INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC

Issues

Is an order denying a motion for relief from the automatic stay in a bankruptcy proceeding a final order—and thus immediately appealable—under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), an order denying a motion for relief from an automatic stay in a bankruptcy proceeding is a final order. Petitioner Ritzen Group, Inc. argues that an order denying stay relief is an interlocutory order—and thus not immediately appealable—because it merely affects the bankruptcy claims-adjudication process by determining where the parties can resolve underlying claims. Respondent Jackson Masonry, LLC argues that an order denying stay relief is final and subject to immediate appeal because proceedings deciding motions for stay relief are distinct from the overall bankruptcy proceeding and involve discrete claims, procedural standards, and legal standards. The outcome of this case will have implications on the judicial efficiency of bankruptcy litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an order denying a motion for relief from the automatic stay is a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

On March 21, 2013, petitioner Ritzen Group, Inc. entered into a Real Estate Contract (“the Contract”) with respondent Jackson Masonry, LLC.

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The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist

Issues

Must an appellate court vacate a district court’s final judgment as to completely diverse parties if it determines the district court was wrong to dismiss a non-diverse party at the time the case was removed?

 

This case asks the Court to determine whether an appellate court must vacate a district court’s final judgment if it determines the district court erred in dismissing a non-diverse party when the case was removed. The Hain Celestial Group (“Hain”), as Petitioner, argues that the district court had jurisdiction to enter final judgment because the parties before it were completely diverse after Whole Foods, Inc. (“Whole Foods”) was dismissed. Alternatively, Hain argues Whole Foods could be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 as a dispensable party. Sarah Palmquist, Grant Palmquist, and E.P. (the “Palmquists”), as Respondents, argue that Whole Foods remained a part of the litigation until the final judgment, destroying the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Palmquists argue that Hain’s Rule 21 argument is improper and would result in prejudice to them. The outcome of this case could impact forum shopping strategies and increase the resources parties must expend if they must relitigate claims after a final judgment is vacated.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court’s final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.

Grant and Sarah Palmquist (the “Palmquists”) had a son (“E.P.”) in 2014. See Palmquist v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc.at 2. The Palmquists allege that E.P.’s diet consisted of “almost exclusively” products manufactured by Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (“Hain”) during his first two years of life.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Maggie Gardner for her insights into this case. 

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