Assault is generally defined as an intentional act that puts another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. No physical injury is required, but the actor must have intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the victim and the victim must have thereby been put in immediate apprehension of such a contact.
Assault and battery is a modern legal term which combines assault with the separate charge of battery. Assault refers to the wrong act of causing someone to reasonably fear imminent harm. This means that the fear must be something a reasonable person would foresee as threatening to them. Battery refers to the actual wrong act of physically harming someone.
A person commits false imprisonment when they engage in the act of restraint on another person which confines that person in a restricted area. False imprisonment is an act punishable under criminal law as well as under tort law.
Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt an employer’s state tort claims against a labor union for intentionally destroying the employer’s property during a strategically-timed labor strike?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an employer can bring a tort claim in state court against a union or its members for intentionally destroying the employer’s property during a strike. The Court will decide if the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which allows employers and unions to tactically use “economic weapons” such as strikes to gain leverage during collective bargaining, preempts such tort claims. The parties agree that tort claims involving conduct which is “arguably protected” under the NLRA are preempted. Glacier Northwest contends that intentional destruction of private property is not “arguably protected” because it is unlawful. Glacier Northwest additionally argues that, even if intentional destruction of private property is “arguably protected,” a “local interest” exception to preemption applies. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 174 counters that intentional destruction of private property is “arguably protected” and that the “local interest” exemption does not apply. The Supreme Court’s decision could significantly impact labor law by opening the door to more frequent employer lawsuits and recalibrating the legal protections for activities that unions engage in to secure bargaining leverage.
Whether the National Labor Relations Act impliedly preempts a state tort claim against a union for intentionally destroying an employer's property in the course of a labor dispute.
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) gives employees the right to collectively bargain and to undertake “concerted activities for… mutual aid or protection.” Glacier Nw. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 at 15. Concerted activities include the right to strike.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is a tort that occurs when one acts in a manner that intentionally or recklessly causes another to suffer severe emotional distress, such as issuing the threat of future harm.
Kim Millbrook, a federal inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for the alleged sexual assault and battery he suffered from three correctional officers at the prison. The important issue in the case is how to understand the sovereign immunity provisions of the FTCA, and when federal correctional officers can be sued for their tortious conduct. Millbrook contends that while the FTCA generally provides sovereign immunity to the Government for torts committed by their employees while at work, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for specific intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers during the scope of the officers’ employment. The Third Circuit has limited this waiver of sovereign immunity to instances where the enforcement agent is executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest for violations of federal law. The Supreme Court will resolve a circuit split over how narrowly the waiver of sovereign immunity should be read. How the Court decides this case will determine when a federal correctional officer can be sued for his tortious conduct, and has significant implications for the protection of vulnerable prisoners against assault and abuse.
Whether 28 U.S.C §§1346(b) and 2680(h) waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for the intentional torts of prison guards when they are acting within the scope of their employment but are not exercising authority to “execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal law."
Are prison guards, as officers of the United States government, protected by the sovereign immunity of the United States against intentional tort claims
