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Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds

Issues

Should Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 be construed as a statute of repose, and, if so, is it permissible to toll a statute of repose until the disclosure requirements of Section 16(a) have been met?

 

Vanessa Simmonds brought suit under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to recoup profits realized by Credit Suisse and other investment banks in the course of engaging in short swing trading. The defendants engaged in such trading as underwriters during a series of lucrative initial public offerings in the early 2000s. Section 16(b) limits lawsuits to a two-year period following the date on which profits from trading were realized. In this case, Credit Suisse argues that the two-year time limit enunciated in Section 16(b) begins at the time the defendant realized profits, and constitutes a period of repose, which should not be extended under any circumstance. Simmonds argues that the Section 16(b) time limit should be interpreted in context with Section 16(a), which mandates disclosure in SEC filings of private transactions. Simmonds contends that, when read together, sections 16(a) and 16(b) suggest the time limit should toll until the plaintiff learns of the transaction. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the disclosure policies of investment banks and the time period during which directors can be held liable for short-swing purchases and sales.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the two-year time limit for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), is subject to tolling, and, if so, whether tolling continues even after the receipt of actual notice of the facts giving rise to the claim.

In this case, respondent Vanessa Simmonds challenges the conduct of fifty-four underwriters in their activities related to a series of Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”) of equity securities in the stock market boom of 1998 to 2000. See 

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Additional Resources

Wex: Statute of Repose

Wex: Statute of Limitations

Securities and Exchange Commission: Securities Exchange Act of 1934

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Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.

Issues

Does the statute of limitations for judicial review of an adverse determination on a disability benefits claim begin to accrue at the time specified by an insurance policy or when the claimant files an ERISA disability claim?

Julie Heimeshoff was a longtime Wal-Mart employee who became ill and applied for long-term disability benefits from the Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company (“Hartford”). Hartford denied her claim and Heimeshoff sued under ERISA to challenge the insurance determination. The district court granted Hartford’s motion to dismiss because Heimeshoff had missed the filing deadline, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court will now consider when the statute of limitations starts to accrue for judicial review of an adverse determination on a disability benefits claim. Heimeshoff argues that a bright-line rule is necessary under federal law so that potential plaintiffs will be able to understand the filing deadline. Hartford contends that the statute of limitations on an ERISA disability claim should be determined by an insurance plan’s accrual provision unless the provision is unreasonable. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the administration of long-term disability plans. A bright-line rule would lead to more compressed time periods in which claimants would be required to seek judicial review, while a reasonableness rule would lead to possible inefficiencies and inconsistencies in administration. The Court’s decision will impact insurance companies’ control over the statute of limitations on review of ERISA disability claims and the period during which disabled employees can seek relief through the courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When should a statute of limitations accrue for judicial review of an ERISA disability adverse benefit determination?

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Facts

Petitioner Julie Heimeshoff worked for Respondent Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) from 1986 to 2005 and eventually became Senior Public Relations Manager. See Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2012 WL 171325 at 1 (D. Conn. 2012). During that time, Heimeshoff developed symptoms of fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome, and lupus. See id. These symptoms worsened until Heimeshoff could no longer work in June 2005.

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Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States of America, et al.

Issues

Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied Holland’s decision when it ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for claims brought under the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”)? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied the Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida when the D.C. Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin’s (“the Tribe”) 1996–1998 claims for contract support costs. See Brief for Respondent at i. The Tribe argues that despite the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the Holland standard for equitable tolling as rigid and mechanical, the Holland standard should instead conform to the Federal Circuit standard, which is a comprehensive and unified analysis that also follows the proper interpretation of HollandSee Brief for Petitioner at 5–6. In contrast, the United States argues that the elements within a comprehensive analysis do not provide an independent basis for equitable  tolling,  and that equitable tolling should not excuse the Tribe’s miscalculations and legal misunderstandings. See Brief for Respondent at 21–22, 48.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner: Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied this Court’s Holland decision when it ruled that the Tribe was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 Respondent: Whether the court of appeals misapplied this Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida, when it ruled that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Respondent at I

Between 1995 and 2004, the Tribe provided healthcare services to its members pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 764 F.3d 51, 54 (U.S. App. 2014).

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Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States of America, et al.

Issues

Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied Holland’s decision when it ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for claims brought under the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”)? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied the Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida when the D.C. Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin’s (“the Tribe”) 1996–1998 claims for contract support costs. See Brief for Respondent at i. The Tribe argues that despite the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the Holland standard for equitable tolling as rigid and mechanical, the Holland standard should instead conform to the Federal Circuit standard, which is a comprehensive and unified analysis that also follows the proper interpretation of HollandSee Brief for Petitioner at 5–6. In contrast, the United States argues that the elements within a comprehensive analysis do not provide an independent basis for equitable  tolling,  and that equitable tolling should not excuse the Tribe’s miscalculations and legal misunderstandings. See Brief for Respondent at 21–22, 48.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner: Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied this Court’s Holland decision when it ruled that the Tribe was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 Respondent: Whether the court of appeals misapplied this Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida, when it ruled that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Respondent at I

Between 1995 and 2004, the Tribe provided healthcare services to its members pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 764 F.3d 51, 54 (U.S. App. 2014).

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Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., et al.

Issues

Does the filing of a putative class action serve, under the American Pipe rule, to suspend the three-year time limitation in § 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the claims of putative class members?

The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) requires companies issuing a security to create offering documents that adequately outline the security’s risks to potential investors. Section 13 of the Securities Act requires a plaintiff to file a Securities Act claim within three years to allege the existence of material misstatements or omissions in these offering documents. In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, however, the Supreme Court held that many statutory time limits could be “tolled” or stopped when plaintiffs are potential members of an existing class action dealing with the same legal claim. This case should decide whether or not the time limitation in § 13 is the sort of limit subject to this “American Pipe rule.” The decision has implications for the efficiency of courts and stock issuers alike.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the filing of a putative class action serve, under the American Pipe rule, to suspend the three-year time limitation in § 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the claims of putative class members?

Respondent IndyMac MBS, Inc. (“IndyMac”) is an issuer of a type of security known as mortgage pass-through certificates. See In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation, 718 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

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