guilty plea

Bradshaw v. Stumpf

 

John Stumpf and his accomplice, Clyde Wesley, were convicted of the murder of Mary Jane Stout. Stumpf, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, argues that the prosecutor unfairly used inconsistent theories to prove that both he and Wesley were guilty for the murder – -- even though a single shot was used to kill Stout. Stumpf thus claims his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution were violated. Stumpf also argues that his guilty plea at trial was entered unknowingly and involuntarily because he did not understand the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court, in making its decisions, will have to address the role of the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding, the rights of the defendant under the Due Process Clause, and the extent to which a defendant can later invalidate his earlier plea of guilty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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Kowalski v. Tesmer

 

John Tesmer was convicted of a home invasion charge after pleading guilty in Michigan state court. A Michigan statute prohibited the appointment of appellate counsel for defendants who pleaded guilty. Citing that particular statute, the trial judge John F. Kowalski denied Tesmer's request for an appointed appellate counsel. Tesmer, along with two other indigent criminal defendants and two attorneys who routinely represented indigent criminal defendants, filed a complaint stating that the Michigan statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court had previously recognized a litigant's standing to sue when the litigant suffered an actual injury, bears a close relation to the third party, and the third party in question has limited ability to protect his or her own interests. In this case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine two issues: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an automatic right to appointed appellate counsel for indigent criminal defendants convicted by a guilty plea? (2) Do attorneys who derive part of their income from representing indigent criminal defendants convicted by a guilty plea have third-party standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute which purportedly violates the due process rights of such defendants?

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a right to an appointed attorney in a discretionary first appeal of an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea?

 
2. Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential future indigent criminal defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting the appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas where the federal courts properly abstained from hearing the claims of indigent criminal defendant themselves?

In 1994, Michigan eliminated appeals of right for criminal defendants who plead guilty. See Mich. Const. 1963 art. I, § 20. In 1999, after John Tesmer pleaded guilty to the charge of home invasion, Judge John F.

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plea bargain

Overview

Many successful criminal prosecutions in the United States end not with jury trials, but with plea bargains. Plea bargains are agreements between defendants and prosecutors in which defendants agree to plead guilty to some or all of the charges against them in exchange for concessions from the prosecutors.

White v. Woodall

Issues

Does a trial court’s rejection of a non-testifying defendant’s request for a no-adverse-influence instruction during the sentencing phase of a capital punishment trial violate that defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when the defendant has pled guilty to all of the alleged crimes and aggravating circumstances?

Robert Keith Woodall pled guilty to the murder, rape, and kidnapping of a sixteen-year-old victim. At the penalty phase, Woodall put on fourteen witnesses but did not himself testify. The trial court rejected his request for a no-adverse-inference jury instruction regarding his decision not to testify. The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial court accepted this recommendation. After exhausting state court avenues, Woodall filed for and received habeas corpus relief from a federal district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the trial court violated Woodall’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by rejecting his request for a no-adverse-inference jury instruction. In this case, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to consider whether the rejection of a request for a no-adverse-inference at the penalty phase of a trial, even where the defendant has pled guilty to all charged crimes, violates the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. This case will impact the rights of criminal defendants charged with capital crimes and will clarify prior Supreme Court precedent. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Robert Keith Woodall, amidst overwhelming evidence of his guilt, pled guilty to kidnapping, raping, and murdering a 16-year-old child, and thus pled guilty to all aggravating circumstances. At the penalty phase trial, the prosecutor elected to present evidence of guilt and the circumstances of the crimes. Woodall did not testify; and his request that the jury be instructed not to draw any adverse inference from his decision not to testify (a "no adverse inference instruction") was denied. He was sentenced to death by a Kentucky jury. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. 

Even though this Court has never held that a defendant is entitled to a no adverse inference instruction at the sentencing phase of a trial where the defendant has pled guilty to the offense and all aggravating circumstances, the Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief to Woodall on the ground that the trial court's failure to provide such an instruction violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The questions presented are: 

  1. Whether the Sixth Circuit, violated 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) by granting habeas relief on the trial court's failure to provide a no adverse inference instruction even though this Court has not "clearly established" that such an instruction is required in a capital penalty phase when a non-testifying defendant has pled guilty to the crimes and aggravating circumstances. 
  2. Whether the Sixth Circuit violated the harmless error standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), in ruling that the absence of a no adverse inference instruction was not harmless in spite of overwhelming evidence of guilt and in the face of a guilty plea to the crimes and aggravators.

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Facts

A grand jury indicted Respondent Robert Keith Woodall for the murder, kidnapping, and rape of a sixteen-year-old female victim, and Woodall pled guilty in Kentucky state court to all of the charges and aggravating circumstances.

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Edited by

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume of Cornell Law School for his insights into this case.

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