Article I of the Constitution of Michigan contains the state’s Declaration of Rights, articulating fundamental guarantees of equality, liberty, and personal autonomy. Three sections are particularly significant are § 2 on equal protection, § 25 on marriage, and § 28 on reproductive freedom.
Does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate the bar on second or successive applications in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), thereby preventing federal prisoners from filing repeat motions to vacate? When a court of appeals denies authorization for a successive § 2255 motion, does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court review, making the courts of appeals the court of last resort for such prisoners?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide two questions about the interpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). First, does 28 U.S.C. § 2255 incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s restrictions on second or successive motions to federal prisoners? Second, are the courts of appeals the final forum for federal prisoners seeking authorization to file such motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e), or can the Supreme Court review these gatekeeping decisions? The Petitioner, Michael Bowe, argues that extending both the restrictions on second or successive motions and the bar on Supreme Court review to federal prisoners goes against congressional intent and creates an unnecessary roadblock to federal prisoner’s claims to be fairly adjudicated by the courts. Kasdin Mitchell, whom the Supreme Court appointed to defend the judgment below because the United States declined to do so, argues that allowing for second or successive motions will burden the courts with unnecessarily and largely erroneous filings. For its part, the United States argues that the bar on Supreme Court review in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) should extend to federal prisoners because they have other avenues, beyond AEDPA, to appeal their convictions. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the fairness of habeas procedures and judicial economy.
(1) Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (2) whether § 2244 (b)(3)(E) deprives this court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under § 2255.
Habeas corpus proceedings allow prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention, but habeas procedures differ for state and federal prisoners. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.
Did the Louisiana State Legislature act unconstitutionally when it created SB8 to remedy a Section 2 violation?
This case asks whether the Louisiana State Legislature’s creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Appellant Press Robinson argues that not only does SB8 comply with both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but that it is a valid and necessary remedy to a particularly dangerous form of racial discrimination. Callais counters that SB8 is a presumptively invalid form of racially based governmental action and is neither narrowly tailored nor furthers a compelling governmental interest. This case raises significant issues about racial discrimination in redistricting, the responsibilities of elected officials to their constituents, and the relationship between the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.
Whether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The Supreme Court first heard this case on March 24, 2025, but later ordered supplemental briefing and reargument. SCOTUSblog. On June 27, 2025, the Court directed the parties to focus on whether Louisiana’s second majority-minority distric
Do police officers need to show probable cause to enter a home without a warrant to render emergency aid, or is reasonable suspicion that an emergency is occurring sufficient?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they enter a home without a warrant but with a reasonable belief that an emergency is occurring, rather than probable cause. William Trevor Case argues that the framers’ intent and America’s commitment to privacy demand extending the probable cause standard from criminal searches to warrantless entries under the emergency aid exception. In response, the State of Montana argues that the plain text of the Fourth Amendment suggests that probable cause is not required to make a warrantless entry during a potential emergency. The case touches upon important questions regarding the balance between public safety and privacy interests.
Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches of their homes. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Connecticut General Statutes Section 54-102b requires that when a defendant is convicted of an offense involving a sexual act, the court must order the offender to undergo testing for HIV and AIDS upon the victim’s request. Testing is to be conducted promptly, and results are provided to both the offender and the victim. The statute is intended to ensure that victims receive timely and accurate health information following sexual offenses, enabling early medical evaluation, preventive treatment, and counseling when needed.
Connecticut General Statutes § 54-86g provides special procedures to protect children under the age of twelve who are testifying in prosecutions for assault, sexual assault, or child abuse. At the request of either party, and with judicial approval, the child’s testimony may be taken in a separate room rather than in open court. The testimony must occur under the supervision of a judge and be televised or recorded for presentation to the jury. The statute authorizes several accommodations to reduce the child’s stress and risk of re-traumatization.
Section 53a-190 defines bigamy as knowingly marrying or purporting to marry another person while already legally married, or knowingly cohabiting as spouses with someone who is married to another. The offense applies whether the subsequent marriage is performed within or outside the state of Connecticut if the parties then live together in the state as spouses. The statute provides several affirmative defenses to prevent conviction where the conduct results from mistake or circumstances beyond the actor’s control.
Connecticut General Statutes Section 53a-192a defines the crime of trafficking in persons and prohibits the use of force, fraud, or coercion to compel another person to engage in sexual conduct, labor, or services in the state of Connecticut. The statute criminalizes recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining another person for the purpose of exploitation.
Connecticut’s prostitution-related statutes under §§ 53a-85 through 53a-89 establish a graduated framework addressing third-party involvement, coercion, and the enablement of prostitution. Section 53a-85 provides the definitional foundation, identifying two primary forms of unlawful conduct: advancing prostitution, which is defined as knowingly aiding, arranging, or causing another to engage in prostitution; and profiting from prostitution, defined as k
Section 53a-82 makes it unlawful for any person eighteen years of age or older to engage, agree to engage, or offer to engage in sexual conduct for a fee. The offense applies whether the act is completed or merely solicited, emphasizing that the exchange of sexual conduct for money itself constitutes the violation. A first offense is classified as a Class A misdemeanor, which is punishable by up to one year in jail, a fine of up to $2,000, or both.
