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misdemeanor

Abuelhawa v. United States

Issues

Whether, if someone uses a cellular phone to buy drugs for personal use, which is a misdemeanor offense, that person can also be charged with a separate felony offense because using the cellular phone facilitated the sale of the drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

Salman Khade Abuelhawa was convicted on felony drug charges under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) for facilitating a drug deal. Abuelhawa bought a small amount of cocaine for personal use, and set up the transaction with his dealer using his cellular phone. The Fourth Circuit found that 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) applied to anyone that facilitated a drug offense with any communication device, regardless of whether the person was the drug dealer or the drug purchaser. The Supreme Court will now interpret the meaning of this statute at the center of a Circuit split, to decide if the use of a cell phone or other communication device should be able to elevate a misdemeanor drug possession to a felony charge.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the use of a telephone to buy drugs for personal use "facilitates" the commission of a drug "felony," in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), on the theory that the crime facilitated by the buyer is not his purchase of drugs for personal use (a misdemeanor), but is the seller's distribution of the drugs to him (a felony).

When Salman Khade Abuelhawa called drug dealer Mohammed Said on his cellular phone, he had no way of knowing that there was a third party listening to and taping their conversations: the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415, 417 (4th Cir. 2008). The FBI suspected that Said was distributing cocaine in the Washington, D.C.

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Lange v. California

Issues

May police officers always enter a home without a warrant when they are pursuing a suspect whom they believe committed a misdemeanor?

This case asks the Supreme Court to weigh the privacy interests of individuals under the Fourth Amendment against the government’s interest in enforcing the law. Petitioner Arthur Lange (“Lange”) was arrested in his garage by a police officer who pursued him for violating traffic laws. Though a police officer with probable cause may generally only enter a home after obtaining a warrant, certain exigent circumstances may justify warrantless home entry, including the pursuit of a felony suspect. The United States, in support of affirmance, argues that this warrantless exception should extend to the pursuit of misdemeanor suspects as a category. Lange and Respondent California, both in support of vacatur, counter that a case-by-case exception is more appropriate given the wide variety of misdemeanor offenses. This case has broad implications for individual privacy interests, public safety, and policing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the pursuit of a person whom a police officer has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor categorically qualifies as an exigent circumstance sufficient to allow the officer to enter a home without a warrant.

In the late evening of October 7, 2016, California Highway Patrol Officer Aaron Weikert observed Petitioner Arthur Gregory Lange (“Lange”) playing music loudly and honking repeatedly while driving. People v. Lange at 2. Officer Weikert began to tail Lange and approached within 500 feet of Lange with no cars in between them. Id. Officer Weikert turned on his overhead lights, signaling his intent to conduct a traffic stop.

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United States v. Castleman

Issues

  1. Does the criminal statute 18 U.S.C § 922(g), which requires a conviction for a predicate domestic violence crime involving the “use or attempted use of physical force” require violent contact?
  2. Does a state misdemeanor for domestic violence, which requires proof of “bodily injury,” qualify for an 18 U.S.C § 922(g) conviction?

In 1996, Congress passed what is now Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18, which criminalizes the possession of firearms by certain individuals. Section 922(g)(9) makes it a federal crime for a person convicted in state court of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm if the misdemeanor involved the use or attempted use of physical force. In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was convicted in Tennessee of misdemeanor domestic assault, which requires proof of causing bodily injury to another. Seven years later, Castleman was indicted for possessing a firearm in violation of Section 922(g)(9). The Supreme Court will address whether Castleman’s conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for Section 922(g)(9) and whether the language “physical force” in Section 922(g)(9) requires violent contact. The Court’s ruling will affect the scope of limitations on domestic violence offenders’ possession of firearms, and may serve as precedent for other misdemeanor offenses which contain the language “physical force.”  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 922(g)(9) of Title 18, United States Code, makes it a crime for any person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to possess a firearm. The phrase “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is defined to include any federal, state, or tribal misdemeanor offense, committed by a person with a specified domestic relationship to the victim, that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(A). The question presented is:

 

Whether respondent’s Tennessee conviction for misdemeanor domestic assault by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to the mother of his child qualifies as a conviction for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

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Facts

In 2001, Respondent James Alvin Castleman pled guilty, in Tennessee state court, to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault in violation of Tennessee Code § 39-13-111(b).

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Voisine v. United States

Issues

Is reckless misdemeanor assault a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under the Gun Control Act?

 

Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“section 922”), to prohibit domestic abusers from obtaining firearms. Section 922 covers individuals convicted for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which includes state misdemeanors that constitute “the use of physical force.” The Supreme Court will consider whether convictions under Maine’s domestic assault law satisfy this predicate offense requirement. Stephen Voisine was convicted under Maine’s domestic assault statute, which criminalizes “the intentional, knowing, or reckless causation of bodily injury or offensive physical contract to another person.” Voisine was then convicted under section 922. But Voisine asserts that common law battery requires a mens rea greater than recklessness and that the “use of physical force” implies intentional conduct. The United States argues that recklessness meets the standard for common law battery, and contends that section 922 would be pointless if it did not cover misdemeanors like Maine’s domestic assault statute. The Court’s decision will affect the ability of misdemeanants to possess firearms and the health and safety of domestic violence victims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a misdemeanor crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9)?

In 1996, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“section 922”). Section 922 prohibits individuals previously convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing firearms or ammunition. See United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 177 (1st Cir.

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Additional Resources

Jess Bravin, Death of an Eagle Hatches Supreme Court Firearms Case, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 30, 2015).

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