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QUI TAM

Graham County Soil v. United States

Issues

Does the Federal Claims Act jurisdictional bar apply only to publicly disclosed federal reports, audits, and investigations, or does it apply to publicly disclosed state reports, audits, and investigations as well?

 

Respondent, the United States ex rel. Karen Wilson ("Wilson"), brought a qui tam action against two North Carolinian counties, Graham and Cherokee (collectively the “Counties”), for allegedly filing fraudulent reimbursement claims with the federal government. The Counties argue that, under the False Claims Act, no court has jurisdiction over Wilson's suit, because the State of North Carolina had previously publicly disclosed the information on which Wilson relies in her suit. Wilson counters that the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar refers only to federal reports, audits, and investigations. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether, under the False Claims Act, a publicly disclosed state audit and investigation may preclude jurisdiction over a qui tam action.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an audit and investigation performed by a State or its political subdivision constitutes an “administrative . . . report . . . audit, or investigation” within the meaning of the public disclosure jurisdictional bar of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).

In February 1995, petitioners, Graham County and Cherokee County (collectively, the “Counties”), applied for federal assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (the "EWP Program"), a United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) federal disaster assistance program. See United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 528 F.3d 292, 296 (4th Cir.

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Additional Resources

·      Legal Information Institute: Graham County Soil v. United States (I)

·      Wex: Law about False Claims Act

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Rockwell International Corp. v. U.S.

Issues

Did the Tenth Circuit incorrectly decide in favor of a whistleblower on the basis of a lenient construction of the False Claims Act’s definition of an “original source”?

 

The federal False Claims Act permits private citizens and company employees, known as relators, to bring suit in the name of the United States (known as a qui tam suit) against a corporation that has committed fraud against the government, and to share in any judgment thereon. James Stone, a former engineer for Rockwell International, brought a qui tam suit against Rockwell for environmental health and safety violations at the Rocky Flats weapons facility. However, Rockwell claimed that Stone was ineligible to bring suit because the knowledge he had was not sufficiently “direct and independent” to qualify him as an “original source” under the statute. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will resolve a split among the circuit courts regarding precisely what level of “direct and independent knowledge” a potential qui tam plaintiff must have to qualify as an original source. The Court’s decision will ultimately affect any business that contracts with the federal government or participates in government programs, and could make it either substantially easier or more difficult for potential whistleblowers to bring suit under the False Claims Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Tenth Circuit erred by affirming the entry of judgment in favor of a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act, based on a misinterpretation of the statutory definition of an “original source” set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)?

The Rocky Flats weapons production facility, near Denver, Colorado, manufactured plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons from 1953 to 1988. Between 1975 and 1989, Petitioner Rockwell International operated the site for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under a Management and Operating contract. See U.S. v.

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Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States, ex rel. Daniel Kirk

Issues

Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), do FOIA responses produced by a federal agency qualify as publicly disclosed reports, which are barred from use in claims of fraud against the government under the False Claims Act?

 

Daniel Kirk, a Vietnam War veteran, filed a qui tam suit against Schindler Elevator Corporation ("Schindler"), alleging that Schindler violated the False Claims Act ("FCA") through its failure to comply with The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustments Assistance Act ("VEVRAA"). Section 3730(e)(4) of the FCA expressly states that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over claims based upon “public disclosure of . . . administrative . . . report[s] . . . or investigation[s].” Kirk's FCA claim utilized information requested from the Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the case, holding that information obtained through a FOIA request constitutes a “report” or “investigation” under the FCA, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. In doing so, the Second Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s method of focusing upon the dictionary definitions of “report” and “investigation” and instead adopted the Ninth Circuit’s method of considering the “nature of the [FOIA] document itself.” Schindler appealed, claiming that FOIA responses, by virtue of being produced by federal agencies, are "reports” or “investigations" and therefore fit the FCA public disclosure bar. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether a federal agency's FOIA disclosure is a "report" or "investigation" under Section 3730(e)(4).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal agency's response to a Freedom of Information Act request is a "report ... or investigation" within the meaning of the False Claims Act public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).

In 2004, Respondent Daniel Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor ("DOL") against his former employer, Petitioner Schindler Elevator Corporation (“Schindler”), alleging that Schindler had violated the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act ("VEVRAA”). 

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State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. United States ex rel. Rigsby

Issues

What are the consequences of violating the False Claims Act’s seal requirement?

Cori and Kerri Rigsby sued State Farm Fire & Casualty Company under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), alleging that State Farm defrauded the federal government while paying out claims related to the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. The district court and the Fifth Circuit found that the Rigsbys’ attorney violated the FCA’s seal requirement by distributing documents to several news outlets, but declined to dismiss the Rigsbys’ suit after applying a three-part balancing test to evaluate whether dismissal was warranted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over what standard governs the decision to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the FCA’s seal requirement. The United States, on behalf of the Rigsbys, points to the FCA’s test, structure, legislative history, and purpose, to argue that only discretionary sanctions apply to a violation of the seal requirement. State Farm maintains that a violation of the seal requirement must result in mandatory dismissal of the suit, rather than a discretionary balancing test. This decision may affect the prevalence of qui tam FCA suits and the government’s ability to recover from defrauding parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

What standard governs the decision whether to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the False Claims Act’s seal requirement, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)?

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”) participated in the National Flood Insurance Program’s “Write Your Own” Program. See United States ex rel. Rigsby v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 794 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2015). This program allows private insurance companies to offer government-backed flood insurance policies to geographic areas where it would otherwise not be economical to do so.

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United States, ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc.

Issues

Does the government have the authority to dismiss a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act after declining to proceed with the action at the outset; and, if so, what showing must it make to have the action dismissed?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the government may dismiss a qui tam action over the objections of the relator when the government chooses not to proceed with the action at the outset. Jesse Polansky argues that the text, structure, history, and purpose of the False Claims Act indicate that when the government chooses not to pursue an action at the outset of a case, the relator has the exclusive right to decide whether to proceed with an action or request its dismissal. Polansky maintains that the government cannot retain its right to dismiss after it declines to proceed at the outset. Executive Health Resources, Inc. counters that the False Claims Act allows the government to dismiss a qui tam action at any time because the Constitution vests executive power in the President. Executive Health Resources contends that delegating executive power to relators, as Polansky suggests, would be unconstitutional. The case has significant policy implications because litigating qui tam actions is costly for all parties involved, and a ruling for unrestricted governmental dismissal authority could chill relators from bringing future qui tam actions, whereas a ruling for limited government dismissal authority could burden the government with meritless qui tam actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the government has authority to dismiss a False Claims Act suit after initially declining to proceed with the action, and what standard applies if the government has that authority.

Respondent Executive Health Resources, Inc. (“EHR”) is a “physician advisor” company that certifies health care services as having been properly billed for Medicare reimbursement. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res. at 380–81.

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Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar

Issues

Should the scope of the False Claims Act be expanded to include noncompliance of staffing regulations?  

 

The U.S. Supreme Court will consider whether the False Claims Act (“FCA”) applies to fraudulent misrepresentation in payment claims due to violations of staffing regulations for medical centers. Petitioner Universal Health Services argues that the basis for liability stemming from the FCA does not allow for the implied certification theory, under which liability may be based on merely filing for payment, and thus should merit reversal of the judgment below. On the other hand, respondent Escobar contends that UHS knowingly and materially committed fraud under the FCA provisions notwithstanding the absence of an express fraudulent statement. This case will determine whether businesses that provide services to the government will be subject to FCA liability and will establish the range of remedies available to qui tam litigants under the FCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Is the “implied certification” theory of legal falsity under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., viable?
  2. If the “implied certification” theory is viable, can a government contractor’s reimbursement claim be legally false under that theory if the provider failed to comply with a statute, regulation, or contractual provision that does not state that it is a condition of payment; or does liability for a legally false reimbursement claim require that the statute, regulation, or contractual provision expressly state that it is a condition of payment?

Yarushka Rivera (“Rivera”), the daughter of relators Carmen Correa and Julio Escobar (“Escobar”), was a member of MassHealth, Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, and in 2007 received mental health support at Arbour Counseling Services (“Arbour”), which was owned and operated by petitioner Universal Health Services (“UHS”). See 

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