minors

Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association

Issues

Can a state ban the sale of violent video games to minors, and if so, must the state prove that violent video games directly cause physical and psychological harm to minors for the ban to be constitutional?

 

California enacted California Civil Code §§ 1746–1746.5, which imposed restrictions on the sale of violent video games to minors. The Entertainment Merchants Association and the Entertainment Software Association sought declaratory relief in federal court, alleging that the law was an impermissible restriction of speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Entertainment Merchants. California appealed, asserting that the First Amendment does not protect the sale of violent video games to minors and that California need not show a direct causal link between violent video games and physical or psychological harm in minors before restricting such sales. The Supreme Court's decision will affect minors' constitutional rights, the power of states to control which materials children are exposed to, and the expression in media with violent content.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors?

2. If the First Amendment applies to violent video games that are sold to minors, and the standard of review is strict scrutiny, under Turner Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994), is the state required to demonstrate a direct causal link between violent video games and physical and psychological harm to minors before the state can prohibit the sale of violent video games to minors?

On October 7, 2005, Petitioner California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (“California”) signed into law California Civil Code §§ 1746–1746.5, which prohibits the sale of violent video games to minors. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Wex: First Amendment

· New York Times, Linda Greenhouse: The Court as Mr. Fix It? (Apr. 30, 2010)

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United States v. Skrmetti

Issues

Does banning gender-affirming care for minors violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the extent to which the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to gender-affirming healthcare for transgender minors. Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1 prohibits medical treatments intended to alleviate gender dysphoria or initiate gender transition for minors. The United States argues that the Bill violates the Equal Protection Clause by withholding medical care on the basis of a patient’s sex, or alternatively, that the Bill discriminates against a quasi-suspect classification: transgender status. Skrmetti contends that the Bill applies equally to Tennessee youth regardless of gender, that it is not motivated by discriminatory intent, and that transgender status does not meet the quasi-suspect class characteristics of being discrete, insular, immutable, and politically powerless. The case will have powerful implications for future state policies regarding healthcare and transgender care, especially for minors, in the continuing social and political conflict over LGBTQ+ rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1, which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow “a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity,” violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

On March 2, 2023, Tennessee passed Senate Bill 1, which went into effect on July 1, 2023. L.W. v. Skrmetti at 469. The law prohibited minors in Tennessee from receiving gender-affirming care for gender dysphoria or enabling minors to live with a gender identity inconsistent with their sex assigned at birth. Id. at 470.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Deborah Dinner and Sheri Lynn Johnson for their insights into this case.

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