TERRORISM

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization

Issues

Does the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA) allow federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority consistent with the Fifth Amendment?

The Supreme Court will consider whether the personal jurisdiction subsection of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Fuld argues that early laws like the Judiciary Act of 1789 show that Congress can give courts the ability to adjudicate extraterritorial conduct. The Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) argue the Fifth Amendment only allows courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners with a presence in the U.S. and that early statutes required physical control over people or property within the U.S. as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Fuld asserts that the PSJVTA’s clear notice makes the PLO’s conduct a manifestation of consent to jurisdiction. The PLO contends that consent requires a voluntary act, and that the PSJVTA lacks U.S. nexus and fair notice, violating due process. The outcome of this case will likely determine whether Fuld can recover, as well as frame the future of personal jurisdiction for terrorism in foreign countries. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992 (“ATA”) allows Americans to sue a person who aids and abets or conspires to commit an act of international terrorism. Fuld v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Michael Dorf for his insights and comments in writing this article.

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Gonzalez v. Google LLC

Issues

Can online platforms be held liable for algorithmically recommending harmful third-party content to users?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether online platforms can be held liable for algorithmically recommending third-party content to users. Petitioner Reynaldo Gonzalez argues that Google LLC can be held liable for YouTube’s recommendations of ISIS recruitment videos because YouTube does not qualify for immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Respondent Google LLC argues that since YouTube did not create the ISIS videos at issue, it should be able to claim immunity under Section 230. This case will affect the availability of remedies for victims of harmful online content, internet company accountability, moderation, and online speech.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider, or only limits the liability of interactive computer services when they engage in traditional editorial functions (such as deciding whether to display or withdraw) with regard to such information. 

In 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez, a United States citizen studying abroad in France, was killed in a terrorist attack in Paris. Gonzalez v. Google LLC. The following day, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and posting a YouTube video. Id.

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Republic of Sudan v. Harrison

Issues

Can a plaintiff suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act properly serve that foreign state by mailing the service package to the head of the foreign state’s ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can serve a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) by addressing the service of process package to the state’s foreign minister and sending it to the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States. The plaintiff, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”), maintains that, under the FSIA, plaintiffs must serve a foreign state by sending the service of process package to the foreign minister at the ministry of foreign affairs located in that foreign state’s capital. Sudan contends that Article 22 of the Vienna Convention supports this interpretation because it precludes service “via” or “through” a diplomatic mission. However, the respondents—a group of victims of an al-Qaeda attack including named party Rick Harrison (“Harrison”)—contend that, although the FSIA requires plaintiffs to address and send their service of process mail to a state’s foreign minister, it does not direct plaintiffs to send the package to a particular location. Harrison asserts that, because the FSIA’s text unambiguously allows service through an embassy, the Vienna Convention does not apply in this case. This case has large implications for foreign relations, especially as regards to terrorism. A decision for Harrison may better compensate victims of terrorist attacks and restrict state-sponsored terrorism, whereas a decision for Sudan may better protect the United States as a foreign litigant and aid the effective function of embassies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Second Circuit erred by holding – in direct conflict with the D.C., Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and in the face of an amicus brief from the United States – that plaintiffs suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may serve the foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) by mail addressed and dispatched to the head of the foreign state’s ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s diplomatic mission in the United States, despite U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to preserve mission inviolability.

On October 12, 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was refueling in Aden, Yemen when it was bombed by members of al-Qaeda. Harrison v. Republic of Sudan (“Harrison II”), at 4. In 2010, the Respondents, Rick Harrison, other victims of the attack, and their families (“Harrison”) sued the Petitioner, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C.

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Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh

Issues

(1) Does a social media website that allegedly could have taken more meaningful action to prevent terrorists from using its services provide substantial assistance to those terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2333; and (2) can a social media website incur liability for aiding and abetting under § 2333 despite a lack of connection between their generic, widely available services and the specific terrorist act that injured the plaintiff?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Google provide substantial assistance to terrorists by allegedly not taking meaningful action to prevent such terrorists from using their services. This case also asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the same social media platforms can be held liable under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), even if their services were not used in connection with the specific act of terrorism that caused injury to the plaintiff. Twitter contends that a defendant does not knowingly provide substantial assistance through general awareness that terrorists were among its many users, and that liability cannot stem from such generalized assistance to a terrorist organization. Mehier Taamneh counters that whether Twitter and other defendants know of terrorist use of their services is a question of fact, and, at this stage, the Court need only decide that plaintiff’s factual allegation is plausible. Taamneh also argues that liability exists when a defendant substantially assists international terrorism and that JASTA’s text doesn’t limit liability to action that has a direct connection to the specific attack that injures the plaintiff.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a defendant that provides generic, widely available services to all its numerous users and “regularly” works to detect and prevent terrorists from using those services “knowingly” provided substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggressive” action to prevent such use; and (2) whether a defendant whose generic, widely available services were not used in connection with the specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333.

On January 1, 2017, Abdulkadir Masharipov, an individual affiliated with and trained by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), committed a terrorist attack on the Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. Gonzalez v. Google, at 16. Masharipov fired more than 120 rounds into a crowd of 700 people for seven minutes, injuring 69 and killing 39.

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