mootness

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez

Issues

  1. Does a claim become moot when the plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief; and does the answer change if that plaintiff purports to represent an uncertified class?
  2. Does the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity extend generally to government contractors acting within the scope of their contract, or is it limited to claims of property damage related to public works projects?

 

This case presents two issues. First, the Supreme Court will determine whether a case is  moot when a plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief for his claims, even if one of the plaintiff’s claims was made on behalf of an uncertified class of litigants. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, No. 14-857, 13 (Feb. 19, 2015). If the case is not moot, the Court will consider whether the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity for government contractors is restricted to claims arising out of property damage caused by public works projects or is applicable in other cases. See Brief for Petitioner, Campbell-Ewald Co. at 36–37, 42. Government contractor Campbell-Ewald argues that an offer of complete relief renders the plaintiff’s individual and class claims moot. See id. at 26–27. But the plaintiff, Jose Gomez, contends that an unaccepted offer does not moot a claim. See Brief for Respondent, Jose Gomez at 37. Additionally, Campbell-Ewald argues that it qualifies for derivative sovereign immunity. See Brief for Petitioner at 36–37, 42. However, Gomez argues that only contractors working on public works projects are entitled to such immunity. See Brief for Respondent at 44. This case may affect the viability of class action  lawsuits,  and may define the scope of derivative sovereign immunity. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Constitutional Accountability Center, in Support of Respondent at 19; Brief of Amicus Curiae KBR, Inc., in Support of Petitioner at 23.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does a case become moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief on his claim?
  2. Is the answer to the first question any different when the plaintiff has asserted a class claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but receives an offer of complete relief before any class is certified?
  3. Is the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity recognized in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), for government contractors, restricted to claims arising out of property damage caused by public works projects?

In 2005, the U.S. Navy contracted Campbell-Ewald Co. to provide the Navy advertising services. See Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, No. 13-55486, at 4 (9th Cir.

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Chafin v. Chafin

Mr. Jeffrey Lee Chafin, an American, prevented his separated Scottish wife, Mrs. Lynn Hales Chafin, from leaving the United States with their daughter, E.C.. Mrs. Chafin successfully obtained a return order from the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama pursuant to the International Children Abduction Remedies Act, an Act passed by Congress as a result of the Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Mr. Chafin appealed the return order, but the Eleventh Circuit declared the case moot because Mrs. Chafin and E.C. had already returned to Scotland. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Chafin argues that a court’s inability to enforce its judgment does not render a case moot. Mrs. Chafin counters that allowing an appeal after a return order would conflict with the purposes of the Hague Convention. This decision implicates issues of comity between nations, and rights of American parents.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (2000) and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a parent may file a petition for return of their minor child/custodian to the child's country of habitual residence if it appears that the child has been wrongfully abducted. Once an Order has issued from the District Court returning the child to the petitioning custodian and an appeal has been filed by the respondent the Circuits are spilt as to whether the return of the child to the country of habitual residence renders the appeal moot.

The Eleventh Circuit, in Bekier v. Bekier, 248 F.3d 1051 (2001), held that such an appeal is clearly moot since the relief sought by petitioner has been granted and the Court had "no authority 'to give opinions on moot questions or abstract propositions ... which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before [the Court].'" Bekier at 1054. The Court provided that no actual affirmative relief could be provided to the appellant. However, this decision and others like it has come under great scrutiny by other Circuits. Specifically the Fourth Circuit, in Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (2003), has held that "[c]ompliance with a trial court's order does not moot an appeal (of a Petition for Return of Custody under the aforementioned Acts) if it remains possible to undo the effects of compliance or if the order will have a continuing impact on future action." Fawcett at 494.

The Fourth Circuit in Fawcett held that even after the return of a child in compliance with the lower court's order that "this Court can [affect the matter in issue]." Id. To consider the merits of an appeal and potentially reverse the lower court's decision would have a considerable effect.

In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit's unfathomable position on this particular matter eliminates the basis and purpose of the appeal process. Whether an appeal of a District Court's ruling on a Petition for Return of Children pursuant to International Child Abduction Remedies Act and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction becomes moot after the child at issue returns to his or her country of habitual residence, as in the Eleventh Circuit's Bekier case, leaving the United States Court system lacking any power or jurisdiction to affect any further issue in the matter or should the United States Courts retain power over their own appellate process, as in the Fourth Circuit's Fawcett case, and maintain jurisdiction throughout the appellate process giving the concerned party an opportunity for proper redress.

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Issue(s)

Whether an appeal becomes moot when a child returns to his or her country of habitual residence in a case involving the

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Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk

Issues

Does a purported collective action become moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff in the case receives a complete offer of judgment from the defendants and all other potential plaintiffs have not yet joined the case?

 

In a putative collective action, Laura Symczyk alleged that Genesis HealthCare Corporation violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by automatically deducting break time from her and other employees’ pay, regardless of whether they performed compensable work during their breaks. Before any other plaintiffs joined the action, Genesis made an offer of judgment for full relief of Symczyk’s claims. Symczyk did not accept the offer, but the district court dismissed the case because the offer of judgment left Symczyk without a personal stake in the litigation. Symczyk argues that she continues to have a personal stake and that the interests of plaintiffs yet to join the action creates jurisdiction. Genesis argues that a complete offer to satisfy a lone plaintiff’s claim renders the case moot. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will decide whether an unaccepted offer of judgment can render a case moot and whether courts may consider the interests of unnamed, hypothetical parties in determining whether the parties have a personal stake in the litigation. The decision will affect collective-action trial practices for both plaintiffs and defendants, including plaintiffs’ use of the discovery process to join class members and defendants’ use of individual offers of judgment to forestall or avoid collective actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s claims.

Between April and December 2007, Laura Symczyk worked as a Registered Nurse at a healthcare facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 190 (3d Cir.

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United States v. Sanchez-Gomez

Issues

Can an appellate court hear an interlocutory appeal regarding a lower court’s pretrial defendant-shackling policy, and can an appellate court rule on the appeal despite the mootness of the appeal’s underlying claims?

This case will have important repercussions for two seemingly disconnected areas of the law: the methods available for defendants to challenge courtroom procedures and the delineation of the jurisdictional boundaries of courts of appeals. The issue in this case is whether the Ninth Circuit had constitutional and statutory authority to hear an interlocutory appeal challenging a policy that all defendants appearing in pretrial proceedings must wear physical restraints. On the one hand, the United States argues that the Ninth Circuit lacked statutory authority because the appeal fell into neither the collateral-order exception nor the ambit of the All Writs Act, and lacked constitutional authority because the claims were moot. On the other hand, Sanchez-Gomez et al. contend that the Ninth Circuit had statutory authority under either the collateral-order exception or the All Writs Act, and had constitutional authority because their claims fell into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. The case will either open or close a novel avenue for criminal litigants to challenge courtroom policies.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals erred in asserting authority to review respondents’ interlocutory challenge to pretrial physical restraints and in ruling on that challenge notwithstanding its recognition that respondents’ individual claims were moot?

In 2013, Respondents Rene Sanchez-Gomez, Moises Patricio-Guzman, Jasmin Isabel Morales, and Mark Ring all appeared in “full restraints” in pretrial proceedings in the Southern District of California. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, No. 13-50561 (9th Cir.

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Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski

Issues

Does a subsequent change of an unconstitutional policy moot plaintiffs’ claims that the policy violated their constitutional rights when their only remaining claims are for nominal damages?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a college’s change of an unconstitutional speech policy moots a claim that the original policy violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights when their claims are only for nominal damages. Petitioner Chike Uzuegbunam argues that a claim for nominal damages is not mooted by a subsequent policy change because nominal damages serve to vindicate plaintiffs’ past injuries. Uzuegbunam also argues that nominal damages serve an important function because they are distinct from declaratory judgments and there are no alternative remedies for victims of unconstitutional government conduct. Respondent Stanley C. Preczewski counters that nominal damages merely serve a prospective purpose, and therefore nominal-damages claims are moot when a constitutional violation is not reasonably expected to continue. Preczewski also argues that when a constitutional violation is completed, nominal damages only serve to provide declaratory relief and that other remedies, such as declaratory judgments, injunctions, and compensatory damages, can be used to address government violations of a victim’s constitutional rights. This decision will impact how governments respond to constitutional challenges and the administrative burdens imposed on the courts and government defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a government’s post-filing change of an unconstitutional policy moots nominal-damages claims that vindicate the government’s past, completed violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional right.

 

Chike Uzuegbunam and Joseph Bradford were both students attending Georgia Gwinnett College (“GGC”) who shared similar religious beliefs and a desire to express those beliefs publicly. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski at 3–4. In July 2016, Uzuegbunam was distributing literature that promoted his religious beliefs in an outdoor plaza on campus when a campus police officer approached him. Id. at 3.

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