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Fernandez v. California

Issues

Can police obtain consent from a cotenant to search a dwelling after another cotenant who objected to the search is lawfully removed?

Court below: California 2nd District Court of Appeal

Walter Fernandez was a suspect in a robbery and police came to his apartment and asked for permission to search it. He refused to let them in and the police arrested him for the robbery and removed him from the apartment. A short time later, the police returned and got permission from Fernandez’s girlfriend to search the apartment. At trial, Fernandez moved to suppress the evidence found in his apartment because he claimed it was obtained as a result of an unreasonable warrantless search and seizure. The Supreme Court, in Georgia v. Randolph,has previously held that when one cotenant refused to consent to a search of the dwelling, the police could not immediately obtain consent from another cotenant. A key reason for that holding was that it provides a clear rule for law enforcement to follow in the field. Fernandez argues this his refusal to let police search his apartment remained in effect after his lawful arrest. California argues that the defendant needed to be present in order to override his girlfriend’s consent to the search. The outcome of this case will clarify both Georgia v. Randolph andlaw enforcement procedures when obtaining consent to search. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under Georgia v. Randolph, must a defendant be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a cotenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or is a defendant's previously-stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search a continuing assertion of Fourth Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a cotenant?

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Facts

On October 12, 2009, Detective Kelly Clark and Officer Joseph Cirrito responded to a radio dispatch about a robbery involving the Drifters gang. See People v. Fernandez, 208 Cal. App. 4th 100, 105 (2012). Clark and Cirrito went to Magnolia and 14th Street, a place where they knew Drifters gathered.

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Heien v. North Carolina

Issues

Can a police officer’s misinterpretation of the law provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop? 

On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse arrested Nicholas Heien in North Carolina after a traffic stop that Darisse initiated based on his misinterpretation of relevant state statutes. When Heien tried to exclude evidence that resulted from the traffic stop during his subsequent trial, the trial court denied his request. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that an officer cannot justify a traffic stop when a mistake of law serves as the primary justification for the stop. In December 2012, the North Carolina Supreme Court overturned the appellate court’s ruling. The Supreme Court of the United States will now consider whether a police officer’s mistake of law can serve as the requisite reasonable suspicion needed for a constitutional traffic stop. Heien argues that allowing police officers to base traffic stops on misinterpretations of the law would violate the Fourth Amendment rights of those stopped. North Carolina, however asserts that just as police officers can execute constitutional traffic stops by relying on reasonable mistakes of fact, a police officer can justify a stop if it is based on a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of a statute. The Court’s ruling implicates the Fourth Amendment practices of law enforcement, the right to privacy of individuals, and the right of individuals to be free from restraint. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.

On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff’s Department in North Carolina pulled over a vehicle in which Nicholas Heien was a passenger. See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (N.C. 2012). Darisse initiated the stop because one of the rear brake lights on the vehicle was not working properly.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Sherry Colb of Cornell Law School for her help and for directing them to her work on Heien v. North Carolina

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Navarette v. California

Issues

  1. Does the Fourth Amendment require that an officer who receives an anonymous tip about a drunken or reckless driver corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle? 
  2. Does an anonymous, uncorroborated tip that a vehicle ran someone off the road create reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle? 

In August 2008, a Mendocino County 911 dispatcher received a call from another county dispatcher reporting that a silver Ford truck had run another car off the road. The car occupants had anonymously reported that the truck ran them off the road. A police officer saw the truck, pulled it over, searched it, and found four large bags of marijuana, and arrested Jose and Lorenzo Navarette for marijuana transportation, possession, and sale. The Navarettes filed a motion to suppress evidence of the marijuana, arguing that the anonymous tip was not sufficient to justify the stop because the officer did not independently corroborate the alleged illegal activity. The magistrate judge denied the motion to suppress, and on appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether an anonymous tip must be corroborated in order to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This case will impact the continuing development of Fourth Amendment law. The Navarettes argue that the Fourth Amendment requires independent corroboration of reckless driving in order for an anonymous tip to justify stopping a vehicle. California responds that because of the state’s interest in protecting the public, an anonymous tip can supply reasonable suspicion absent police corroboration. 

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?
  2. Does an anonymous tip that a specific vehicle ran someone off the road provide reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, where the detaining officer was only advised to be on the lookout for a reckless driver, and the officer could not corroborate dangerous driving despite following the suspect vehicle for several miles?

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Facts

On August 23, 2008, Mendocino County 911 dispatchers received a call from the Humboldt County dispatcher reporting that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck with an identified license-plate number had run another car off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. See People v. Navarette, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. at 2–3, 2012 BL 268067 (Oct.

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San Francisco v. Sheehan

Issues

What is the scope of reasonable police officer action under Title II of the ADA and the Fourth Amendment when dealing with armed and violent, mentally ill individuals?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the ADA requires police officers, when attempting an arrest, to reasonably accommodate a violent and armed, mentally ill suspect. San Francisco argues that Sheehan, the suspect in this case, posed a direct threat to others and, accordingly, the ADA did not apply. Moreover, San Francisco contends that, at the least, the officers did not violate a clearly established right and, thus, are protected from liability by qualified immunity. Sheehan counters that she posed a threat only to people that entered her room and that the officers’ action violated her clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Court’s ruling will have an effect on the safety of the public, the mentally ill, and law enforcement officers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody.
  2. Whether it clearly established that even where an exception to the warrant requirement applied an entry into a residence could be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment by reason of the anticipated resistance of an armed and violent suspect within.

In 2008, Respondent Teresa Sheehan, who has a mental illness, was a resident at the Conrad House, a group home in San Francisco for the mentally ill. See Sheehan v. San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2014). After a social worker, Heath Hodge, entered Sheehan’s room without her permission to check on her, Sheehan told Hodge to leave and threatened him after stating that she had a knife.

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Additional Resources

  • Lyle Denniston: Court to rule on disability rights, mercury pollution, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 25, 2014).
  • Jessie Lorenz: SF appeal threatens protections for the disabled, The San Francisco Examiner (Jan. 20, 2015).
  • Richard Wolf: Justices to decide rights of disabled during arrests, USA Today (Nov. 25, 2014).
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