retroactivity

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A jury convicted Petitioner Lonnie Lee Burton of rape, robbery, and burglary. After initially choosing to run Burton’s robbery and burglary convictions concurrent with his rape conviction, the sentencing judge on remand imposed the same 562-month aggregate sentence but ran the three convictions consecutive to each other after finding that Burton’s earlier sentence was too lenient. As a result, Burton’s sentence was 258 months above the 304 month ceiling of the statutory sentencing range. Burton contends that the sentencing court acted in violation of Blakely v. Washington. Burton further contends that the rule from Blakely, decided after his sentence became final, is not a new rule, but rather a rule dictated by the earlier case Apprendi v. New Jersey. The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Blakely is a new rule or is in fact dictated by Apprendi. If Blakely is a new rule, the Court will decide whether it applies retroactively. A decision for either side has the potential to change the amount of discretion that judges exercise when sentencing defendants.

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Stephen Danforth was convicted of first degree criminal sexual misconduct in a Minnesota state criminal trial that included videotaped testimonial evidence from Danforth's victim. After Danforth's conviction became final, the United States Supreme Court found that use of such evidence violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. But the Court later found this decision did not apply retroactively to convictions finalized before the decision was announced. The court made this decision using Supreme Court retroactivity standards. Danforth now asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a state post-conviction court can use state retroactivity standards to apply a new Supreme Court decision on criminal procedure to a final conviction, or if it must use the retroactivity standards the Supreme Court has established. This decision will clarify the boundaries between state and federal authority in state post-conviction proceedings that address federal questions.

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Officer Curtis Miller arrested Petitioner Willie Davis for using a false name during a routine traffic stop. Incident to the arrest, Officer Miller searched the vehicle and discovered a gun. Davis was subsequently charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, Davis made a motion to suppress the gun as evidence, but the district court denied the motion and let the evidence come in. While Davis’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, holding that searches like the one conducted in Davis’s case violate the Fourth Amendment. Davis argued on appeal that the retroactive application of Gant to his case should result in exclusion of the gun as evidence. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Davis, who now appeals to the Supreme Court. The United States maintains that the evidence of the gun should not be suppressed because Officer Miller, in objectively reasonable good faith, believed his search was proper when it was conducted. This case will determine whether retroactive application of the rule in Arizona v. Gant requires exclusion of evidence acquired under a prior rule, or whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.

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On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which reduced the disparity between the amounts of crack and powder cocaine required to trigger certain minimum mandatory sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioners Edward Dorsey and Corey Hill were both arrested for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute prior to the FSA’s passage, but were both sentenced after the FSA was enacted. Under the pre-FSA guidelines, they received ten-year prison sentences, but under the new FSA guidelines, both would have received substantially shorter prison sentences. Dorsey, Hill, and the United States government all argue that Congress intended for the FSA to apply immediately, and therefore, all prisoners sentenced after August 3, 2010, including Dorsey and Hill, should have been sentenced according to the FSA. Miguel Estrada, a court-appointed amicus curiae writing in support of the judgments below, argues that nothing indicates that Congress intended for immediate effectiveness and that the federal Saving Statute prevents retroactive application of new statutes that would eliminate previously incurred penalties. The decision in these cases will have implications for the consistent application of the FSA to prisoners falling within this particular sentencing window, as well as potential social costs and burdens on the justice system.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Ramos v. Louisiana, which held that a criminal defendant charged in state court can only be convicted by a unanimous jury, applies retroactively to cases that were finalized before Ramos was decided. Petitioner Thedrick Edwards was convicted under Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury rule and contends that Ramos recognized an ancient guarantee of criminal procedure that should be given retroactive effect under Teague v. Lane. Alternatively, Edwards asserts that Ramos enunciated a new watershed rule that must be applied retroactively because of the importance of juror unanimity to ensure accurate convictions. In response, Respondent Darrel Vannoy, the Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, argues that Ramos overruled Apodaca v. Oregon and announced a new rule that significantly changes criminal proceedings in states that allowed conviction by nonunanimous juries. Additionally, Vannoy claims that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 independently bars the retroactive application of Ramos. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for individuals seeking retrial for guilty verdicts decided by nonunanimous juries.

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After Petitioner Joel Judulang, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of a deportable offense, the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that he was not eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportability under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On its face, Section 212(c) applies only to lawful permanent residents who are excludable when they attempt to enter the country, rather than to residents convicted of deportable offenses while already in the country. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals has previously allowed some permanent residents convicted of deportable offenses to apply for the Section 212(c) discretionary waiver. Petitioner Judulang asserts that he should be allowed to take advantage of the waiver, since his deportable offenses would render him excludable if he tried to re-enter the country. Judulang further argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals' change in Section 212(c) policy regarding deportable and excludable offenses is impermissibly retroactive and facially unconstitutional. The Department of Justice argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals has good reason to require a close textual similarity between a charged ground of deportability and a waivable ground of excludability, and that its policy is not impermissibly retroactive because it does not reflect a change in previous law. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will mean the difference between amnesty and deportation for many lawful permanent residents convicted of deportable offenses.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred when it granted respondent Lee Boyd Malvo’s habeas corpus petition to reconsider his life-imprisonment-without-parole sentence, yet declined to decide whether Malvo’s sentence was mandatory or discretionary. Petitioner warden Randall Mathena argues that Malvo’s sentence must stand because the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama expressly limited availability of habeas relief to juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under mandatory sentencing schemes, and because the precedent upon which the Supreme Court based that opinion does not support expanding the rule to discretionary sentencing schemes. Malvo counters that he should be resentenced because the Supreme Court precedent and the Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana—extending Miller retroactively to cases on collateral review—requires sentencing judges to take juveniles’ youth into account during sentencing, even if the sentence occurred before Miller. Malvo further contends that even if he were sentenced pursuant to a “discretionary” sentencing scheme, his life sentence violates Miller because the sentencing judge failed to consider, on account of his juvenile status, his lessened moral blameworthiness and greater capacity for change, therefore entitling him to resentencing. The outcome of this case will affect how the criminal justice system treats juveniles and victims, whether the system will preserve the distinction between discretionary and mandatory sentencing schemes.

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Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a Greek citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to counterfeiting and was convicted in 1994. In 2003, following a brief trip to Greece, Vartelas received notice to appear for removal proceedings. The immigration judge ordered Vartelas’s deportation, after deeming Vartelas inadmissible under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Vartelas argues that application of this 1996 Act to his 1994 crime violates the presumption against retroactivity and the reasonable expectations he had when entering his guilty plea. Respondent Attorney General Eric Holder argues that Vartelas’s case does not have a retroactive effect because it penalizes acts conducted after the statute’s enactment: Vartelas’s decision to leave and re-enter the United States. This case affects lawful permanent residents who were convicted of crimes prior to the Act’s enactment. The Supreme Court’s decision could restrict their ability to travel internationally, which in turn could damage their ability to maintain family ties or fulfill religious obligations.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), should apply retroactively. If so, the Court may decide whether the sudden snatching of a purse constitutes a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Gregory Welch was sentenced to a mandatory minimum fifteen years of prison under the ACCA, because he had three previous violent felony convictions. Subsequently, Welch challenged his sentence, arguing that one of the predicate convictions, Florida-law strong-arm robbery, was not a violent felony. Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, relying on the so-called “residual clause” of the ACCA. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Welch contends that Johnson struck down the residual clause as unconstitutional. Welch and the United States both argue that Johnson should be applied retroactively. Further, Welch argues that because Johnson should be applied retroactively and his conviction was based solely on the portion of the ACCA that was deemed unconstitutional, his conviction should be vacated. But the United States argues that the case should be remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether a sudden snatching of a purse constitutes a violent felony under the constitutionally valid “elements prong” of the ACCA. The Court’s decision could increase ACCA-related litigation and decrease the length of some defendants’ sentences.

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