, concurring in part in the judgment announced by Justice Blackmun, reasoned that “there is good reason to treat [Ellis and the Court’s other statutory cases] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule.” Id. at 555.

May a State, nonetheless, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment of agency fees for purposes of financing a monopoly bargaining agent’s affiliates’ litigation outside of a nonunion employee’s bargaining unit?

The Maine State Employees Association (“MSEA”), a union which is part of a larger umbrella union, the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), represents two types of Maine state employees: those who are members of the union, and some who are not. See Locke v. Karass, 498 F.3d 49, 51, 52 (1st Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Angela Cornell for her research help with this case.

Additional Resources

· LII Law About: Collective Bargaining

· Circuit Court Split: Otto v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n,330 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2003)

· Circuit Court Split: Reese v. City of Columbus, 71 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1995)

· Circuit Court Split: Pilots Against Illegal Dues v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991)

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New Process Steel v. NLRB

Issues

Whether the National Labor Relations Board may decide cases with only two sitting members.

 

Under 29 U.S.C. §153(b), the “[National Labor Relations] Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . . A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to [delegation].” New Process Steel argues that the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) is prohibited by statute from deciding issues when it acts with only two sitting members on a five-member Board. The NLRB contends that it has the authority to issue decisions, even with only two current members on a five-member Board. The NLRB claims that its previous delegation of authority to a three-member Board allows the Board to continue operating with a two-member quorum. This case will decide how to interpret the 29 U.S.C. §153(b), and whether the current two-member quorum meets the minimum statutory requirement. This case will also affect how the Board handles pending or future cases when there are vacancies on the Board.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the National Labor Relations Board have authority to decide cases with only two sitting members, where 29 U.S.C. §153(b) provides that “three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board”?

New Process Steel operates steel processing facilities in the United States and Mexico. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. N.L.R.B., 564 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.

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The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

Issues

Can the Federal Labor Relations Authority regulate the labor practices of state militias?

The Supreme Court in this case will determine whether the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) has jurisdiction to regulate state militia labor practices. The Ohio Adjutant General, Ohio Adjutant General’s Department, and the Ohio National Guard contend that the Ohio National Guard is under state control and that Congress has not expressly included state militias in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, and thus the state militias are not subject to the FLRA’s jurisdiction. In contrast, the FLRA maintains that the Guard is subject to the FLRA’s jurisdiction because the statute memorialized various federal regulations providing collective bargaining rights to dual status technicians, and the FLRA’s jurisdiction is necessary to such rights. This case has significant implications for federal military power, labor relations for state militias, and the balance of power between state and federal governments.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which empowers the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of federal agencies only, empower it to regulate the labor practices of state militias.

In 2011, the Ohio National Guard (“the Guard”) signed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) with the American Federation of Government Employees (“the Union”), the union that represents the Guard’s technicians. The Ohio Adjutant General’s Dept., et al v.

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Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive

Issues

  1. Are final arbitration awards determined by the National Railroad Adjustment Board subject to review for violations of due process?
  2. Was the National Railroad Board applying a “retroactive” interpretation of the procedural requirements in its arbitration proceedings by dismissing a complaint because of untimely submission of evidence of prior conferencing between the parties?

 

Five railroad employees filed claims through their union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (“Brotherhood”), contesting disciplinary charges imposed by the Union Pacific Railroad (“Railroad”). The National Railroad Adjustment Board dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the Brotherhood had failed to submit written evidence that the parties had met in conference. The District Court affirmed the Board’s decision. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the Brotherhood. The Seventh Circuit found that the due process rights of the Brotherhood were denied, because it was not clear when and how evidence of conferencing should be presented, and dismissal for reasons that were not clear at the time of filing functioned as a denial of its due process rights. The Railroad subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court arguing that because submission of evidence is solely within the arbitrator’s discretion, the Board’s award should be final and binding. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court’s decision will test the scope of the federal government’s power to review arbitration disputes between private parties. The Court’s decision will also affect future labor disputes and collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §§151 et seq., sets forth a comprehensive framework to resolve labor disputes in the railroad industry through binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (“the Board”). The statute provides that the Board's judgment “shall be conclusive . . . except . . . for”: (1) “failure . . . to comply” with the Act, (2) “failure . . . to conform or confine” its order “to matters within . . . the [Board’s] jurisdiction,” and (3) “fraud or corruption” by a Board member. 45 U.S.C. §153 First (q). This case involves the Board’s denial of employee grievance claims for failure to comply with its rules governing proof that the dispute had been submitted to a “conference” between the parties. 45 U.S.C. §152 Second. The Seventh Circuit held that the award must be set aside because the Board violated due process through retroactive recognition of a supposedly “new rule.” The questions presented are: 

  1. Whether the Seventh Circuit erroneously held, in square conflict with decisions of the Third, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, that the RLA includes a fourth, implied exception that authorizes courts to set aside final arbitration awards for alleged violations of due process.
  2. Whether the Seventh Circuit erroneously held that the Board adopted a “new,” retroactive interpretation of the standards governing its proceedings in violation of due process.

For employees in the railroad industry, the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) governs the resolution of labor disputes between rail carriers and unions regarding their collective bargaining agreements. 45 U.S.C.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Collective Bargaining

·      Wex: Law about Labor Law

·      Workplace Prof Blog, Law Professor Blogs Network: Labor Law

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Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall

Issues

Does an agreement stipulating that an employer will remain neutral and give access to employee information in exchange for a union’s support of an employer-friendly ballot initiative, constitute a “thing of value” in violation § 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act; or, must a thing of value be monetary for purposes of § 302?

In 2004, UNITE HERE Local 355 (“Local 355”) entered into an agreement with Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc. (“Mardi Gras”), the employer of Martin Mulhall. Mardi Gras agreed to help Local 355 unionize Mardi Gras’s employees by remaining neutral in the process and giving Local 355 access to its facilities and employee information. If the unionization effort was successful, Mardi Gras would recognize Local 355 as the exclusive bargaining agent for its employees. In exchange, Local 355 promised to support a Florida ballot initiative that would allow casinos to operate slot machines in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties. Mulhall opposed the unionization effort and sought to block the agreement under § 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. Mulhall argues that under § 302 Mardi Gras’s promises are “things of value” and thus constitute an illegal payment from an employer to a union. Local 355 disagrees and contends that cooperative employer-union agreements have long been considered lawful. The Eleventh Circuit held that an employer’s promises in union-organizing agreements may constitute “things of value,” implicating § 302. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the future of cooperative employer-union agreements and the way that employees and unions try to unionize. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an employer and union may violate § 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act by entering into an agreement under which the employer promises to remain neutral to union organizing, grants union representatives access to the employer’s property and employers in exchange for the union’s promise to forego its right to picket, boycott, or otherwise pressure the employer's business?

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Facts

On August 23, 2004, Petitioner UNITE HERE Local 355 (“Local 355”), entered into an agreement with Respondent Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc. (“Mardi Gras”), the employer of Co-Respondent Martin Mulhall. See Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir.

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