probable cause

Camreta v. Greene; Alford v. Greene

Issues

1. Prior to questioning a child regarding possible sexual abuse, must law enforcement agents first obtain a warrant, or are they permitted to proceed without a warrant, provided that the public interest in conducting the investigation outweighs any impact that the questioning has on the liberties of the individual?

2. Is the Supreme Court authorized to review the legal basis of a lower court opinion that objected to the petitioners’ actions, even though the court ultimately decided in favor of the petitioners on qualified immunity grounds?

 

When the Oregon Department of Human Services received a report of alleged abuse against a nine-year old child, a caseworker and police officer decided to interview the child at school, without parental consent or a warrant. After the charges against the child's father, Mr. Greene, were dropped, the child’s mother, Mrs. Greene, sued the caseworker and officer for violating her daughter's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search or seizure, arguing that probable cause is a necessary prerequisite to interviewing children about their alleged sexual abuse because such interviews may cause irreparable harm to the children when the allegations are unfounded. The caseworker and officer argue that reasonableness is the proper standard because it would be difficult to obtain probable cause when the child is often the only witness to the abuse. The Court's decision will likely clarify whether probable cause or reasonableness is the proper standard for interviewing a child who is the alleged victim of abuse without parental consent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Camreta

1. The state received a report that a nine-year-old child was being abused by her father at home. A child protection caseworker and law enforcement officer went to the child's school to interview her. To assess the constitutionality of that interview, the Ninth Circuit applied the traditional warrant/warrant-exception requirements that apply to seizures of suspected criminals. Should the Ninth Circuit, as other circuits have done, instead have applied the balancing standard that this Court has identified as the appropriate standard when a witness is temporarily detained?

2. The Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the interview in order to provide "guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting child welfare within the confines of the Fourth Amendment[,]" and it thus articulated a rule that will apply to all future child-abuse investigations. Is the Ninth Circuit's constitutional ruling reviewable, notwithstanding that it ruled in petitioner's favor on qualified immunity grounds?

Alford

Does the Fourth Amendment require a warrant, a court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances before law enforcement and child welfare officials may conduct a temporary seizure and interview at a public school of a child whom they reasonably suspect was being sexually abused by her father?

In 2003, Nimrod Greene was arrested after F.S., a seven-year old child, informed his parents and investigators that Mr. Greene had inappropriately touched him twice. See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). In connection with the ensuing investigation, F.S.'s mother told investigators that Mr. Greene's wife, Sarah Greene, said that she did not like her daughters, S.G.

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Case v. Montana

Issues

Do police officers need to show probable cause to enter a home without a warrant to render emergency aid, or is reasonable suspicion that an emergency is occurring sufficient?

Court below

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they enter a home without a warrant but with a reasonable belief that an emergency is occurring, rather than probable cause. William Trevor Case argues that the framers’ intent and America’s commitment to privacy demand extending the probable cause standard from criminal searches to warrantless entries under the emergency aid exception. In response, the State of Montana argues that the plain text of the Fourth Amendment suggests that probable cause is not required to make a warrantless entry during a potential emergency. The case touches upon important questions regarding the balance between public safety and privacy interests.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches of their homes. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

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Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio

Issues

May a plaintiff bring a § 1983 suit alleging malicious prosecution on account of baseless charges, even if one or more of the charges was supported by probable cause?

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether Jascha Chiaverini’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the City of Napoleon, Ohio may proceed, although some of the charges filed against Chiaverini were based on probable cause. Jascha Chiaverini argues that state common law governs his lawsuit, and that as such the charge-specific rule, in which any baseless charge allows a § 1983 to proceed, applies. The City of Napoleon argues that Petitioner presents a false binary between the “any-crime” rule and the charge-specific rule that leads to a framework that is incompatible with the intent and meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This case has implications for the viability of malicious prosecution suits filed under § 1983 and the reach of Fourth Amendment protections against baseless charges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, under which a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause, or by the “any-crime” rule, under which probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.

Plaintiff Jascha Chiaverini is the manager of Diamond and Gold Outlet, a jewelry store owned by co-plaintiff Chiaverini, Inc. and located in Napoleon, Ohio. Jascha Chiaverini, et al. v. City of Napoleon, et al. at 2. On November 16, 2016, Chiaverini purchased jewelry items from Brent Burns but was later contacted by David and Christina Hill, who claimed the jewelry was stolen. Id.

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City of Hays v. Vogt

Issues

Does the prosecution’s use of allegedly compelled statements at a pretrial hearing, not at a criminal trial, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause?

This case asks the Supreme Court to review the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, particularly the clause’s applicability to probable cause hearings. Petitioner, the City of Hays, argues that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only during a criminal trial and that they should therefore not be civilly liable for the introduction of an incriminatory statement during a pretrial hearing. Respondent Matthew Vogt contends that his Fifth Amendment right applies to an entire “criminal case,” which includes pretrial proceedings. This case may resolve questions about the scope of defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights, as well as issues relating to judicial efficiency and internal workplace investigations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when allegedly compelled statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial.

In 2013, Matthew Vogt, a police officer in the City of Hays, Kansas, applied for a new position with the City of Haysville’s police department. See Vogt v. City of Hays, Kansas, 844 F.3d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 2017). In his application to the City of Haysville police department, Vogt acknowledged that he had kept a knife which he had obtained while working as a Hays police officer. See id.

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Devenpeck v. Alford

Issues

Whether a police officer can arrest a person for one offense, but later charge that person with another offense even if the charged offense is wholly unrelated to the arresting offense?
Whether a law or doctrine is "clearly established" when several courts have differing opinions?

 

In Devenpeck v. Alford, the Supreme Court will consider two issues. First, the Court will settle a conflict among the circuit courts in determining how precise an officer's stated reasons for probable cause must be to the actual arresting offense. Two judicial circuits find an arrest reasonable if, based on an objective assessment by a reasonable officer, there is probable cause to arrest for any offense. On the other hand, at least five judicial circuits find an arrest to be reasonable only if there is probable cause to arrest for crimes "closely related" to the crime or crimes articulated by the arresting officer. The Court will likely find the narrow approach more appealing and allow arrests for only "closely related" offenses. Second, the Court will decide if the law regarding arrests for "closely related" offenses was clearly established at the time of Alford's arrest. The Court will likely find the law was not settled, and thereby overrule the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alford v. Haner, et al. 333 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2003).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest?
 
For the purpose of qualified immunity, was the law clearly established when there was a split in the circuits regarding the application of the "closely related offense doctrine," the Ninth Circuit had no controlling authority applying the doctrine, and Washington state law did not apply the doctrine?
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District of Columbia v. Wesby

Issues

What is the scope of probable cause for trespass under the Fourth Amendment, and was this law so clearly established prior to the arrests involved as to entitle the police officers to qualified immunity?  

The Supreme Court will decide whether a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect for trespassing under the Fourth Amendment when the owner of a house says that the suspects do not have authority to enter and the officers find circumstantial evidence of trespass, but the suspects claim that they thought that they had authority to be there. Additionally, the Court will decide whether, if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects in this case, the law of probable cause for trespass was unclear enough to entitle the officers to qualified immunity. Petitioners District of Columbia, et al. argue that an officer, in order to be able to make timely probable cause determinations, should not be required to exactly determine the criminal intent of a suspect; at the very least, the District of Columbia argues, officers should not be required to rely on a suspect’s claims of an innocent mental state. The District of Columbia also argues that the law was not “clearly established” in this area and so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Respondents Theodore Wesby, et al. argue that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the suspects for trespassing because the suspects indicated that they thought that they had permission to be in the home and, thus, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. This case will address the scope of the probable cause standard for trespass claims under the Fourth Amendment and will clarify the standard for qualified immunity.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Police officers found late-night partiers inside a vacant home belonging to someone else. After giving conflicting stories for their presence, some partiers claimed they had been invited by a different person who was not there. The lawful owner told the officers, however, that he had not authorized entry by anyone. The officers arrested the partiers for trespassing. The questions presented are:

  1. Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest under the Fourth Amendment, and in particular whether, when the owner of a vacant home informs police that he has not authorized entry, an officer assessing probable cause to arrest those inside for trespassing may discredit the suspects’ questionable claims of an innocent mental state.
  2. Whether, even if there was no probable cause to arrest the apparent trespassers, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in this regard.

Early in the morning on March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers responded to a complaint of illegal activity occurring in a vacant house. See Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 at 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). When the officers entered the house, they saw “scantily-clad” women who they believed were “stripping” for other guests of the party.

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Florida v. Harris

Issues

Did the Florida Supreme Court err in creating an additional evidentiary standard that the state must satisfy before an alert from a well-trained drug-detection dog may suffice to establish probable cause?

Court below

 

Officer Wheetley stopped Clayton Harris’s truck for expired tags and searched the vehicle after his drug-detection dog alerted to the driver-side door handle. Officer Wheetley recovered precursors to methamphetamine, and at  trial  Harris alleged that Officer Wheetley did not have probable cause, or a reasonable basis, to search and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Harris argues that training alone cannot establish a dog’s reliability because there are no standard certification standards for drug-detection dogs, and dogs are likely to be influenced by outside factors that could affect their reliability. The State of Florida asserts that certification of a dog should be sufficient to prove  reliability,  and to provide  adequate  basis for a search. This decision implicates concerns of individuals’ right to privacy in their possessions and raises concerns of costs associated with increased evidentiary burdens in drug possession cases, which could hamper the states’ ability to prosecute drug offenders.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Florida Supreme Court has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the established Fourth Amendment precedent of this Court by holding that an alert by a well-trained narcotics detection dog certified to detect illegal contraband is insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of a vehicle?

In June 2006, Officer William Wheetley stopped Clayton Harris’s truck because its tags had expired. See Harris v.&n

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Additional Resources

E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. & Michael Brady, Florida Supreme Court Erred in Drug Dog Ruling, JURIST-Hotline, Apr. 23, 2012, http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/04/getchell-brady-florida-canines.php.

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Florida v. Harris (11-817)

Court below

Officer Wheetley stopped Clayton Harris’s truck for expired tags and searched the vehicle after his drug-detection dog alerted to the driver-side door handle. Officer Wheetley recovered precursors to methamphetamine, and at trial Harris alleged that Officer Wheetley did not have probable cause, or a reasonable basis, to search and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Harris argues that training alone cannot establish a dog’s reliability because there are no standard certification standards for drug-detection dogs, and dogs are likely to be influenced by outside factors that could affect their reliability. The State of Florida asserts that certification of a dog should be sufficient to prove reliability, and to provide adequate basis for a search. This decision implicates concerns of individuals’ right to privacy in their possessions and raises concerns of costs associated with increased evidentiary burdens in drug possession cases, which could hamper the states’ ability to prosecute drug offenders.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Florida Supreme Court has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the established Fourth Amendment precedent of this Court by holding that an alert by a well-trained narcotics detection dog certified to detect illegal contraband is insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of a vehicle?

 

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Issue

Did the Florida Supreme Court err in creating an additional evidentiary standard that the state must satisfy before an alert from a well-trained drug-detection dog may suffice to establish probable cause?

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Additional Resources

E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. & Michael Brady, Florida Supreme Court Erred in Drug Dog Ruling, JURIST-Hotline, Apr. 23, 2012, http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/04/getchell-brady-florida-canines.php.

 

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Florida v. Jardines

Issues

Whether police violated the Fourth Amendment by taking a dog that had been trained to alert officers of the presence of illegal substances to a house where the officers suspected, without probable cause, that marijuana was being grown.

Court below

 

After receiving an anonymous tip that Joelis Jardines’ home was being used to grow marijuana, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) officers conducted a warrantless surveillance of Jardines’ home. During the surveillance, a drug detection dog sniffed the exterior of the home and alerted to a smell of marijuana at the front door. Based on this positive alert, among other indications of marijuana production, the officers were granted a search warrant. The search confirmed that the house was being used as a marijuana grow house and Jardines was charged with drug trafficking and grand theft for stealing electricity. Jardines successfully moved to suppress evidence of the dog sniff outside his home by arguing that the sniff constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the canine sniff was not a Fourth Amendment search. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately reversed the appellate court’s decision and held that a dog sniff is a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The State of Florida then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. This decision could affect a crucial method used by DEA agents and police officers to detect and seize illegal substances and will clarify the right held by individuals such as Jardines in preventing invasions of privacy. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause?

On November 3, 2006, the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") received an anonymous tip that home of Respondent, Joelis Jardines, was being used as a marijuana grow house. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla.

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Florida v. Jardines

Issues

Whether police violated the Fourth Amendment by taking a dog that had been trained to alert officers of the presence of illegal substances to a house where the officers suspected, without probable cause, that marijuana was being grown.

Court below

 

After receiving an anonymous tip that Joelis Jardines’ home was being used to grow marijuana, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) officers conducted a warrantless surveillance of Jardines’ home. During the surveillance, a drug detection dog sniffed the exterior of the home and alerted to a smell of marijuana at the front door. Based on this positive alert, among other indications of marijuana production, the officers were granted a search warrant. The search confirmed that the house was being used as a marijuana grow house and Jardines was charged with drug trafficking and grand theft for stealing electricity. Jardines successfully moved to suppress evidence of the dog sniff outside his home by arguing that the sniff constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the canine sniff was not a Fourth Amendment search. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately reversed the appellate court’s decision and held that a dog sniff is a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The State of Florida then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. This decision could affect a crucial method used by DEA agents and police officers to detect and seize illegal substances and will clarify the right held by individuals such as Jardines in preventing invasions of privacy. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause?

On November 3, 2006, the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") received an anonymous tip that home of Respondent, Joelis Jardines, was being used as a marijuana grow house. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla.

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