computer and internet fraud
Computer and internet fraud entails the criminal use of a computer or the Internet and can take many different forms. While some argue that “hacking” is a neutral term (see United States v.
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internet
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
Peer-to-peer file sharing software has made the distribution of virtually any type of digital file uncomplicated and readily accessible. A user merely installs the software on his computer, thus allowing the computer to function both as a client and server. The file sharing software allows the user's computer to be accessed via the Internet by other users who may then retrieve digital files from the host computer.
The use of peer-to-peer file sharing software thrives in the area of music and motion pictures, where users easily share digitized music and movie files with one click of the mouse. Copyright owners, such as songwriters, music publishers, and motion picture studios, have not gone unaffected and claim that the majority of peer-to-peer file sharing involves copyrighted material of which the users are benefiting without any monetary compensation accruing to the copyright owners. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, a group of copyright owners allege that peer-to-peer software distributors Grokster Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. are contributorily and vicariously liable for any copyright infringement committed by users of their software. The United States Supreme Court may likely rule in favor of the copyright owners, as the Court generally does not want to sanction the kind of lawless behavior which is undoubtedly taking place across these networks. However, the Court would also like to avoid criticism for overstepping its power by censoring distributors, which may lead to a verdict in favor of the software distributors.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to long-established principles of secondary liability in copyright law (and in acknowledged conflict with the Seventh Circuit), that the Internet-based "file sharing" services Grokster and StreamCast should be immunized from copyright liability for the millions of daily acts of copyright infringement that occur on their services and that constitute at least 90% of the total use of the services.
Brief Facts
There are many benefits of living in an increasingly high-tech world where innovations seem to emerge daily. Digital services are becoming progressively faster and more convenient while modern devices continue to shrink and yet possess more functionality.
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Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh
Issues
(1) Does a social media website that allegedly could have taken more meaningful action to prevent terrorists from using its services provide substantial assistance to those terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2333; and (2) can a social media website incur liability for aiding and abetting under § 2333 despite a lack of connection between their generic, widely available services and the specific terrorist act that injured the plaintiff?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Google provide substantial assistance to terrorists by allegedly not taking meaningful action to prevent such terrorists from using their services. This case also asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the same social media platforms can be held liable under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), even if their services were not used in connection with the specific act of terrorism that caused injury to the plaintiff. Twitter contends that a defendant does not knowingly provide substantial assistance through general awareness that terrorists were among its many users, and that liability cannot stem from such generalized assistance to a terrorist organization. Mehier Taamneh counters that whether Twitter and other defendants know of terrorist use of their services is a question of fact, and, at this stage, the Court need only decide that plaintiff’s factual allegation is plausible. Taamneh also argues that liability exists when a defendant substantially assists international terrorism and that JASTA’s text doesn’t limit liability to action that has a direct connection to the specific attack that injures the plaintiff.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
(1) Whether a defendant that provides generic, widely available services to all its numerous users and “regularly” works to detect and prevent terrorists from using those services “knowingly” provided substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggressive” action to prevent such use; and (2) whether a defendant whose generic, widely available services were not used in connection with the specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333.
On January 1, 2017, Abdulkadir Masharipov, an individual affiliated with and trained by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), committed a terrorist attack on the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. Gonzalez v. Google, at 16. Masharipov fired more than 120 rounds into a crowd of 700 people for seven minutes, injuring 69 and killing 39.
Additional Resources
- Erin Hawley, Google v. Gonzalez & Twitter v. Taamneh, Independent Women’s Forum (Nov. 2, 2022).
- Etta Lanum, Supreme Court Grants Certiori in Gonzalez v. Google and Twitter v. Taamneh: An Overview, Law Fare (Nov. 8, 2022).
- Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Report: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 21-1496, National Association of Attorneys General (Oct. 17, 2022).
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United States v. Williams
After Respondent Williams sent a hyperlink containing pornographic images of children to an Internet chat room dedicated to child pornography, he was prosecuted under the PROTECT ACT (18 U.S.C. � 2252A(a)(5)(B)) for "pandering" material in a manner intending to cause another to believe that the material contains child pornography. Williams pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the PROTECT Act was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and thus interfered with First Amendment free speech. In particular, Williams argued that the statute criminalized speech about child pornography when the actual materials were not pornographic or did not exist. Williams further claimed that the statute similarly criminalized those who appear to be but are not actually discussing child pornography. The Eleventh Circuit Court held the PROTECT Act unconstitutional, and the United States government appealed. The United States argues that the PROTECT Act is neither overbroad nor vague because it only criminalizes speech which the First Amendment does not protect. It further claims that the statute requires intent and that the PROTECT Act is necessary to combat child pornography.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
On April 26, 2004, an undercover government agent entered an Internet chat room dedicated to child pornography. U.S. v. Williams 444 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir.
Additional Resources
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