WARRANT

Case v. Montana

Issues

Do police officers need to show probable cause to enter a home without a warrant to render emergency aid, or is reasonable suspicion that an emergency is occurring sufficient?

Court below

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they enter a home without a warrant but with a reasonable belief that an emergency is occurring, rather than probable cause. William Trevor Case argues that the framers’ intent and America’s commitment to privacy demand extending the probable cause standard from criminal searches to warrantless entries under the emergency aid exception. In response, the State of Montana argues that the plain text of the Fourth Amendment suggests that probable cause is not required to make a warrantless entry during a potential emergency. The case touches upon important questions regarding the balance between public safety and privacy interests.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches of their homes. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

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Dahda v. United States

Issues

Must a court exclude evidence obtained by wiretapping, solely because the judge issuing the wiretapping warrant exceeded his or her territorial jurisdiction?

In this case the Supreme Court will determine if evidence obtained by wiretapping while investigators were outside the state where the authorizing judge sits is admissible in court. Petitioners Los and Roosevelt Dahda were arrested, charged, and convicted in a conspiracy to distribute over two thousand pounds of marijuana. Most of the evidence used against them was obtained by wiretapping phones. A judge in Kansas authorized the wiretap, including wiretaps both inside and outside Kansas. The Dahda brothers argue that the judge had no authority to authorize interception outside Kansas and that, therefore, the entire warrant is deficient under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and all the evidence obtained from wiretaps cannot be used against them at trial. The Government agrees that the warrant was overbroad, but claims that the warrant was not wholly deficient and thus the Government should be allowed to present the evidence obtained from wiretaps within Kansas. Much is at stake in this case: organizations supporting the Dahda brothers claim a ruling for the Government would undermine personal privacy. The Government disagrees, asserting that no privacy concerns are implicated.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, required suppression of communications that were intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court, pursuant to a wiretap order that permitted interceptions to take place outside the jurisdiction of the issuing court.

Petitioners, twin brothers Los and Roosevelt Dahda (collectively “the Dahda brothers”), joined a drug-distribution network as importers and dealers. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3a, 35a. Los was responsible for driving money from Kansas to California to help a co-conspirator purchase marijuana. Id. at 3a–4a.

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Lange v. California

Issues

May police officers always enter a home without a warrant when they are pursuing a suspect whom they believe committed a misdemeanor?

This case asks the Supreme Court to weigh the privacy interests of individuals under the Fourth Amendment against the government’s interest in enforcing the law. Petitioner Arthur Lange (“Lange”) was arrested in his garage by a police officer who pursued him for violating traffic laws. Though a police officer with probable cause may generally only enter a home after obtaining a warrant, certain exigent circumstances may justify warrantless home entry, including the pursuit of a felony suspect. The United States, in support of affirmance, argues that this warrantless exception should extend to the pursuit of misdemeanor suspects as a category. Lange and Respondent California, both in support of vacatur, counter that a case-by-case exception is more appropriate given the wide variety of misdemeanor offenses. This case has broad implications for individual privacy interests, public safety, and policing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the pursuit of a person whom a police officer has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor categorically qualifies as an exigent circumstance sufficient to allow the officer to enter a home without a warrant.

In the late evening of October 7, 2016, California Highway Patrol Officer Aaron Weikert observed Petitioner Arthur Gregory Lange (“Lange”) playing music loudly and honking repeatedly while driving. People v. Lange at 2. Officer Weikert began to tail Lange and approached within 500 feet of Lange with no cars in between them. Id. Officer Weikert turned on his overhead lights, signaling his intent to conduct a traffic stop.

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Mitchell v. Wisconsin

Issues

Does the Fourth Amendment require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before drawing blood from an unconscious motorist when, under state law, intoxicated motorists have given their implied consent for blood draws?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Fourth Amendment permits police to draw blood from unconscious drivers under a theory of implied consent in lieu of a warrant. Gerard Mitchell, a driver from whom police drew blood while he was unconscious, contends that the Fourth Amendment’s consent exception should not apply because a blood draw is a serious intrusion that calls for a warrant. Wisconsin argues that it has a great interest in addressing intoxicated driving, and it fairly uses an implied-consent statute that allows it to draw blood from unconscious drivers. Mitchell suggests that permitting these warrantless blood draws may seriously threaten privacy rights and open the door to additional forms of warrantless intrusions. Wisconsin warns of the dangers posed by impeding police efforts to remove intoxicated drivers from the road.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In a state with an implied-consent statute for intoxicated motorists, is a warrantless blood draw of an unconscious driver for whom police have probable cause of operating under the influence an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment?

In 2013, the City of Sheboygan Police Department received a report that a neighbor saw Gerald Mitchell, who appeared intoxicated, drive away in a van. State v. Mitchell at 3. The police officers responding to the report found Mitchell walking near a beach. Id. Mitchell was wet, shirtless, covered in sand, unbalanced, and had slurred speech.

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