adverse possession
Adverse possession is a doctrine under which a trespasser, in physical possession of land owned by someone else may acquire valid title to the property.
Adverse possession is a doctrine under which a trespasser, in physical possession of land owned by someone else may acquire valid title to the property.
What is the scope of probable cause for trespass under the Fourth Amendment, and was this law so clearly established prior to the arrests involved as to entitle the police officers to qualified immunity?
The Supreme Court will decide whether a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect for trespassing under the Fourth Amendment when the owner of a house says that the suspects do not have authority to enter and the officers find circumstantial evidence of trespass, but the suspects claim that they thought that they had authority to be there. Additionally, the Court will decide whether, if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects in this case, the law of probable cause for trespass was unclear enough to entitle the officers to qualified immunity. Petitioners District of Columbia, et al. argue that an officer, in order to be able to make timely probable cause determinations, should not be required to exactly determine the criminal intent of a suspect; at the very least, the District of Columbia argues, officers should not be required to rely on a suspect’s claims of an innocent mental state. The District of Columbia also argues that the law was not “clearly established” in this area and so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Respondents Theodore Wesby, et al. argue that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects for trespassing because the suspects indicated that they thought that they had permission to be in the home and, thus, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. This case will address the scope of the probable cause standard for trespass claims under the Fourth Amendment and will clarify the standard for qualified immunity.
Police officers found late-night partiers inside a vacant home belonging to someone else. After giving conflicting stories for their presence, some partiers claimed they had been invited by a different person who was not there. The lawful owner told the officers, however, that he had not authorized entry by anyone. The officers arrested the partiers for trespassing. The questions presented are:
Early in the morning on March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers responded to a complaint of illegal activity occurring in a vacant house. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 at 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). When the officers entered the house, they saw “scantily-clad” women who they believed were “stripping” for other guests of the party.
Prima facie is Latin for "at first sight,” or “on the face of it.”
Trespass is knowingly entering another owners’ property or land without permission, which encroaches on the owners’ privacy or property interests. There are many laws relating to trespass.
Can 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which prohibits a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter, be enforced on a portion of a military installation that is subject to a public roadway easement?
John Apel was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which prohibits the reentry of persons barred from a military installation. The Ninth Circuit overturned his conviction, interpreting § 1382 as requiring the military’s exclusive control over the area, which did not exist here because the area was subject to a public easement. The United States disputes the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1382 and argues that the military need not have exclusive possession or control of an area for a military installation commander to exclude a civilian trespassing. According to the government, it is sufficient that the easement be under the jurisdiction of the military. The United States also argues that § 1382 is a content-neutral restriction that does not violate the First Amendment. Apel responds that § 1382 requires that the military have exclusive control and possession of an area and that the area be used for a military purpose to be considered a “military installation” under the statute. Apel also argues that his conduct is protected under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court’s decision will help determine the scope of the military’s power in relation to easements on their property. It may also affect the scope of First Amendment protections afforded soldiers and others who would protest the government on or near military installations.
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which prohibits a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter, may be enforced on a portion of a military installation that is subject to a public roadway easement.
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California has two state highways that run through the base, Highway 1 and Highway 246. See Brief for Respondent at 3. The military base is considered closed, meaning that entering the base is only possible through guarded areas.