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The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist

Issues

Must an appellate court vacate a district court’s final judgment as to completely diverse parties if it determines the district court was wrong to dismiss a non-diverse party at the time the case was removed?

 

This case asks the Court to determine whether an appellate court must vacate a district court’s final judgment if it determines the district court erred in dismissing a non-diverse party when the case was removed. The Hain Celestial Group (“Hain”), as Petitioner, argues that the district court had jurisdiction to enter final judgment because the parties before it were completely diverse after Whole Foods, Inc. (“Whole Foods”) was dismissed. Alternatively, Hain argues Whole Foods could be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 as a dispensable party. Sarah Palmquist, Grant Palmquist, and E.P. (the “Palmquists”), as Respondents, argue that Whole Foods remained a part of the litigation until the final judgment, destroying the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Palmquists argue that Hain’s Rule 21 argument is improper and would result in prejudice to them. The outcome of this case could impact forum shopping strategies and increase the resources parties must expend if they must relitigate claims after a final judgment is vacated.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court’s final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.

Grant and Sarah Palmquist (the “Palmquists”) had a son (“E.P.”) in 2014. See Palmquist v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc.at 2. The Palmquists allege that E.P.’s diet consisted of “almost exclusively” products manufactured by Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (“Hain”) during his first two years of life.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Maggie Gardner for her insights into this case. 

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United States v. Texas

Issues

Are states required to suffer direct injuries to sue the federal government? Are the Department of Homeland Security’s September 2021 immigration enforcement guidelines, which authorize discretion to enforce immigration statutes, contrary to federal immigration law or the Administrative Procedure Act, and can a court vacate the guidelines?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether Texas and Louisiana may sue the federal government in federal court despite not having suffered a direct injury from agency action, and whether the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) September 2021 Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (“Guidelines”) violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Court must also decide whether the INA prevents a court from vacating an administrative action under the APA. The United States claims that Texas and Louisiana cannot sue the federal government because the Constitution requires a direct harm, that the Guidelines do not violate the INA because the statutory language accommodates traditional prosecutorial discretion, and that the INA prevented the district court from vacating the Guidelines. Texas and Louisiana counter that they can sue because a direct injury is not required when a state sues the federal government, that the Guidelines violate the INA because the statutory language specifically override prosecutorial discretion, and that the district court properly vacated the Guidelines because it was authorized by the broad statutory language and court precedent and did not conflict with the INA. The Court’s holding will affect the removal for noncitizens, which significantly impacts the social treatment of and rhetoric surrounding noncitizens, government efficiency and accountability, and public health, safety, and stability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law;

(2) whether the Guidelines are contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), or otherwise violate the Administrative Procedure Act; and

(3) whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) prevents the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the guidelines under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

In January 2021, the then-Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a memorandum. Texas v. United States at 2.

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