writ of habeas corpus

Issues

Carlos Manuel Ayestas brought a state habeas petition after he was sentenced to death in Texas for murder. After the state denied his petition in 2008, Ayestas petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Ayestas requested funding for “investigative, expert, or other services” under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) to help support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Ayestas’s claim and denied his § 3599(f) motion, finding that he had not demonstrated a “substantial need” for investigative assistance. Ayestas now challenges this substantial need test on appeal, arguing that it is inconsistent with the text, history, and purpose of § 3599(f). The Director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Lorie Davis, on the other hand, argues the test is proper in light of the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This case will allow the court to determine the appropriate statutory interpretation of § 3599(f), as well as its applicability to federal habeas proceedings. The case could have significant consequences for the resources available to capital defendants bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

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Gary Cone was convicted and sentenced to death in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, for the murder of two people. Subsequent to Cone’s direct appeal, the state made available documents that both supported Cone’s defense that he was a drug addict at the time of the killings and impeached the testimonies of several witnesses. Respondent Bell argues for the state that Cone is procedurally barred from raising his grounds for relief in a federal habeas corpus review, as state courts already rejected it and Cone failed to properly argue it in the state courts. Petitioner Cone, however, argues that there should not be a procedural bar in this case because he did not receive the new information until his second request for post-conviction review, so the courts erroneously found that his claim had been previously decided. He also argues that it is the federal court’s duty in federal habeas review to examine grounds for relief based on federal law.  The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could implicate the methods by which individuals convicted in state court can litigate their claims, both in state courts and upon federal habeas corpus review. Additionally, the Court’s decision could clarify the roles of state and federal courts in an area of law with implications for the federalist structure.

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Salim Ahmed Hamdan, alleged former aide to terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, challenges the legality of the military commission that seeks to establish its jurisdiction to try him as an alleged enemy combatant in connection with the September 11th attacks. The government responds that the President has the constitutional, congressional, and statutory authority to create military commissions and to use them in the ongoing conflict with al Qaeda. This case involves the critical question of allocation of power among Congress, the President, and the federal courts in the “war on terror.” It also presents issues arising under the 1949 Geneva Convention. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will have to balance the interests of national security versus the preservation and promotion of individual human rights.

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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) prohibits the filing of “second or successive” habeas petitions by state prisoners. Petitioner, Billy Joe Magwood (“Magwood”) and respondent, Warden Tony Patterson (“Patterson”), disagree as to whether Magwood, who received habeas relief from an earlier death sentence, may challenge a subsequent state issued death sentence for the same act. Magwood argues that a habeas petition challenging a new judgment for the first time cannot be “second or successive.” In response, Patterson asserts that Magwood had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the “fair warning claim” in the first habeas petition, and it would be an abuse of the writ and a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to raise the same claim in this subsequent petition. The Eleventh Circuit sided with Patterson and held that Magwood’s claim is part of a “successive” petition under § 2244(b). The Supreme Court must now decide whether a petitioner, who already obtained federal relief from an earlier sentence, may challenge a resentence in a subsequent habeas petition if that petitioner could have challenged the first sentence on the same constitutional grounds now used to challenge the second sentence.

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